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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The “Niger Delta” in Nigeria has attracted a great deal of attention
over the years. Among the major reasons for this is the rich natural
endowment of the region. The Niger Delta is reputed to be one of
the world’s largest wetlands, having ecosystems comparable to the
Sundarbans in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and India (Osagie, Ibaba &
Watts, 2009, p. 13). More importantly, it is also rich in crude oil, 
which has become the mainstay of Nigeria’s economy.  
Another major reason for the popularity of the Niger Delta, 
unfortunately, is the frequent conflicts associated with oil
production in the region. Osagie, Ibaba & Watts (2009, p. 9)
observe that though it is rare for Nigeria to be emblazoned on the
front page of the Wall Street Journal, the 9th September 2009 issue
featured a story titled “Delta Farce: Nigeria’s oil mess.” This
chapter, therefore, provides a background to this study and also
conceptualises the research problem. Research objectives and
questions are also presented to define the focus of the study.    
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
There have been several attempts to define the characteristics of
the Niger Delta over the years. Asakitikpi & Oyelaran (1999)
observe that it is a densely populated area in Nigeria. Its
boundaries, as defined by the Nigerian government, extend over
70,000 km. The area makes up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. It
stretches in an East-West direction and extends from South-West
Cameroun to the Okitipupa ridge, forming an apex at the South-
East of the Rivers Niger and Benue confluence.  
According to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 
the Niger Delta includes all the nine oil producing States of
Nigeria: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, 
Ondo, and Rivers States (NDDC, 2006). The UNDP (2006) agrees
with this definition of the area.  The reasons for this grouping were
largely political and they include administrative convenience, 
political expedience, and development objectives (UNDP, 2006). 
Ibaba (2005), however, observes that the inclusion of Abia, Imo, 
and Ondo States in the definition is wrong because the scope of the
region should be defined not by politics, but by geography.  
Ibaba (2005) goes on to say that the definition given by the defunct
Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission
15
(OMPADEC) and the Willink Commission Report, which states
that there are only 6 Niger Delta States, better captures the make-
up of the area. He, nevertheless, notes that with states creation, it is
probable that some Niger Delta communities may have now been
placed in States other than the six widely accepted Niger Delta
States. This current study adopts Ibaba’s description of the Niger
Delta because the focus is on communities with resident oil
activities and shared geographical characteristics.  
The communities in the Niger Delta have settled in the area for
several centuries (Alagoa, 2005). It is inhabited by over 7 million
Nigerians from 20 ethnic groups in about 800 communities (Ibaba, 
2005). According to Atakiti (2004) (as cited in Saiyou, 2006), the
Niger Delta consisted mostly of agrarian communities before the
15th century. Those communities produced commodities such as oil
palm, rubber, sugarcane and fruit trees like mango, banana, 
plantain, and pawpaw. They also engaged in fishing, handicraft
and trading. 
Oil exploration started in Nigeria between 1908 and 1914. The
process was initiated when the German Nigerian Bitumen
Corporation and the British Colonial Petroleum Company began
drilling from the heavy oil seeps in the cretaceous Abeokuta
formation (Nwaobi, 1980; Saiyou, 2006). Consequent on the
16
discovery of only dry holes and particularly the break-out of World
War I, the venture was abandoned. However, interest in oil
exploration was resuscitated from 1937 to 1940 when preliminary
investigation was undertaken by Shell D’Arcy Petroleum
Development Company. This effort also was aborted due to the
Second World War.   
In 1946, the Royal Dutch Shell Group and British Company
replaced Shell D’Arcy, and jointly financed the Shell-BP
Development Company of Nigeria. Exploration continued in the
northern part of the Niger Delta. In 1953, the first evidence of oil
was found at Shell D’Arcy’s Atata-1 well; however, oil was not
discovered in commercial quantity until late 1955 when Shell-BP
made a find in the Tertiary Agbada formation at Oloibiri. More
discoveries were made at Ughelli (Nwaobi, 1980). The first oil
cargo from Nigeria was exported from Oloibiri oilfield in 1958 at
the initial rate of 5,100 barrels a day.  
Nwaobi (1980) notes that the Nigerian government, in 1961, 
granted 10 oil exploration licences to these five companies: Shell-
BP, Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated, Amosea, Texaco and
Nigerian Gulf Oil. The government also commenced discussions
that same year with the Royal Dutch Shell Group and Shell-BP on
the establishment of Nigeria’s first oil refinery. The refinery was
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commissioned in 1965 and was located at Port Harcourt. It is
interesting to note that before the civil war of 1967, Nigeria’s oil
production had already exceeded 152 million barrels a year. 
The Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was set up in May
1971 to be involved in all the phases of the oil industry ranging
from exploration to marketing. Nigeria became the 11th member of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in July
1971. In 1977, the NNOC and the Ministry of Petroleum were
merged after the role of the government in oil management was
rationalized and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) was formed.   
Owing to the demands of the oil industry in Nigeria, NNPC was
re-organized in 1985 into six sectors. This was done to encourage
innovation, efficiency and positive aggressiveness. It is
noteworthy, however, that 25 years after the re-organization, the
objectives are yet to be achieved since oil refineries in Nigeria are
in poor state and the price of the refined product constantly
increases.  In 1988, the Nigerian oil exploration and exploitation
business was opened to private entrepreneurs by the Federal
Government.                 
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Saiyou (2006) notes that the initial disposition of the host
communities to the advent of oil companies in the Niger Delta was
positive.  The discovery of oil in the region and the influx of
transnational oil corporations raised the hopes of the indigenes in
respect of the long awaited development that suddenly seemed
apparent. The author further points out that the discovery of oil
was a welcome development. This was consequent on the general
impression of most Nigerians that the Niger Delta, particularly the
Ijaw territory, was one of the world’s vast wasted wetlands. Hence, 
the host communities readily accepted the oil companies, seeing
them as an opportunity to address long overdue developmental
issues.  
The oil exploration and exploitation processes have, however, 
brought with them the degradation of the environment, thereby
impoverishing the host communities and endangering lives. 
Asakitikpi & Oyelaran (1999) observe that tapping into the oil
reserves requires the construction of rigs, industrial facilities and
power plants; it also involves prospecting, exploring and drilling of
crude mineral oil. They state that all these result in the degradation
and destruction of life-supporting ecological systems and natural
resources.  
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Apart from the destruction of vegetation during the exploration and
production phases, the flaring of associated gas in the process of
extracting the crude oil poses a threat to human life (Asakitikpi &
Oyelaran, 1999). Unburned carbon is often transported into the
homes and working areas of the Niger Delta inhabitants. Also, 
whenever it rains, thick soot is washed off roofs and other surfaces, 
causing water pollution, which is believed to contain harmful
chemicals that affect the fertility of the soil. According to Alao
(2005), some gas flaring sites in the Niger Delta have been in
existence for more than 30 years running 24 hours a day. Hence, 
about 35 million tons of carbon dioxide and 12 million tons of
methane are released in a year (Alao, 2005). 
About 52 years after oil was first discovered at Oloibiri, the Niger
Delta communities have declared war on the oil companies they
once so readily welcomed. This development is due to the extent of
damage suffered by those communities as a result of the oil
exploration processes. They also consider there to be inadequate
compensation by the oil companies and/or gross neglect of the
region by successive Nigerian governments.  
In 2005, the Niger Delta communities sued NNPC, Shell, Exxon, 
Chevron, Total and Agip joint venture companies for failure to
stop gas flaring. According to Environmental Rights Action
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(ERA), though gas flaring had been prohibited under
environmental regulations since 1984, Nigeria still has more gas
flared than anywhere else in the world (F.O.E., 2005). According
to Rizvi (2005), environmentalists estimated the amount of gas
associated with crude oil that is wasted daily at about two million
cubic feet. They stress that the wasted gas contains a mix of toxins
that pose severe health risks to human populations. The author
further notes that child respiratory diseases, asthma, cancer, and
premature deaths are increasingly becoming the lot of a vast
majority of Niger Delta residents, due to the massive gas flaring. 
Hinman (1993), based on the case of the Oil Spill Intelligence
Report commissioned by Greenpeace, an international organization
for environmental conservation and the preservation of endangered
species, states that Shell’s major spills in Nigeria total 7.4 million
litres. It was also revealed in the 10-year spill record that of the
major spills from Shell’s operations in over 100 countries
worldwide, 40% occurred in Nigeria. Hinman also explains that
since the Niger Delta is a catchment area for over 20 river systems, 
six million people depend on its fertile fishing grounds and
agricultural land. Consequently, the spills constantly flow into
nearby streams costing communities their farmland and water
supply. 
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In 1999, the Shell Company was accused of allegedly injecting a
million litres of waste into an abandoned oil well in Erovies. 
According to Ofehe (2008), investigations later revealed that
several people who consumed crops or drank water obtained from
swamps in the area displayed symptoms such as stomach ache, 
cough, vomiting and dizziness. Ninety-three people died from the
illness within two months. The results of independent researches
conducted by three laboratories and two Nigerian universities a
year after the health problem was detected revealed a poisonous
concentration of lead, zinc and mercury in the dumped substance
(Ofehe, 2008).    
Consequent on the complex nature of the problems in the Niger
Delta, members of the community have embraced violence as a
means of curbing the excesses of oil companies, getting at the
government and attracting international attention amongst others. 
According to Ogbogbo (2004), the various joint venture
agreements entered into by the Federal Government and
transnational oil companies indicate an increase in the parties
involved in the crises. The government is perceived to have
abandoned its responsibility to its citizens while the oil companies
are believed to have failed to demonstrate corporate commitment
to the welfare of their host communities.  
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Hence, the oil companies have been categorized as foes, thereby
increasing the number of parties to the conflicts. This view was
corroborated by Ron Van den Berg, the Chairman and MD of
Anglo Dutch Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
when he remarked that since the communities could not attack the
government, they attacked the oil companies instead (“Niger Delta
Situation,” 1999). In 2002, an international observation team
declared the Niger Delta as one of the most volatile regions in the
world (Alao, 2005). Since a higher percentage of the violence in
the area is against the oil companies, it becomes imperative for the
companies to re-evaluate their relationships with their host
communities, that is, re-engineer their community relations
strategies. 
Basking, Aronoff and Lattimore (1997) explain that the
community relations of an organization may be affected by a
variety of factors, ranging from recruitment methods to waste
disposal and energy use. This means that an organization’s
community relations is a function, not only of those things it does
to compensate and placate the community, but also of its ethical
execution of business. For instance, why spend lots of money
building health centers for communities while still poisoning their
air and water?  
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According to Peak (1991, p. 117), “Today, no matter how large, 
small, or important an institution may be, it can be undermined if
its community relations are haphazard”. In an empirical study
carried out by Rim-Rukeh, Ogbemi and Imide (2008, p. 645-657)
in 10 Niger Delta communities, it was discovered that the
community in which there was the highest record of crises, also
had 95% vote that the resident oil company was a bad corporate
organization, owing to environmental degradation occasioned by
incessant oil spillages and poor community relations.   
This appears to establish a clear relationship between the
community relations practice of an organization and its level of
exposure to crises. Ironically, huge sums of money are usually
quoted to have been spent on such communities by oil companies
in the Niger Delta. The study also revealed that some communities
with infrastructure provided by oil companies still had some
degree of crises. This, therefore, brings to the fore the question of
how community relations is practised, rather than whether or not it
is practised at all.  
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The degree of violence in the Niger Delta has become endemic, 
characterized by 33 cases of kidnapping recorded between January
2006 and February 2007, with over 200 victims being mostly
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expatriate oil workers (Africa Masterweb, 2007). There were also
about 12, 770 cases of vandalism, particularly of oil pipelines and
installations, recorded in Nigeria between 2000 and 2007 with
most of them occurring in the Niger Delta (Nwankwo & Ezeobi, 
2008). 
The implications of the Niger Delta crises are too far-reaching to
be ignored: for the inhabitants of this area, there are constant
environmental hazards and security threat, while for the Nigerian
government, over N150.5bn in revenue was lost in eight years
(Nwankwo & Ezeobi, 2008); there was also a drop of more than
20% in oil exports between April 2006 and October 2007 (BBC
News, 2007). The global community is not excluded from the
effect of the crises; the crude oil price on the world market was
raised to $100 per barrel in January 2008 (Arowolo, 2008 as cited
in Alabi, 2008) and later to about $120 a barrel in April 2008.  
The worst hit of all the victims of vandalism and kidnapping, 
however, are the oil companies.  More than 95% of the kidnap
cases mentioned above involved oil workers, and the installations
of oil companies were the target of most of the vandalism. It is
noteworthy, however, that the degree of these occurrences varies
across different oil companies (Aaron & Patrick, 2008). Onua
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(2007) describes it as a sort of revenge on the multinational oil
companies.  
While the oil companies claim to be practising community
relations and to have invested a lot in the development of their host
communities, the communities, on the other hand, either claim that
enough has not been done, or that the efforts have been made
without due consultations with them. The concern of this study is
why the escalation of conflicts rather than abatement between host
communities and oil companies while the companies have in place
community relations strategies to manage the conflicts in the
communities? This question forms the basis for this study. 
  
1.4 OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this study is to examine the community relations
strategies used by oil companies in managing the crises in the
Niger Delta. Considering that most attacks are carried out by
community members, it is plausible that a proper community
relations scheme should be able to nip any conflict in the bud. This
study, therefore, investigates the efforts by oil companies to use
community relations in crises management in the Niger Delta. It
also considers the perception of the communities concerning such
efforts. 
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The specific objectives of this study are therefore to:
1) Examine the extent to which conflict has occurred in
selected Niger Delta communities in relation to oil
exploration by Shell, Agip and Chevron and the causes. 
2) Assess the consequences of the conflicts in the Niger Delta
on the communities and the oil companies.  
3) Identify the community relations strategies used by the oil
companies in conflict resolution in the selected
communities. 
4) Compare the form of community relations strategies
adopted by the selected oil companies. 
5) Evaluate the host communities’ perceptions of the
community relations strategies adopted by the oil
companies. 
6) Investigate the community relations strategies preference
by the host communities for conflict resolution. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In the light of the above, the following research questions were
raised:
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1) How often have conflicts occurred in the Niger Delta
involving Shell, Agip and Chevron and what are the
causes?
2) What are the consequences of the conflicts in the Niger
Delta on host communities and oil companies?
3) What are the community relations strategies employed by
oil companies to avoid/resolve conflicts with host
communities?
4) What structural differences are inherent in the community
relations strategies adopted by the selected oil companies in
the Niger Delta?
5) How do the host communities perceive oil companies’
community relations strategies?
6) What community relations strategies would host
communities prefer in their relationship with oil
companies?  
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study is on community relations strategies used by oil
companies to resolve crises in the Niger Delta. It focuses on the
specific techniques involved in building a good relationship with
host communities. The oil companies under consideration in this
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study are Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), 
Chevron and Agip. The study population is restricted to Omoku
and Obrikom communities in Rivers State and Eruemukohwarien, 
Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State. 
1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY
Although several studies have been carried out on Niger Delta
conflicts and the roles of the oil companies, there is inadequate
information on the specific community relations strategies
employed by oil companies and the preference of host
communities. Community relations is germane to the peaceful
coexistence of the companies and the communities. Failure to give
it its due attention engenders consequences such as the following:
1. Distrust: one of the major causes of conflicts in the Niger
Delta is host communities’ distrust for oil companies. 
Consequent on the poor relationship between the two
parties, host communities believe that oil companies exploit
them by extracting oil from their environment thereby
destroying their natural habitat; but the companies fail to
adequately compensate them.  Hence, any advance from the
companies is seen as placating the communities instead of
dealing with the developmental challenges of the people. 
2. Restiveness: among the causes of the restiveness being
witnessed in the Niger Delta is the ineffective community
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relations of oil companies. The youths who attack the
installations of oil companies and abduct their staff are
members of the communities. A favourable relationship
with host communities would have forestalled this
undesirable situation. This further underscores the
importance of community relations.  
3. Revenue loss: it cannot be overemphasized that oil
companies and the Federal Government have lost a great
amount of revenue as a result of the Niger Delta conflicts. 
While most of the communities remain inhabitable because
of clashes between the youths and military forces, business
also becomes impossible for multinational companies for
fear of attacks. 
From the foregoing, it becomes pertinent to conduct a study that
provides a clear analysis of the community relations strategies
engaged by oil companies and how they can be effectively
employed for conflict resolution. Hence, it is hoped that this study
will expand the frontiers of knowledge in respect to community
relations strategies and also serve as a launching pad for other
researchers in public relations.  
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1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
In the course of this study, some challenges were encountered that
imposed some limitations on this study. One of the major
challenges encountered was the population of Tisun and Kolokolo
communities. A crisis occurred in the communities in 2004, which
led to the death of several indigenes and the displacement of
others. The entire villages were razed down and deserted; and up to
the time of conducting this study, only a few of the natives had
returned home. Hence, only a small sample could be used in the
communities. This problem was, however, managed by using
about 80% of the available population to arrive at a considerable
sample and to ensure a formidable representation of their
perception.  
Also, the study was to include the comparison of the community
relations strategies of Shell, Agip and Chevron. While Shell and
Chevron granted interviews for the sake of this study, Agip
declined. All efforts made to secure an appointment with the
company’s representative, including a letter of introduction from
the Department of Petroleum Resources, NNPC, were stonewalled. 
Hence, the analyses made on the strategies of the oil companies
excluded Agip.  Considering that the information on Agip’s
website was inadequate for the in-depth investigation required for
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this study, only the survey data were used to avoid presenting
misleading information. 
Consequent on the volatility of the Niger Delta at the time this
study was conducted, some initially selected communities
(Ogulaha, Ashaka-Ashimoke and Okpai communities in Delta
State) had to be substituted. This was after due consultation with
both supervisors of this work and advice from some resident Niger
Delta indigenes. The substitution was done systematically by
randomly selecting replacements for the affected communities to
preserve the integrity of the study.  
Due to the tensed situation and the air of suspicion it created, some
of the respondents were reluctant to fill the questionnaire. Some
also insisted on being paid before responding because they were
under the impression that the study was sponsored by the
government or the oil companies. In Tisun and Kolokolo
communities, the women were reluctant to participate in the Focus
group discussions (FGDs) and also to give their names for the
record. This was because they claimed that several people, 
governments, agencies, and even their leaders had come to
interview them and to collect their names without any benefit
resulting from such contacts. This problem was resolved by
presenting proper identification to prove that the study was
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unconnected with any of the suspected sources. The help of
indigenous research assistants was also enlisted to help enlighten
the participants on the purpose of the study. Consequent on the
systematic approach adopted in managing the limitations of this
study, it is believed that the overall quality of the study would not
be undermined.  
1.9 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS
Agip: it is an Italian company with the original Italian name
Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli, which means General Italian Oil
Agency.  It operates in Nigeria as the Nigerian Agip Oil Company
Limited (NAOC). The NAOC is a joint venture operated by Agip
in which NNPC has the larger share (60%).   
CDB: the Cluster Development Board is the administrative body
representing each cluster under Shell’s design of the GMoU. A
cluster is a group of communities that have been categorized based
on specific shared characteristics, and which can jointly decide on
their preferred development direction. 
Chevron: it is an American company which operates in Nigeria
under the joint venture name, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL). In
this case also, NNPC has the larger share of the venture. 
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Communication: in this study, communication refers to the
exchange of relevant information between the oil companies and
the host communities. 
  
Community Relations: it is a specialized arm of public relations
that focuses on building mutual and profitable relationships
between an organization and its host communities. 
Conflict: it is a situation that occurs when the goals, objectives or
values of competing groups- in this case oil companies and host
communities in the Niger Delta- clash and result in aggression, 
which may not necessarily be violent (Cunningham, 1998). 
Cordial Relationship: this is a polite display of friendliness
towards another party. It is based on mutual respect. Cordial
relationship is not one that is necessarily void of conflict, but one
in which provision is made for proper settlement that is acceptable
to all the parties involved.  
Crisis: it is a situation that has degenerated into a critical stage in
which extraordinary intervention is needed to remedy. 
GMoU: the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) was
originated by Chevron in 2005 and was adopted by Shell in 2006. 
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It is an agreement that allows the communities to determine their
own development priorities while the oil companies provide the
funding. 
IRDC: the Itsekiri Rural Development Council represents the
clusters in relating with Chevron in accordance with the
company’s GMoU.  
Issue: It is a matter or an event that has the potential of far
reaching consequences for a public or the publics of an
organization or institution (Folarin, 1998). 
Niger Delta: in this study, Niger Delta refers to the part of
Nigeria’s land mass that stretches in an East-West direction and
extends from South West Cameroon to the Okitipupa ridge, 
forming an apex at the South East of the Rivers Niger and Benue
confluence (Asakitikpi and Oyelaran, 2000). It includes states such
as Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. 
Oil Producing States: this refers to all the states in which oil is
produced in Nigeria. They include the six states that are known as
the Niger Delta states with the inclusion of Abia, Imo and Ondo
States, making nine states in all. 
35
Public Relations: The British Institute of Public Relations’
(BIPR) definition was adopted for this work which says that public
relations is the “deliberate, planned and sustained effort to
establish and maintain mutual understanding between an
organization and its publics,” (Daramola, 2003). 
  
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC): it is the
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, a British/Dutch company, and it
operates in Nigeria. The company is simply known as Shell
Nigeria and is in joint venture with the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and other oil companies.  
Strategies: in this study, they refer to elaborate and systematic
plans that are put in place by the oil companies to resolve conflicts
with their host communities.  
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Several studies have been carried out on Nigeria’s Niger Delta and
the nature of conflicts devastating the region. The activities of
multinational oil companies have also been examined with special
consideration given to the underdevelopment of Niger Delta
communities (Omoweh, 2005; Omoweh, 2010; Akinola, 2008;
Watts, 2009). This chapter presents a review of relevant literature
and the theoretical framework that are germane to this study. The
literature and theories presented here form the bases for the
discussion of findings later in this work.  
2.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CONFLICT
Conflict may be seen as a result of a dynamic relationship between
interested parties, struggling to gain control of valuable resources. 
According to Otite (2001), conflict arises when individuals or
groups in a defined environment pursue divergent goals, interests
and ambitions.  When there is a change in the social environment, 
for instance, the discovery of new resources from development in
the physical environment, a fertile ground for conflict is created. 
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The ensuing conflict usually involves individuals and groups who
are interested in using the new resources to achieve their goals.   
He further observes that conflict is a conscious act in which
personal or group contact and communication are involved. 
The term conflict has been variously defined over the years. 
Among the most common definitions is the one proposed by Coser
(1956, p. 8), which views the term as “A struggle over values or
claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of
the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals”. 
Schelling (1960) also states that “Conflict occurs when competing
groups, goals, objectives, need, or value clash, and aggression, 
although not necessarily violence, is a result” (as cited in
Cunningham, 1998, p. 5). Whereas, Zartman (1991, p. 370)
conceives conflict as “An unavoidable concomitant of choices and
decisions and an expression of the basic fact of human
interdependence.”  
Park & Burgess (1921) argue that conflict is devised to resolve
divergent dualism, and to achieve some sort of unity, 
notwithstanding its propensity to eliminate one of the conflicting
parties. However, conflict should not be perceived as being only a
negative, dysfunctional, or disjunctive process, and a
communication breakdown, as some scholars tend to suggest. 
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Folarin (1998) agrees with the above by stating that conflict is not
necessarily a bad thing; rather, it can be both functional and
dysfunctional. According to him, there is general agreement among
scholars that development is hardly conceivable in the absence of
some form and measure of conflict. He submits by noting that what
matters is the way and manner in which the conflict is handled. 
Though conflict is distinct from competition, struggle, and contest, 
it is similar to them in that it is a normal process of interaction, 
more so in complex societies in which essential resources are
scarce. Donohue & Kolt (1992) explain that when interdependent
people express their differences in the process of achieving their
needs and goals, conflict may arise. The co-existence of the
differences becomes impossible without some adjustment, yet, 
neither of the parties may want to shift ground.  
Sandole (1993) identifies the stages of conflict as initiation, 
escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement and
termination/resolution. He explains that the stages together form a
process, and in that process, peace is the ultimate target of conflict
or perhaps violence. However, the individuals or groups may not
necessarily achieve the initial objective; the conflict may subdue it
through negotiated settlement. It is noteworthy, here, that
Sandole’s view of conflict seems to be influenced by
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functionalism. Functionalists believe that all the parties in a society
are interdependent, therefore, in the case of conflict, the society
evolves a means to resolve it (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). This is, 
however, not always true as can be seen in the case of the Niger
Delta. The conflict seems to be taking the communities farther
from peace. 
Folarin (1998, p. 49) also identifies the following as sources of
conflict:
1) Competition over goals and interests that cannot be shared. In
this context, conflict arises when individuals or groups
compete for interests that are indivisible. For instance, the
struggle to gain control of power may lead to conflict. Nigeria
operates a multi-party political system and the various parties
contest for positions that are indivisible. Major crises arise
when one or more of the parties engage in malpractices or
when they refuse to accept another party as the winner of an
election. 
2) Usurpation or attempt to usurp the goals of one component by
another component of a society. Here, the stronger or more
privileged component violates or denies the rights of the other
component in a bid to achieve its own aim. When this
happens, the deprived party usually attempts to re-establish its
position either forcefully or otherwise. A good example of this
40
is the series of military coup in Nigeria. From the first coup in
1966, which installed Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi as
the Head of State, to the last official one in 1985, which
brought in Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, the military
used its superior power to usurp the goals of the civilian
government. Nigerians agitated for a return to civilian
government and that led to varying degrees of conflicts. 
3) Inconsistencies in goals. While allowance may be made for
pockets of indeterminacies in all human goals, too many
unjustifiable inconsistencies in the goals set by individuals or
groups in a society may become a source of conflict. One of
the major dimensions of the crises in the Niger Delta is the
failure of the government and multinationals to remain
committed to their various promises of development in the
area.  
4) Increasing desire for autonomy or authority by the different
individuals or groups in the community. Conflict ensues when
a former subordinate individual or group attempts to secede or
exert authority over a wider range of issues. Any effort by the
erstwhile dominant party to maintain the status quo may lead
to conflict. In Nigeria for instance, this cannot be better
exemplified than by referring to the civil war. In 1967, the
Southeastern province of Nigeria attempted secession by
declaring the Republic of Biafra. The Federal Government
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resisted this attempt and this led to the war that lasted till
1970.  
5) Scarcity or inadequacy of resources to meet the needs of the
various components. Conflict evolves when the resources that
are required to meet specific needs are scarce, and more
importantly, when the few available are not evenly distributed. 
For instance, the Academic Staff Union of Universities
(ASUU) of Nigerian universities has, on several occasions, 
embarked on strike actions to protest that the educational
sector in Nigeria has been allocated too little money in recent
years. The above scenario describes a conflict based on
scarcity of resources. 
6) Various kinds of communication breakdown. Conflict can
evolve when there is hoarding of information, inefficient
dissemination of information, or even the use of inappropriate
channels of communication within a society. When a few
individuals or groups benefit from available information at the
expense of others, there is bound to be a conflict.  On May 21, 
1994, some angry youths reportedly killed four Ogoni leaders
in Rivers State, for alleged communication with the oil
companies to the detriment of the rest of the community. This
triggered a series of other events, including the execution of
Ken Saro-Wiwa and his comrades.    
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Folarin (1998) further observes that scholars of sociology and
management have proposed several categories of conflict. He
considers his own four-fold categorization to be the simplest.  
According to him, conflict can be divergent, symmetrical, 
complementary, and parallel (Folarin, 1998, p. 50). 
1) Divergent Conflict: a divergent conflict occurs when every
member or group within a society is practically pursuing
individual goals that are different from the corporate goal
of the society, and which are difficult to reconcile with the
extant goals. Consequent on the failure to agree, the society
ends up with not just two factions, but several.  In recent
Niger Delta crises, not all the abductors are nationalists. 
Several groups have been responsible for kidnapping that is
motivated by the possible payment of ransom than with the
struggle for development. In this case, the area ends up
with several factions who may not even be interested in the
resolution of the crises. 
2) Symmetrical Conflict: this type of conflict arises when co-
operation is hindered by the pursuance of the same goal by
two or more separate entities or groups. Due to the
indivisibility of the goal, there ensues a breakdown in the
existing relationship. In April 2006, former Vice-President
Atiku Abubakar, who was also a co-founder of the People’s
Democratic Party (PDP), publicly split with former
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President Obasanjo. Atiku claimed that his action was
based on his disagreement with Obasanjo’s bid for a third
term. Considering that Atiku later contested for the
presidency, it can safely be assumed that his action may
have also been based on the third term agenda’s potential
threat to his ambition.  
3) Complementary Conflict: this type of conflict is a product
of a misinterpretation of the goals or intentions of one party
by another. Though the goals of one group complement
those of the other, they are mistakenly perceived as being
contradictory or opposed to one another. There have been
several clashes between the Nigerian Army and the Police
Force. Though the goals of these forces are complementary, 
the forces erroneously perceive each other as antagonists.  
4) Parallel Conflict: in this type of conflict, each party
reserves the right to make its decision and execute it. For
instance, while labour unions reserve the right to call for a
strike action and manage it, the management of an
organization also has the legitimate right to take all lawful
steps to ensure the security of its property. The extent to
which such rights and powers are exercised, however, 
depends on several factors, such as the personality of each
participant and the historical perspective of the existing
relationships among the parties. Parallel conflicts are
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relatively harmless, in so far as each of the parties
recognises the limits of its rights and powers and does not
go beyond them. 
2.3 THE HISTORY OF CRISES IN NIGER DELTA  
The struggle for relevance in the Niger Delta dates back to the pre-
colonial era. According to Ikalama (2006), the Niger Delta struggle
did not start with the discovery of oil in 1957; but rather due to the
region’s difficult terrain. Ibaba (2005) observes that almost three
quarters of the area are submerged under water made of lagoons, 
creeks, rivers and lakes. What is left is largely swampy land, which
is flooded for about four months in the year as a result of lower
Niger overflow.  
The Niger Delta crisis, therefore, dates back to the early 19th
century when the people agitated for trade terms fair to their
communities. It is noteworthy, however, that the last quarter of that
century was characterized by aggressive European imperialist
economic philosophy of free trade (Alao, 2005). That led to several
conflicts between the Niger Delta people and the Europeans on the
coasts of the region because of the communities’ determination to
maintain their middlemen status. Prominent among those crises
were the Jaja of Opobo’s clash with the British, leading to his
eventual exile in 1886; King Koko of Nembe’s famous Akassa  
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raid on the depot of the Royal Niger Company in 1895; and the
crisis between Nana Olomu, the then Itsekiri Governor of Benin
River and the British in 1895.   
According to Alao (2005), during the colonial era, virtually all the
resources of the colonized people were controlled by the colonial
state. The agitation of the Niger Delta people was principally
focused on drawing attention to their environmental peculiarities
and their requirement for basic infrastructural amenities. 
Colonialism, however, curtailed the initial dominance of the Niger
Delta on the Nigerian economic scene by abolishing the
middleman advantage hitherto enjoyed by the region.  
Moreover, cash crops emerged in other parts of the country, such
as the groundnut pyramids in the Northern Region, and cocoa in
the Western Region, further reducing Niger Delta’s economic
relevance. According to Sir Willinki (as cited in Alao, 2005), due
to its ecological make-up, the Eastern Region is the poorest of the
three regions, and this has engendered the lackadaisical attitude of
both the federal and regional governments towards the lack of
development in the Niger Delta. 
Ikalama (2006) explains that in 1914, after the amalgamation of
the Northern and Southern protectorates, Southern Nigeria was
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administered on the basis of provinces. Hence, the Niger Delta
people were divided among various provinces. Davis (2005) (as
cited in Ikalama, 2006) adjudges that the amalgamation was like a
forced marriage that entrapped the Niger Delta people. For colonial
administrative convenience, the western Ijaws were in Delta
Province and the eastern Ijaws were in Owerri and Calabar
Provinces.   
This classification was, however, not acceptable to the Ijaws of the
Niger Delta who began to request the creation of a separate
province for themselves. In order to put up a formidable front, The
People’s League was established in 1942. The League later
metamorphosed into a full-fledged association which spearheaded
the struggle. The efforts of the association were rewarded when a
Rivers Province was created in 1947. In 1957, the struggle was
taken to the constitutional conference in London. According to
Alao (2005), the people demanded for a separate state within the
federation, arguing that there was:  
No other area in the whole of West
Africa with a physical
configuration like that of Rivers
area. It was unfair that such an area
should not have its own separate
government to harness the energies
of the Rivers and develop its
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unique resources in the interest of
the people who live there (p. 57). 
The people further argued that the administrative headquarters of
various regions to which the Niger Delta belonged could not
appreciate their peculiarities and needs because they were too
distant. The request was, however, denied.  
A fresh dimension to the crises emerged after Nigeria’s
independence. On February 23, 1966, Isaac Adaka Boro, in a bid
to protest the injustice against the Niger Delta people, led one
hundred and fifty one comrades to Tontouban, in the present
Bayelsa State. From that location, he launched a guerrilla war
against the then federal military government (Ikalama, 2006). Boro
had earlier, in January 1966, declared the Niger Delta People’s
Republic, with himself as the Head of State. The Nigerian Police
was engaged and humiliated in a bloody confrontation.  
The Armed Forces of Nigeria, however, went into the war, and
after being held up for a while, defeated Boro and his men on the
12th day. Today, the rebellion is known in Nigeria’s political
history as “The 12 Day Revolution” (Watts, 2009). Nwajiaku
(2006) notes that Boro was succeeded, in the struggle for self-
determination and resource control, by Ken Saro-Wiwa and the
Ogoni people. Though the federation’s revenue allocation has been
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continually revised since 1967, the increase has been far below the
demand of the Niger Delta (Mustapha, 2000). 
2.3.1 The Political Dimension of the Niger Delta Crisis
According to Omoweh (2010), the Niger Delta crisis is the crisis of
the Nigeria state, that is, its policy in respect to natural resources
and the mode of surplus extraction from the mining sector. He
explains that the crisis is a political one and its origin can be traced
to “the path the state took to development inclusive of its type of
capitalist development in the mining sector” (p. 12).  
Omoweh (2010) describes the Nigerian state as the political
leadership of the country. He considers it ironic that the tiny
fraction of the hegemonic political class, which lead the nation’s
development and controls the state political power, is naturally
interested in perpetuating itself and reproducing its class rather
than thinking of the people and their wellbeing. Consequent on the
need for the state to survive before pursing development, it devised
some strategies to protect itself, which includes the adoption of
defensive radical posture that is driven by pretence to be interested
in the wellbeing of the people, whereas, it is to side with capital to
exploit them. 
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The crisis ensued as a result of the contention between the
dominant class, which struggled for power and resources to
survive, and the subordinate groups in the society who also
claimed their right to survival. Omoweh says that the crisis is made
more pronounced by the state’s mode of extraction of surplus from
the mining sector. He explains that the state uses its political power
“to amass wealth, because of its weak productive base” (Omoweh, 
2010, p. 14). The individuals entrusted with the management of the
state use the political office to accumulate profit, rather than to
invest in entrepreneurship and development. 
The author also observes that the first task of the state, after the
independence of a nation, is usually to establish its political control
over the country and its natural resources. After this, it formulates
and enacts legislations that would permit its model of capitalism in
the natural resources sector, as well as establish public institutions
to administer the surplus extraction. This crystallizes the state’s
ultimate aim of dominating the economy of the nation.  
The unrestricted manner through which the Nigerian state acquire
land and exploit its content betray its failure to recognise that the
land and its resources constitute common resources. According to
Omoweh (2010, p. 17), the resources:
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are not characterized territorially or an ad
hoc aggregation of people or group as an
entity, but by crucial ontological factors, 
notably its availability across generations
past, present and future, and that, they help
create and re-create the social production
and reproduction of people. 
The disposition of the state towards the land and it resources such
as forestry, wetlands and wildlife led to the depravation of the
people in the Niger Delta. Omoweh (2010, p. 17) notes that though
the legislations of the state provided the people in the Niger Delta
with a usufruct rights over their land (which was only the right to
use it), just like people in other parts of the country, the right was
automatically revoked whenever oil was explored from the land.  
Considering that the mining blocks were residential areas, 
farmland, communal fish farms and wetlands and also sacred
bushes amongst others, the communities were not only deprived of
their means of sustenance, but also of their sociocultural heritage. 
Omoweh opines that the state, in joint venture with foreign
oil/mining capitals, regard the acreages mainly as minefields, 
where the sole interest is to extract the minerals with little or no
consideration for the wellbeing of the environment and the people
(Orubu, Odusola, & Ehwarieme, 2004). In the words of Omoweh
(2010, p19):
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In effect, it is a misnomer to talk of
environmental degradation in the oil-
producing communities. For, the entire oil-
producing communities in the Niger Delta
have been turned into a minefield as evident
in the continuous flaring of gas for 24 hours
in the past 50 years. Yet, the inhabitants of
the oil-producing areas are deemed to have
no legal basis to protest the relatively
reckless manner with which the state, SPDC
and other operating oil companies are
‘shelling’ their environment and lives. This
has fired the aggression of the people
against the state and oil companies.  
Akinola (2008) agrees with the above assessment by saying that
the Nigerian state relies on oil as the main stay of its economy, 
whereas, the communities where it is extracted generally suffer
poverty, neglect, environmental degradation and even the denial of
their fundamental human rights (Naanen, 1995; Akinola, 2009).  
Nafzinger (2009, p. 69) enumerates the Niger Delta environmental
problems as a result of the oil industry as follows:
1. Damage to the mangrove ecosystem: this engendered the
loss of fuel wood, fish and other aquatic host organisms. 
This also led to the reduction of control and protection
against floods, storms, and erosion. 
52
2. Destruction of lowlands, wetlands and other
environmentally sensitive areas: natural water courses were
blocked and there was disruption of seabed and river
channels as a result of dredging for pipeline installations
and the construction of oil wells. 
3. Pollution of air, surface water and groundwater: these
include the destruction of forest and farm land as well as
vegetation and human settlement due to the oil companies’
wells, fields, pipelines, flow stations, refineries and
destructive practices, such as gas flaring and increase in
leaded vehicle exhaust emission. 
4. Decreased water from safe sources: less than half of the
communities have access to safe drinking water due to the
increase in polluted rivers, lakes, ponds and other untreated
surface water, including unprotected wells and boreholes. 
5. The effects of pollution on the diversion to marginal farms, 
fishing waters and also the cutting down of forests. 
6. Oil spills and blown pipelines: these include the accidental
and deliberate incidences that have led to the degradation
of the forests, contamination of food, killing of fish and
vegetation and the destruction of natural resources
necessary for local livelihoods. 
7. Water organisms and the atmosphere are affected by
natural gas flare, which are 75% waste, and leaks that emit
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hydrocarbons, thereby causing subsidence and sediment, 
and also contribute to acid rain. 
8. Saltwater is diverted into freshwater as a result of the
construction of some canals; thereby leading to the
destruction of the latter’s ecology. 
9. Public facilities, houses and economic assets are threatened
by erosion in the coastal communities.  
10. Shortage of dry and relatively well-drained land. 
11. Water degradation causing harm to human health as a result
of waste discharge from oil operations into the land and sea
(UNDP, 2006). 
2.3.2 Oil Dimension of the Crisis
In February 2007, Nigeria celebrated fifty years of oil exploration, 
but Agagu and Adu (2008) note that observers have opined that in
spite of Nigeria’s oil wealth, the performance of the sector has not
been impressive. Aiyetan (2008) cited Rilwan Lukman, the former
Minister of Petroleum in Nigeria and the former President of
OPEC, to have said that oil is both a blessing and a curse in
Nigeria.  
In the same vein, Ezeobi (2008) describes Nigeria’s years of oil
exploration as 50 depressing years of oil. Agagu & Adu (2008)
observe that only few individuals and companies have benefited
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from oil so far, while several other communities and millions of
people have been underdeveloped and impoverished. They further
argue that there has been unprecedented development in several
communities due to the activities of the oil industry.  
The oil industry has in no small measure helped to propel other
industries since the time oil assumed great ascendency in
industrialization. Among the countries that have benefited from the
oil industry are Dubai, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Britain
and Singapore, among others. Although Nigeria has also benefited
from the industry through oil boom in the global market, the Niger
Delta, which forms the bedrock of the country’s oil exploration
and exploration, has no semblance of development which can be
linked with the oil industry.  
In 1969, Nigeria’s military government under the leadership of
General Gowon abrogated the 1914 Colonial Minerals Ordinance, 
thereby opening a fresh chapter in the state-oil bond by formally
transferring the control and ownership of oil to the state. Nigeria
proceeded to join OPEC in 1971 and in the same year established
its own oil industry, acquiring up to 60 per cent equity ownership
in all operating oil companies.  
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According to Olorode (1998), more than 90 per cent of Nigeria’s
export earnings accumulated from the sales of crude oil, yet the
Niger Delta is neglected. He states that most roads in Ogoni land, 
for instance, where they are available are in deplorable shape. He
considers it ironic that the same oil that made a positive impact on
the Nigerian State, also made a negative impact on the Niger Delta, 
its source, due to the indelible marks of the adverse consequences
of oil exploration. 
The effect of oil exploration on the Niger Delta environment was
not realized until years later. According to Soremekun & Obadare
(1998), although the commercial shipment of oil from the Nigerian
coast started since 1958, the havoc being wreaked on the
environment by the oil companies was not realized until about
thirty years after. They further explain that massive environmental
pollution has been engendered by the oil companies in their
petroleum operations. For instance, there have been several
pipeline leakages, well blow-outs and spillages, having severe
effects on land, water and other ecological elements. One can say
that the extent to which oil is explored and taken away from the
Niger Delta is commensurate with the devastation left in its wake. 
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Due to the negative effects of the operations of oil companies in
the Niger Delta, the erstwhile crises in the region took up a new
dimension. According to Oloruntimilehin & Ayoade (2002, p. 16):
Most of the conflicts have arisen from
complex environmental problems, and a long
history of neglect and social development of
peoples who have seemed helpless watching
their land and water resources continually
devastated by the intense exploitation for
petroleum and gases without deriving any
appreciable benefits by way of investment in
their own development.  
The Niger Delta communities decidedly began to attack oil
companies and their installations in order to attract attention to the
plight of the region. Ikalama (2006) identifies four phases of the
Niger Delta struggle:
Phase 1: Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the
communities, still confident in the state and its judiciary, 
sought redress through the courts. They demanded
adequate compensation and also appealed to the state and
Federal Governments to mediate between them and the
oil companies. Desired results were not achieved through
this approach because the oil companies ignored the court
rulings that were in favour of the communities. When
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compensations were paid by the companies, they were
petty compared to the efforts invested and the harm
caused; besides, such compensations were delayed for
several years. These led to frustration in the communities. 
Phase 2: This phase extended from the mid-1980s to the 1990s and
it was characterized by a more action-oriented approach. 
In addition to lawsuits, the people also engaged in
peaceful demonstrations, occupation of flow stations, and
prevention of workers from working, among others. This
approach, also, was not effective as the companies turned
the law enforcement agents against the people.  
Phase 3: From the mid-1990s to 1998, the actions of the Niger
Delta communities began to evolve into violent protests. 
This is possibly connected to the move by the Nigerian
government to engage military force in restraining the
communities. During this era, late Ken Saro-Wiwa
championed the cause of the Niger Delta people, 
particularly the Ogoni community, until he and his
comrades were executed in 1995 by the late Gen. Sanni
Abacha’s regime. 
Phase 4: From 1998 till date, the Niger Delta has become an
endemic, fully fledged crises-infested region. There have
arisen several militant groups that resort to kidnapping, 
vandalism, extortion, etc. 
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Watts (2009) recounts that a pipeline explosion in 2005 ushered in
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta’s (MEND)
call for the international community to evacuate from the Niger
Delta. MEND issued an ultimatum that was to expire by February
12th, after which violators would face violent attacks. Two weeks
after, nine workers employed by Willbros, an oil servicing
company, were kidnapped, with the group claiming responsibility. 
The action was allegedly carried out to retaliate an attack by the
Nigerian military on a community in the Western Delta. More than
fifteen Nigerian soldiers were reportedly killed, while between
May and August 2006, there was an average of three kidnappings
per month. 
Citing the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS)
report, Watts (2009, p.31) confirms that 123 hostages were taken
and 42 attacks were carried out on oil installations between
January 2006 and March 2007. He also makes reference to the
Nigerian National Petroleum Company’s (NNPC) 2003 reports, 
which estimated 400 vandalisms on company facilities each year
between 1998 and 2003. The report also claimed that the number
increased to 581 between January and September 2004, with over
$1 billion oil losses annually.  
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There were nineteen attacks on foreign oil operations in the first
six months of 2006, costing over $2.187 billion lost in oil
revenues, which the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)
claimed represented 32% of the entire revenue generated by the
country that year.  While the Nigerian government claimed that
$6.8 billion oil revenue loss was recorded between 1999 and 2005, 
the managing director of Shell Nigeria further claimed in
November 2006 that the loss of revenue, consequent on the unrest
and violence in the Niger Delta, was $61 million per day, making a
total of $9 billion since January 2006. The author sums up that the
estimated loss of revenue by the Nigerian government between
2006 and 2008, as a result of insurgency, was $45.5 billion (Watts
2009, p.31).  
2.3.3 Critical Issues on the Niger Delta Crises
Mbembe (2001) raises the question as to why oil is so frequently
the epicenter of violence. Watts (2009), in an attempt to answer
this question, says that in states in which oil is a national resource, 
the states’ geography and the centralization of oil revenue through
the state joint venture usually combine to create new sorts of
governable spaces. These spaces are characterized by a ferocious
struggle of access and control of rent.  
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Ako, Okonmah & Ogunleye (2009, pp. 111-112) critically analyse
two conflict eras in the Niger Delta; the oil palm era and the crude
oil era. They draw four parallels between the two eras as follows:
1. Both palm oil and crude oil are significant to the global
industrial process. Following the industrial revolution in
Europe, palm oil became highly sought after because it was
required to process the lubricant for the maintenance of
industrial machinery. It was also used in the production of
domestic products such as soaps and margarine.  On the
other hand, the crude oil is the major energy source in the
contemporary world. Its uses include the fuel for airplanes, 
cars, home heating and lubricants for home and industrial
uses. 
2. There is similarity between the parties to the conflict in
both periods. The parties to the trade during the palm oil
era included the local communities that established
themselves as middlemen in the trade, European interests, 
as represented by international capital, and the Federal
Government of Nigeria. Also, in the crude oil era, the
stakeholders include the host communities, foreign capital
and the Federal Government. Another similarity is that the
government and the foreign capital in both eras cooperated
to protect their economic interests through the exploitation
of the region. 
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3. There is a similarity between the causes of conflict in both
eras. The underlying factors to the conflict in the palm oil
and crude oil eras were issues related to indigenous
recognition and participation of the people in the Niger
Delta (Okonta, 2000).  
4. In both eras, the state used repressive means to suppress the
restiveness of Niger Delta inhabitants. During the palm oil
era, the government used its controlled security agencies, 
which included the military, to continually protect the
interests of the foreign capital. For instance, the British
naval forces, under the instruction of Royal Niger
Company, attacked and leveled the trading city of Brass, to
maintain the company’s monopoly over the palm oil trade, 
which the town was known for (Bassey, 2006). Again, the
Human Rights Watch (1999) presents a catalogue of similar
examples in which the Nigerian security forces and oil
companies collaborated to suppress the resistance of the
local communities. 
2.3.4 Amnesty in the Niger Delta
On the 25th of June, 2009, the President of Nigeria, late Umaru
Musa Yar’Adua, announced the Federal Government’s plan to
grant amnesty to Niger Delta militants (“Will Amnesty Bring
Peace,” 2009). The plan was to help restore peace to the region, 
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which had been volatile with militancy since 2006. It was a 60-day
plan, lasting from June 25th to October 4th 2009, and it was to see
the militants disarm and accept presidential pardon.  
At the initial stage, the militants did not seem to trust the
government. In fact, some groups argued that amnesties were only
offered to convicted criminals and their members could not be
described as such. There were also some internal contentions
among the militants as to who would accept the government’s offer
and why. Gradually, the militants started to respond to the offer;
first the commanders and then their loyalists. 
The amnesty period expired on October 4th without an extension of
time, even though the militant pressed for this. If the reports of the
government and media were anything to go by, the programme
was a success. In fact, the Nigerian government had already started
to count the dividends of the amnesty programme. For instance, 
militant attacks in the region since 2006 reduced oil production
from Nigeria’s OPEC quota of 2 million barrels per day to 1.3
million. But Nigeria’s Defence Minister between 2009 and 2010, 
Godwin Abbe, reported that barely a month after the amnesty
programme, production rose to 1.8 million barrels per day. Zimbio
(2010) reports that as at October 4, 2010, more than 5,000 former
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militants, who had embraced the Federal Government’s amnesty in
2009, had been rehabilitated.  
Also, Timi Alaibe, the then adviser to the President of Nigeria on
the Niger Delta, claimed that 5,292 ex-militants, who were
retrained at the July camp, were certified to have imbibed the
principles of non-violence. Hence, they had been sent to undergo
vocational training both in Nigeria and abroad. The number of the
former militants that were granted amnesty by Former President
Yar’Adua was above 20, 000 (Zimbio, 2010).
2.4 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are also known as Trans-
National Co-operations (TNCs) and Multinational Enterprises
(MNCs). For the sake of this study, however, we will adopt MNC. 
Pease (2003) describes MNCs as private, for-profit organizations
having commercial operations and subsidiaries in two or more
countries. A further description was given by Bennett (1999, p. 
162), who says MNC is a business having “Significant investments
in several foreign nations, which derives a substantial part of its
income from foreign operations, and which maximizes its profits
on the global rather than national level,” (Wall & Rees, 2004;
Bertlett & Ghoshal, 2000).  
64
Rugman (2006), however, observes that it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether or not a firm is an MNC because multinationals
often downplay the fact that they are foreign owned. This
observation is also valid in the Nigerian context, because the
subsidiaries of major oil multinationals, like Royal Dutch Shell, 
Agip and Chevron, adopted names such as Shell Petroleum
Development Company (SPDC) or simply Shell Nigeria, Nigerian
Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC) and Chevron Nigeria Limited
(CNL) respectively. The latter set of names shows both the
multinationals’ desire to identify with Nigeria and the need to
reflect their joint venture with the Nigerian government through
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).  
Bennett (1999, p. 162), considering how elusive the definition of
MNCs can be, enumerates the various benchmarks that can be used
to identify MNCs. According to him, the company must:
1. Produce its products abroad as well as in the headquarters
country. This is in contrast with merely distributing the
products abroad.  
2. Operate in a certain minimum number of nations, for
instance six.  
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3. At least a minimum percentage of its income (eg 25%)
must be derived from foreign operations. 
4. Possess a certain minimum ratio of foreign to total number
of employees. 
5. Have a management team who possess geocentric
orientation. 
6. Directly control foreign investment, instead of merely
holding shares in foreign companies. 
By the above criteria, it is needless to say that Shell, Agip and
Chevron, the oil companies under study, are multinational
corporations. Rugman (2006) reports the United Nations’
revelation that there are over 60, 000 MNCs in the world, with
only the largest 500 accounting for 80% of the world’s foreign
direct investments. In spite of the overwhelming influence of the
MNCs on world economy, there have been contentions between
their advocates and their critics. 
The advocates of the MNCs have argued that they are agents of
change as well as progress, and they help in creating a new world;
a world of wide economy based on “Rationality, efficiency and
optimal use of resources,” (Bennett, 1999). They insisted that
among the benefits of the host countries are plants and equipments, 
which they otherwise would not have owned, equipments they
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would not have had access to and skills as well as know-how
necessary for the operation, which would have, otherwise, been out
of reach.  
Another benefit that was identified is the local recruitment of
junior managers, which helps to create a pool of managerial
experience in local communities that can be transferred across a
wide range of industries. Considering the argument above, it can
be admitted that the Niger Delta has benefitted, to some extent, 
from the presence of the oil companies. 
On the other hand, critics of multinational corporations also
present a strong argument to support their position. First, they
argue that influence of MNCs on the political sphere of the host
country has a destabilizing effect. They identify five major
activities of the companies that can jeopardize the nation, they are:
1.   Supporting regressive regimes: the oil companies in
Nigeria have been accused of collaborating with the
government to suppress the communities in the Niger Delta
(Akinola, 2008; Ogbogbo, 2004). One of the major
incidents in Nigeria that boosted this accusation was the
execution of Ken Saro-wiwa and his other Ogoni comrades. 
There was a popular opinion that Shell was instrumental to, 
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or at least supportive of the military government of late
Gen. Abacha in the execution. The assumption was further
reinforced by Shell’s swift announcement to continue with
its $4.3 billion LNG project, just three days after the
execution (Adefemi, 1998).   
2. Paying bribes to secure political influence: in the Niger
Delta, it is believed that the oil companies pay off the
individuals they either identify as threats, or has major
influence on the rest of the communities. Adefemi (1998)
reports an interview with an individual who admitted he
became a “small millionaire” by establishing the Council
for Concerned Indigenes (CCI) specifically to secure
personal gratification from the oil companies. Edafejirhaye
& Edafejirhaye (2008) also cite an investigation which
revealed that oil companies connive with some individuals
in the oil industry and security outfits to promote illegal
bunkering activities. 
3. No respect for human rights: the Civil Liberty Organization
(2002) narrates an incident that occurred in 1999 in one of
the communities in the Niger Delta. The youths in the
community shut down Agip’s operation due to alleged high
level of pollution and degradation of the environment. The
company reportedly dispatched a combined team of navy
and army personnel to the community, resulting in the
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disappearance of 15 people, and the arrest of the traditional
ruler. Another example of the abuse of human rights was
given by Adefemi (1998). According to him, Shell
headquarters in London decided in 1993, as documented by
a memo, to monitor the activities of Ken Saro-wiwa in
respect of his Ogoini struggle to “avoid unpleasant
surprises;” Ken was arrested 16 days later. This exemplifies
the human rights challenges in the Niger Delta.  
4. Paying protection money to terrorist groups. 
5. Destabilizing national governments of which they don’t
approve. 
The critics of MNCs also argue from the environmental
perspective. Among the accusations leveled against them are:  
1. Depletion of natural resources too quickly
2. Pollution of the environment
3. Failure to pay compensations for environmental damages
4. Causing harmful changes in local living conditions
5. Having little regard to the risks of accidents causing
environmental catastrophe. 
The above represent some of the major issues that the oil
communities are contending with, and the bases for some of their
company-community struggles. 
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2.4.1 Major Multinational Oil Corporations in the
Niger Delta
There are several multinational oil companies in Nigeria, however, 
for the purpose of this study, we shall only focus on Shell, Agip, 
and Chevron. 
2.4.1.1 Shell Nigeria (SPDC)
Shell Nigeria is a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell plc, which
has its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands, and its registered
office at the Shell Centre in London, United Kingdom. According
to the Global 500 list, Shell is the largest energy company and the
second company in the world as measured by revenues.  The Royal
Dutch Shell Group was created as a result of the merger between
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and
Trading Company Ltd of the United Kingdom in February 1907. 
The merger was necessitated by the need to compete globally with
John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which was then the
predominant US petroleum company. According to the terms of
the merger, 60% of the new group was given to the Dutch partner
while the remaining 40% went to the British. 
Prior to the merger, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company was a
Dutch company that was founded by Jean Baptise August Kessler
and Henri Deterding in 1890, at the time King William III of the
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Netherlands granted it a royal charter for Working of Petroleum in
the Dutch Indies. Shell, on the other hand, was a British transport
and trading company founded in 1897 by two brothers, Marcus
Samuel and Samuel Samuel. The initial commission of the
company was eight oil tankers for the purpose of transporting oil. 
Shell took control of the Mexican Eagle Petroleum Company in
1919, while in 1921, Shell-Mex Limited was formed, which
marketed products using the “Shell” and “Eagle” brands in the UK. 
As a result of economic difficulties, among other reasons, Shell-
Mex merged its UK marketing operations with the operations of
British Petroleum in 1932, resulting in the creation of Shell-Mex
and BP Ltd. The new company traded for 43 years before the
brands separated in 1975. 
In 1936, the Royal Dutch Shell Group founded Shell D’Arcy, 
which was the first Shell Company to operate in Nigeria, hence, 
the company started business in Nigeria in 1937. The company
was granted Exploration Licence in November 1938, which
allowed it to prospect oil throughout Nigeria. Not until January
1956 did the company drill its first successful well at Oloibiri, in
the present Bayelsa State, in the Niger Delta, where oil was
discovered at commercial quantity. The first oil shipment from
Nigeria was moved in February 1958, and by April 1961, Shell’s
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Bonny Terminal was commissioned, which was followed by the
commissioning of Shell’s Focados Terminal in September 1971. 
Other historic landmarks of Shell Nigeria include the first
Participation Agreement that was signed in April 1973, through
which the Federal Government of Nigeria acquired 35% shares in
the oil companies; second Participation Agreement signed in April
1974, through which the government increased its equity to 55%;
third Participation Agreement signed in 1979, that saw the
government, under the auspices of NNPC, increase its equity to
60%; and also the August 1979 Participation Agreement in which
BP’s share holding was nationalized and NNPC acquired 80% of
the equity, leaving Shell with 20% ( Shell, n.d.).   
  
2.4.1.2 Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC)
Agip is an Italian company with the original Italian name Azienda
Generale Italiana Petroli, which means General Italian Oil Agency.  
It is an automotive gasoline and diesel retailer that was established
in 1926. The process that birthed the company started in 1924, 
when there was the famous affair Sinclair Scandal. A US oil
company, Sinclair Oil, entered into a 50 year long agreement with
the Italian Ministry of National Economy that led to it being issued
a permit to conduct oil research in the country.  
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Had the agreement been upheld, Sinclair and the Italian State
would have entered into a joint venture with 40% of the capital
coming from the State’s property, Sinclair Oil incurring the entire
expenditure, and 25% of the profits going to the Italian State. The
agreement was, however, controversial because the opposition
suspected the government of corruption. 
Consequent on the turn of events, the Government of the Kingdom
of Italy issued a royal decree on April 3, 1929, which ordered the
establishment of Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (Agip, n.d.). 
The company was created to conduct all activities involving
industry and the commerce of petroleum, also created in form of
joint stock companies. 
2.4.1.3 Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL)
Chevron Corporation is an American multinational energy
corporation with its headquarters in San Ramon, California, and
has active operations in more than 180 countries. The company
engages in every aspect of the oil, gas and geothermal energy
industries, which also includes exploration and production. 
Traditionally, Chevron traces its roots to the oil discovery in Pico
Canyon, north of Los Angeles. As a result of the discovery, there
was a formation of the Pacific Coast Oil Company in 1879, which
was Chevron Corporation’s oldest predecessor.  
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Initially, Chevron was known as Standard Oil of California, or
SoCal, which was formed in the midst of the antitrust breakup of
John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company in 1911. Saudi
Arabia granted SoCal a concession in 1933 to find oil, and it was
found in 1938. SoCal discovered the world’s largest oil field in
Saudi Arabia in the early 1950s. In 1984, Standard Oil of
California merged with Gulf Oil, which was the largest merger in
history as at the time. SoCal divested many of Gulf Oil’s operating
subsidiaries under the antitrust regulation and sold some Gulf
subsidiaries as well as a refinery located in eastern US.  
Afterwards, Standard Oil of Californian changed the name to
Chevron Corporation. Chevron merged with Texaco in 2001 to
form ChevronTexaco. The label was changed back in May 2005 to
simply Chevron, after which it merged again with Unocal
Corporation in August 9, 2005. Consequent on Unocal
Corporation’s extensive South East Asian geothermal facilities, 
Chevron became the biggest supplier of geothermal energy in the
planet (Chevron, n.d.).  
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2.4.2 Multinationals and Corporate Social
Responsibility
Seitel (2007) observes that more and more organizations are
beginning to acknowledge their responsibilities to the community.  
Those responsibilities include helping to prevent pollution, 
providing jobs for minorities, enforcing policies that are in the
interest of all employees and generally enhancing everyone’s
quality of life. Hence, social responsibility can be defined as a
concept whereby organizations consider the interests of society by
taking responsibility for the impact of their activities on
stakeholders such as customers, employees, shareholders, 
communities, and the environment.  
An aspect of corporate social responsibility that has, in recent
times, gained attention in academic discuss is community
involvement. Bronn (2006) explains that community involvement
is all about building a relationship between an organization and its
immediate environment. 
There are two general descriptions of community, and they are the
narrow and the broad descriptions. Carroll & Buchholtz (2000)
describe community in terms of the immediate locale of the
organization, which includes the town, city or state in which it
operates. Cannon (1994), on the other hand, not only equate the
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state with the community, but also acknowledges that the
community of an organization has been broadened, sometimes to
include the region, nation, and even the world. This current study
will, however, associate with Carroll and Buchholtz’s description
of community, since the major focus is the host communities of the
oil companies. 
Carroll and Buchholtz (2000) opine that firms have positive impact
on the community in two major ways. First, they donate the time
and talents of their managers and employees for community
service, and second, they contribute to the communities
financially. Grunig and Hunt (1984), in their early work, define a
firm’s community activities as either expressive, used to promote
itself and show goodwill, or instrumental, used to improve the
community or to make working there easier. 
Bronn (2006, p. 310) states that the community is often the
headquarters of the firm and it “Provides the labour force, 
suppliers of other raw materials, utilities, and infrastructure, and
regulates the activities of the organization.” He further explains
that the appearance of community involvement in corporate
reputation rankings instruments, such as the Reputation Quotient, 
is an evidence of its recognition as a tool for reputation building. 
He also observes that some large organizations also have special
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communication departments, with the specific responsibility of
dealing with community relations.  
According to the reports of a Conference Board on senior
communications executives (as cited in Argenti & Forman, 2002), 
over 60% of hundreds of America’s largest firms list community
relations as part of their responsibilities. Adkins (2000) also reports
a study conducted by Business in the Community/Research
International (UK) Ltd, in which it was discovered that 3/4 of
marketing and community affairs directors dedicate at least a
segment of their budget to cause marketing. This involves forming
alliances with typically non-profit agencies to market a service, 
product, or an image for mutual benefit. 
McIntosh et al. (1998) (as cited in Bronn, 2006) observes that once
a company bases its headquarters in a single city or town, it usually
concentrates its community involvement exclusively in that
location. He also observes that many contemporary firms have
multiple headquarters, and this, therefore, raises the question as to
whether community involvement activities accepted in one country
would be accepted in others. Considering that this specifically
applies to multinationals, it is suggested that, while practicing their
corporate social responsibility in the form of community
involvement, they should also consider the implication of doing the
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same things in all countries in which they operate or make sales, as
well as consider accommodating local norms and practices.  
Consequently, Gardberg & Fombrum (2006) advice firms that
operate in diverse foreign contexts to adopt models of corporate
citizenship that would acknowledge their peculiarities. They
explain further that the appropriateness of the activities to the local
context would determine the effectiveness of the corporate social
responsibility initiatives.   
2.5 PUBLIC RELATIONS AND RELATIONSHIP
BUILDING
In recent times, great scholarly focus has shifted to the relationship
building aspect of public relations.  Ledingham (2008, pp. 243-
244) identifies five developments believed to have informed the
emersion of the relational perspective as a paradigm for public
relations. He enumerates the five developments as:
1. The recognition of the need for the field of public relations
to focus on relationship rather than the organization, the
publics or the communication process. 
2. The reconceptualization of a management function
requiring strategic planning and evaluation. 
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3. The construction of models for organization-stakeholder
relationship which includes antecedents, maintenance
processes and consequences. 
4. The distillation of relationship attributes from the literature
of interpersonal relationship and allied disciplines. 
5. The development of organization-stakeholder relationship
scales that would enable the measurement of relationship
quality. 
One of the leading researchers focusing on relationship in public
relations is Ferguson (1984), who, as a result of a landmark study
previously undertaken, recommends that public relations
scholarship should focus on the relationship between the
organizations and the publics they interact with. Sallot, Lyon, 
Acost-Alzaru & Jones (2003, p. 32), following Ferguson, present
six reasons for placing relationship at the core of the public
relations discipline, and they are:
1. The perspective should engender a better understanding of
relationships, both to the organization and the public. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the relationship is the prime
issue of concern, rather than the parties involved. 
2. The perspective should birth, on a macro level, a new
method for studying relationship, which includes the units
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of analysis that are different from those used in analyzing
communication. 
3. A domain for research effort should be created, by
concentrating public relations scholarship on public
relationship, which would guide students of public relations
to share similar assumptions and knowledge. 
4. Consequent on the inclusion of the organization, the public, 
and communication variables in a relationship model, the
stage is set for integrating findings from many relevant
disciplines.  
5. By focusing on the relationship as the unit of analysis, 
opportunities are provided for scholarship, irrespective of
how narrow or broad. 
6. A perspective such as this has the power to “legitimize” the
field in terms of public relations, just as past efforts have
done in defining the field in respect to the activities of
those who practice it. 
Following the identified need to make relationship the core of
public relationship, Cutlip, Center & Broom (1985) quickly
incorporate it into their public relations text. By this, they set the
stage for further scholastic exploration of the relational concept. 
They also updated their text in 1994, thereby including recent
studies of the concept (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 1994).  
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Also contributing to the existing body of work, Broom & Dozier
(1990) suggest a coorientation approach as a means of determining
the level of agreement and accuracy between organizations and
their publics as indicators of relationship quality.  The implication
of their suggestion is that the orientation must be bi-directional; it
should be pursued both on the part of the organizations and their
publics without any assuming the dominance.  
Broom & Dozier (1990) further suggest that the level of mutual
agreement and accuracy between the two parties can be used as
indicators of the quality of their relationship. For this to occur, 
researchers who would measure the relationships would need to
determine levels of agreement between the two parties concerning
major issues. They will also need to identify the degree to which
an organization and its major publics can accurately predict or
anticipate each other’s position on those issues.  
Ferguson (1984) makes a list of attributes that can be used to
measure organization-public relations, and they are (1) their
dynamic nature (2) level of openness (3) degree of satisfaction for
both parties (4) distribution of power and (5) extent of mutuality of
understanding and agreement and consensus. In addition, Grunig, 
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Grunig & Ehling (1992) suggest two more items to Ferguson’s list
which include trust and reciprocity. 
Grunig (1993) goes further to augment the attributes by making a
distinction between what he refers to as symbolic relationships, 
which are communication driven, and behavioral relationships, 
which are action-based. He argues that public relations
practitioners must be able show that their efforts contribute to the
goals of their organizations by helping to build long-term
behavioural relationships with strategic public. 
According to Ledingham (2008), the review of literature on
interpersonal relationships, marketing, psychology and other
relevant disciplines revealed 18 relational attributes presented as
follows:
Investment, commitment, trust, comfort with
relational dialectics, cooperation, mutual
goals, interdependence, power imbalance, 
performance satisfaction, comparison level
of alternatives, adaptation, nonretrievable
investment, shared technology, summate
construct, structural bonds, social bonds, 
intimacy, and passion (p. 3). 
Ledingham further explains that a small-group discussion was
organized, which led to the reduction of the 18 attributes to five;
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these are- trust, openness, involvement, investment and
commitment. He shares the operationalized significance of each of
the five attributes by stating that “Trust” implies an organization
doing what it says it will do, “Openness” involves sharing the
organization’s future plans with the publics, “Involvement” means
the organization getting involved in the welfare of the community, 
“Investment” signifies the organization investing in the welfare of
the community, and “Commitment” entails the organization being
committed to the community’s welfare. 
Several other scholars have also contributed significantly to the
discourse and the effort to expand the frontiers of knowledge in
respect to the relational perspective (Huang, 1997; Thomsen, 1997;
Broom, Casey & Ritchey, 1997; Grunig & Huang, 2000). Hon &
Grunig (1999) develop an organization-public relationship
measurement scale with six relational attributes- control mutuality, 
trust, satisfaction, commitment, exchange relationship and
communal relationship.  
One of the significant contributions of their scale is that it
differentiates between “exchange” relationship and “communal”
relationship. While exchange relationship involves one party
providing benefits to the other with the expectation of
reciprocation, communal relationship involves one party providing
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benefits to the other simply out of concern for the other’s welfare
and without reciprocation in mind. According to Hon & Brunner
(2002), the scale has enjoyed widespread application and seems to
be emerging as the standard for the field.  
Over the years, several scholars have approached the relational
concept from the perspective of their particular expertise. Coombs
(2000), for instance, capitalizes on the trend to enumerate the
benefits of the relational approach in respect to crises. Coombs
suggests a research agenda for further study on relationship and
crises, and also introduces the idea of “relational history” to
existing literature on organization-public relationship.   
Also similar to this contribution is the work of Bridges &Nelson
(2000), in which the relational perspective is applied to sphere of
issue management. They argue that the relational approach should
be adopted as a preventative strategy, also claiming that a
proactive focus on building and maintaining relationships with
both existing and potential publics is the only way issue managers
can begin to protect their organizations from unwanted legislation
and litigation. Bridges and Nelson (2000) further suggest that “If
an organization can identify and work with affected publics to
determine and work towards mutual interests and goals, the
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organization has a good probability of ending organizational-
public conflict,” (p. 111). 
The relational perspective is particularly applicable to our current
study because it provides a way for examining the relationship
between the oil companies in the Niger Delta and the oil producing
communities. This perspective advocates that relationship should
form the core of public relations. Hence, the community relations
activities of the oil companies should focus on mutual relationship
building, rather than the companies or the communities.  
Broom & Dozier’s (1990) contribution is invaluable to this study
because of their suggestion that the level of agreement and
accuracy between an organization and its publics can be used as
indicators of the quality of their relationship. The implication of
this for our current study is that by determining the level of
agreement between the oil companies and the Niger Delta
communities on major issues, and by identifying the degree to
which both parties can accurately predict each other’s positions on
the issues, we would be able to determine the quality of
relationship they share. 
Another important aspect of the relational perspective that applies
to this study is Hon & Grunig’s (1999) distinctions between
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exchange and communal relationships. This dimension will aid our
quest to determine the relationship that exists between the
companies and communities. To do this, we will find ourselves
querying whether the relationship involves the companies
providing benefits to the communities with the expectation of a
payback, or they are simply providing the benefits out of concern
for the communities’ welfare. And of course, Coombs’ (2000)
contribution is also useful for this study considering that our
investigation is on the conflicts that are playing out between the oil
companies and the host communities in the Niger Delta.  
2.6 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC
RELATIONS
Conflict resolution has been a part of human experience for
centuries. Although this is factual, Burton (1993) argues that it is
relatively recent in scholarly discourse. He points out that some
scholars interchange “dispute” with “conflict.” According to him, 
settlement refers to the negotiated or arbitrated results of disputes
while resolution refers to the result of a conflict situation. Hence, 
there is “dispute settlement” and “conflict resolution”. He, 
however, goes on to say that though dispute and conflict may refer
to different conditions and scope of human relationships, they
operate on the same principles and can be used interchangeably.  
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According to Wilmot & Hocker (1998), there are several modes of
intervention and they include facilitation, mediation, counselling
and therapy, conciliation, quasi-political procedures, informal
tribunals, arbitration of different types and criminal and civil
justice systems. In practise, these modes are usually combined for
conflict resolution. Otite (2001) states that conflict resolution
carries out a healing function in societies. This occurs by providing
the opportunity for parties involved to examine alternative pay-offs
in the situation. By so doing, normalty is restored to the society
thus facilitating discussion. It also places the parties in the conflict
in a situation in which they can choose alternative positive means
for resolving their differences. Otite further explains that
consensus-building, social-bridge reconstructions, and the re-
enactment of order in the society are achieved through conflict
resolution. 
The process of conflict resolution focuses on the rebuilding of
broken-down relationships, and this falls within the purview of
public relations. Public relations practice has become well known
in recent times because of the great assistance it offers in crises
resolution. Because of the complexities of the world today, it is
certain that organizations and people cannot avoid trouble and
violence. Wherever there is violence and trouble, wise counsel is
required (Seitel, 2007). Conflict is the outcome of unchecked
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degeneration in human relationships, and according to Folarin
(1998), it evolves in stages; first we have an issue, then it evolves
into conflict, and finally into a crisis. 
2.6.1 What is an Issue?
Folarin (1998, p. 45) presents the following descriptions of an
issue:
1) It is a topic or subject matter that is of interest to all or
some of the publics of an organization or institution. 
2) It is a matter or an event that has the potential of far
reaching consequences for a public or the publics of an
organization or institution. 
3) It is a topic around which public opinion has crystallized
into identifiable characteristics. 
Hence, to forestall, or at least minimize the frequency and/or
magnitude of crises, it is necessary for issue management to
become a routine aspect of public relations practice.  
2.6.2 Issue Management
Issue management is a term coined in 1976 by Howard Chase
(1982) who says:
Issue management is the capacity
to understand, mobilize, 
coordinate, and direct all
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strategic and policy planning
functions, and all public
affairs/public relations skills, 
towards achievement of one
objective: meaningful
participation in creation of public
policy that affects personal and
institutional destiny (pp. 1-2).  
    
Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997) describe issue management as
a process that aims at early detection of any problem. It serves as
an early warning system for organizations so that they can stand a
better chance of shaping public discourse and decision making, 
rather than reacting to them. They identify the two major goals of
the issue management function as early identification of issues that
may affect the organization, and taking appropriate measures in
order to prevent them from causing grievous consequences for the
organization. 
The authors, however, observe that the term may be misleading
because no one can actually manage issues in a free society. 
Nevertheless, organizations can manage their own actions and
statements as far as public issues are concerned. They can
determine what issues to be involved in, as well as when and how
to make statements or take action. Like to marketing, issue
management involves efforts to manage an organization so that it
can interact effectively with its dynamic external environment.  
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Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997) also observe that though the
issue management aspect of public relations experienced rapid
growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, it has been fairly restrained in
recent years. The situation was credited to tight corporate budgets, 
issues requiring organizational change as well as communication, 
and the lack of interdisciplinary professionals. 
  
Seitel (2007) identifies five steps in issue management:
1) Identification of issues that an organization or individual
should be concerned about. 
2) Analysis and delimitation of each issue, taking into
consideration its effect on constituent publics. 
3) Exhibition of various strategic options available to the
organization. 
4) Implementation  of action programmes to communicate the
organization’s views, and to influence the perception on the
issue
5) Evaluation of the action programmes in terms of reaching
organizational goals. 
   
2.6.3 Managing a Crisis
The Harvard Business School defines crisis as a situation that has
reached a critical stage requiring dramatic and extraordinary
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intervention to avoid or repair major damage (Long, 2001, as cited
in Seitel, 2007).  Hence, crisis management includes those methods
that are used to respond to the crisis (Ogedengbe, 2005). Managing
a crisis may be the first step in resolving same, since it has to be
curtailed before a more lasting solution can be considered.   
An organization’s skill in handling its affairs in the midst of a
crisis will affect the way it is perceived by its various publics. 
Since public relations has been defined as the “Art and social
science of analyzing trends, predicting their consequences, 
counselling organizations’ leaders and implementing a planned
programme of action, which serves both the organization and the
public interest” (Daramola, 2005, p. 12), it becomes obvious that it
has a role to play in crisis management. 
From the definition given above, public relations analyzes trends
by assessing the past records of an organization. If the organization
has encountered some level of conflict in the past, or if there are
unresolved issues, this will be an indication that the publics of the
organization are not satisfied with its activities. By analyzing the
precedents of the organization, it would be possible to predict the
consequence of the organizational policies. For instance, if the oil
companies in the Niger Delta had analysed the trends of their
relationship with their host communities, they would have been
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able to predict the increase in the violence against them. This is
because the subject of the people’s agitation in the Niger Delta
today is the same as it was ten years ago, though it may have
become more profound and diversified.      
Another of the very salient attributes of public relations is the
ability to mediate. This attribute is particularly valuable in times of
conflict when a middle ground has to be found. Because the parties
to a conflict are directly involved, it is logical to assume that their
objectivity in viewing the issue would be affected. Hence, public
relations plays the role of a go-between for the organization and its
affected publics. 
2.6.4 Community Relations and the Niger Delta Crises
According to Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997), some
sociologists and political scientists have taken the stand that our
communities are dissolving in the face of increasing mobility and
communication. Nevertheless, the community cannot be declared
dead. In recent times, individuals and agencies have begun to pay
special attention to the reality of the community. They emphasize
that though organizations may be preoccupied by regional, 
national, and international community relations programmes, they
must not forget their immediate communities, i.e. their host
communities.  
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Baskin et.al observe that in the 1990s, most organizations began to
understand that their community relations efforts must become
more organized and proactive. They state that the key to any
effective community relations activity is positive and socially
responsible action.  This will help the community on behalf of the
organization. The organization must, at all cost, guard against
negative acts and also work to preserve existing relationships. For
this to be possible, proactive and positive actions are crucial so that
the organization can achieve its goals. 
Effective community relations can only be achieved when an
organization recognises its interdependence with other institutions. 
When the management recognises the many ways its organization
can impact on the local community and the extent of reciprocal
dependence, it will help to establish social balance. The practice of
good community relations assists the organization in securing its
needs from the community while it also provides what the
community expects. Also, it helps to secure the company’s
investments, increase sales of products, the value of stocks, and
improve the general operating climate of business.    
It has been erroneously believed by several scholars that the crises
in the Niger Delta are beyond what community relations can
handle. The view is also held in some quarters that community
93
relations does not address the core problem in the Niger Delta.  
This view, however, fails to appreciate the essence of community
relations. If the oil companies carry out their activities in the
interest of the host communities and adhere to quality ethical
practices, the conflicts would focus on the government, thereby
excluding the companies.  
Community relations is not about window dressing; rather, it is
about protecting the host community.  As Baskin et.al (1997) point
out, even the staff of the organization would be productive when
proper community relations is carried out. Considering the fact that
most of the staff of any organization live in that community, any
improper or inconsiderate attitude displayed by the management
can endanger their lives, as can be seen in the kidnap cases in the
Niger Delta.  
2.7 GAP IN THE LITERATURE
There exists several scholarly works on the crisis in the Niger
Delta, its causes and possible solutions. Several scholars have also
agreed that the conflict is multidimensional (Aaron & Patrick, 
2008; Edeogu, 2008), and that it has unquantifiable consequences
on the Nigerian nation.  Schools of thought have even evolved on
the extent to which the crisis can be attributed to the exploration of
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oil in the area. While some believe that Niger Delta communities
have been excluded from the oil wealth generated from their
region, others claim that the protesting youths and women are only
pawns in the hands of the privileged class (Ibaba, 2005). 
  
Individuals, groups, the media and even the government have
continually called on oil companies to demonstrate a higher degree
of social responsibility to their host communities. Some scholars
are, however, of the view that oil companies should not be relied
upon for development because of their past failures. Aaron (2008)
observes that with the huge amount claimed to have been invested
by oil companies in their host communities, the level of
underdevelopment in those communities, as well as rising
incidents of conflicts, a logical conclusion may be drawn that
corporate social responsibility (CSR), as practiced by the oil
companies in the Niger Delta, is a gross failure.  
Aaron (2008) notes:  
Even a cursory look at the
financial records of the major oil
companies operating in the Niger
Delta region of Nigeria reveals a
phenomenal rise in budgetary
allocations to community
development projects- Shell alone
spent $59 million and paid $114
million to NDDC in 2006 (p. 
268).  
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He goes further to state that the CSR of the oil companies has
neither developed the communities, nor secured the social license
of the transnationals (oil companies) to operate. He concludes that
it would amount to wishful thinking to expect the oil companies to
meaningfully develop the Niger Delta communities since they are
for-profit organizations, pursuing by all means possible to achieve
their objective of making more profit. 
Consequent on the foregoing discussions, some important issues
require urgent attention. If on one hand we could accept as a fact
that the oil companies actually invested the amount they claimed in
their host communities, then it becomes an issue of such serious
concern what became of the investments. Were they entrusted into
wrong hands? Were they too negligible compared to the
developmental challenges? It is obvious at this juncture that this is
a question of the strategies involved in relating with the
communities.  
According to Aaron (2008), Shell spent $59 million and paid $114
million to NDDC in 2006, yet there was no visible evidence of the
expenses. If these huge amounts, which are somewhat considered
to be a fraction of the company’s profit, left no trace of their
existence, what is the possibility that the entire profit, assuming it
was ever possible to be given, would make any difference? On the
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other hand, if we say that the figures claimed by the oil companies
were mere window dressing, then we cannot claim that CSR has
failed because it has not been practised in the first place.  
This study focuses on the gap between the communities and the oil
companies. It investigates the community relations strategies used
by the oil companies to resolves the differences between
themselves and their host communities in the Niger Delta. This is
important, particularly because a plethora of materials abound on
CSR of oil companies, their failures, the motives behind their
efforts and even the lack of involvement of the communities in the
planning and execution of such projects. However, there is scanty
scholarly work on the specific community relations strategies
engaged by the oil companies. This study, therefore, presents a
holistic picture from both the perspectives of the oil companies and
the host communities by examining the oil companies’ strategies, 
what the communities prefer, and how there can be a synergy.   
Again, several scholars have worked on the use of community
relations, hence, public relations, as a means of conflict resolution
(Baskin et.al, 1997; Chase, 1982; Folarin, 1998). It is a consensus
among public relations scholars that the best response to conflict is
to be prepared. According to Igben (2008), preventive public
relations, which is also known as proactive PR, involves taking
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action ahead of time.  Aliyu & Mohammed (2008) also say that
public relations professionals believe that proactive approach to
conflict management is the most strategic approach.  
The Niger Delta crises are ones in which all the proactive
strategies of the oil companies in relation to conflict management
have failed. If those strategies have been effective, the conflicts
and violence against them would have been envisaged and
forestalled, or at the very least, nipped in the bud. Hence, reactive
public relations is the most suitable approach to adopt now. This
involves adapting existing plans to dynamic situations. Though
Aliyu & Mohammed (2008) suggest some public relations
strategies that can be used in a crisis situation, they are, however, 
limited to communication and information management.  
This study is aimed at examining and evaluating the actual
community relations strategies used by oil companies within the
crises context; not just the ones they planned beforehand. Also, a
lot of the work that has been done on the Niger Delta and the oil
companies have focused more on what the oil companies have
done or are expected to do for their host communities (Aaron, 
2008; Aaron & Patrick, 2008; Edeogu, 2008).  This study will, 
however, focus on the techniques used in executing those
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community relations plans and the communities’ perception of
them. 
2.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The significance of theories in shaping this study cannot be
overemphasized. Lewin (1958) states that good theories enable
researchers to put facts in perspective and to hypothesize what will
happen, even before they do happen (as cited in Folarin, 2005). 
Folarin (2005) also says that theories help researchers to manage
reality. Hence, some theories have been selected to provide focus
for this study, and they are the Conflict Theory, Situational
Theory, and Stakeholder Theory.  
2.8.1 Conflict Theory
Conflict theory posits that in a society or an organization, each
individual participant and/or group struggles to maximize certain
benefits and this inevitably contributes to social change. This
change may include political struggles and revolution. The theory
focuses on the idea that personal or group’s ability has a role to
play in exercising influence and control over others in producing
social order. Hence, conflict theorists believe that there is a
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continual struggle between all different elements of a particular
society. 
According to Wallace & Wolf (2006), conflict theory evolved as a
major alternative to the functionalist approach to analyzing a
society’s general structure. Ritzer (2003) also observes that apart
from the theory’s origination in reaction to structural
functionalism, it also has other roots that include Marxian theory
and works of Georg Simmel on social conflict. Conflict theory
provided an alternative to the functionalist approach in the 1950s
and 1960s. Although it was superseded by a variety of neo-
Marxian theories after the 60s (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004), it has
become increasingly popular and relevant in modern sociology
(Wallace & Wolf, 2006). 
Functionalists consider societies and social institutions as systems
in which equilibrium is created through the interdependence of all
the parts. They do not deny the existence of conflict; however, they
believe that the society evolves means of controlling it. This forms
the basis of functionalist analysis. Conflict theorists, on the other
hand, perceive the society in a different light. Contrary to
functionalists’ view of the existence of interdependence and unity
in the society, conflict theorists view the society as an arena where
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groups contend for power. For conflict to be controlled, one group
must be able to, at least temporarily, suppress its rivals. Conflict
theory focuses on the shifting balance of power among competitors
in the society, rather than the creation of equilibrium through
interdependence and cooperation (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). 
This Marxist perspective has been specifically applied to
international organizations/multinational corporations, which are
the focus of this study. According to Pease (2003), Marxists argue
that international organizations are products of hegemony. 
However, traditional Marxists and Gramscian Marxists have two
separate notions of hegemony, thereby leading them to different
conclusions on the nature of international organizations. While
traditional Marxists tend to equate hegemony with military and
economic dominance, Gramscian-inspired Marxists claim that it is
the relation of consent to political and ideological leadership
(Simon, 1982). 
Both the traditional and the Gramascian Marxists perspectives can
be applied to this study, though in varying degrees. The notion of
the traditional Marxists is applicable, more so when we consider
that the Multi-national companies (MNCs) actually dominate the
economy of the countries (e.g. America and Japan), but
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particularly the communities, in which they operate. This they do
by taking over the means of production of the communities, while
the people live on compensations. The oil companies, however, did
not dominate the Niger Delta through the use of force, at least at
the initial stage. Military force was introduced much later with the
rise of vandalism and militancy.  
On the other hand, the Gramscian Marxists’ argument is also very
fundamental to the study. The relevance of their own argument is
embedded in the question: “How does the ruling class get
subordinate classes to consent to their own domination and
exploitation?” (Pease, 2003, p. 79). Pease presents the answer; it is
by linking the dominant class’ interests to the interests of the
subordinate classes. This involves the development of a coherent
set of values that transcends both class and national boundaries
without compromising the dominant class’ position.  
According to Saiyou (2006), the initial reaction of the Niger Delta
communities to the discovery of oil in their territory was that of joy
and anticipation of development. At that initial stage, the goals of
the oil companies were linked with those of the communities. 
However, as the communities began to realize that the goals of the
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oil companies were being realized while theirs were abandoned, 
conflict began to develop. 
Marxists believe that MNCs are tools of exploitation and
mechanisms of domination that promotes underdevelopment. 
According to Pease (2003), MNCs seek out states with lax
environmental and labour standards under the guise of drive for
market efficiency. Many of them locate areas where labour is not
represented by unions so as to keep labour cost low. It is obvious
that the oil companies in the Niger Delta are taking advantage of
the inconsistency of the Nigerian Government to increase their
profit. Several deadlines have been set for the termination of gas
flaring, yet, it is still being flared. A vast majority of the Niger
Delta residents increasingly face child respiratory diseases, asthma, 
cancer, and premature deaths as a result of the massive flaring
(Rizvi, 2005). 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the conflict theory is pivotal
to this study. The theory has enabled us to identify the sources and
nature of conflicts as well as how they relate to the Niger Delta. 
Nevertheless, it does not identify the nature and stages of human
response to conflicts. Hence, the Situational Theory has been
included to cater for these aspects of conflicts. 
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2.8.2 Situational Theory
According to Baskin, Aronoff &Lattimore (1997), the situational
theory was proposed by Grunig and Hunt in 1984. It states that a
public can be defined or characterized according to the degree of
its awareness of the problem confronting it and the extent to which
it seeks a solution to it. The theory aims at helping to understand
the different component parts of a community and how
organizations relate with them at different times.  
The situational theory was propounded to explain how and when
different types of public can be identified. An active public, as
defined by Grunig & Hunt (1984), is one that seeks and processes
information concerning an organization or an issue of interest to an
organization (cited in Baskin et al, 1997, p. 56). They further
identify three variables that determine whether or not an individual
is active and when he will seek and process information about an
issue. 
1.  Problem recognition: when a person is faced with an issue, 
he must first become aware of it and recognise the fact that
it has the potential to affect him. 
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2.  Constraint recognition: this describes how individuals
perceive the obstacles in the way of a solution. If they
believe that they stand a chance of overcoming the
obstacles, they will seek and process information on that
issue; in the alternative, they remain passive. 
3.  Level of involvement: this refers to the extent to which an
individual cares about an issue. The degree to which he
cares will determine his involvement in seeking and
processing information about it. 
In assessing Niger Delta communities using the steps above, it is
crystal clear that they are active publics. Firstly, they recognise that
there is a problem, and the problem is that they are both physically
and economically disadvantaged (Ibaba, 2005; Alabi, 2008). They
also recognise the possible consequences of the problem for them;
indeed, they are actually heavily affected (“Children Kidnapped,”
2007).  Secondly, Niger Delta communities identify both the
government and the oil companies as their obstacles in accessing
their due share of the oil resources, and they probably believe they
can overcome the obstacles through the use of violence. Thirdly, 
the extent of protest and violence clearly indicates how much they
care about the issue. 
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2.8.3 Stakeholder Theory
The concept “Stakeholder” was first used in 1963 in an internal
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute. According to its
first usage, stakeholders are groups whose support the organization
needs so as to remain in existence. The concept was developed into
a theory and championed by Edward Freeman in the 1980s
(Freeman & Reed, 1983, p. 89). Freeman and Reed (1983) later
write on the comparison between stockholder and stakeholder, and
Freeman (1984) provides more details on the theory.   
The stakeholder theory states that a corporation has stakeholders
who are generally the groups and individuals that benefit from, or
are harmed by the corporation’s actions. The rights of these parties
can either be violated or respected by the corporation (Hartman, 
2005). The stakeholder theory identifies the groups and individuals
relative to a corporation. It also describes as well as recommends
methods by which the interests of each party can be catered for by
the management of the corporation (Freeman & Reed, 1983). The
stakeholder theory is one of the classical theories in public
relations. 
As Philips (2004) observes, the question of who is and who is not a
stakeholder has been discussed for years. Some of the questions
that appear relevant to a proper conceptualization here are: Should
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stakeholder status be a reserved right for constituencies having
close relationship with the organization? Should the status be seen
to apply broadly to all groups that can affect or be affected by the
organization? Should activists, competitors, natural environment or
even the media be classified as stakeholders? In an attempt to
answer these questions, Freeman & Reed (1983) explain that the
narrow definition only includes the groups that are vital to the
survival and success of the organization, while the wide or broad
definition accommodates all groups that can affect or be affected
by the actions of the corporation.  
Still in an attempt to identify who the stakeholders should be, 
Dougherty (1992) and Ray (1999) classify them into four groups;
enabling publics, functional publics, normative publics and
diffused publics. Stephens, Malone & Bailey (2005, p. 395)
explain that enabling publics provide leadership for the
organization and also control the resources that allow it to exist
and among them are shareholders, regulatory bodies and boards of
directors. The functional publics are those who exchange inputs in
an organization for outputs such as the employees, unions, 
suppliers and customers who provide labour or make use of the
organization’s products and services. Normative publics are those
with shared values or similar problems such as trade unions and
professional societies. The last group is referred to as the diffused
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publics, which emerge when external consequences result from an
organization’s activities; these include the media, 
environmentalists, residents, and the community, among others. 
In a later work, Freeman, Winks & Parmar (2004, p. 364) elaborate
further on their previous work by stating that the stakeholder
theory is managerial in nature because it reflects and directs how
managers operate, rather than primarily addressing management
theorists and economists. From the analytical point of view, a
stakeholder approach provides assistance to managers through the
promotion of the analysis of how the corporation fits into its larger
environment (Mayer, 2008). It also encourages the evaluation of
how the standard operating procedures of the corporation affect
stakeholders like employees, managers and investors who are
within the company, and customers, suppliers and financiers who
are outside the company.  
Freeman (as cited in Mayer, 2008) suggests that managers should
fill a “Generic stakeholder map” with specific stakeholders. This
will help the managers to always keep them in perspective, 
particularly when making important decisions. He emphasizes that
a rational manager will not make a major decision for the
organization without first considering its implications on each of
the stakeholders. The stakeholder theory posits that every
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legitimate person or group involved in the activities of a firm is a
stakeholder for the sake of benefits, and that the priority interest of
every legitimate stakeholder is not self-evident (Furneaux, 2006).  
According to Donaldo & Preston (1995, p.66), the stakeholder
theory has the following characteristics:
1) The stakeholder theory is descriptive: it offers a model of
the corporation. 
2)    It is instrumental: it offers a framework for investigating
the links between conventional firm performance and the
practice of stakeholder management. 
3) It is fundamentally normative: although stakeholder theory
possesses the above two characteristics, it is more
fundamentally normative. Stakeholders are identified by
their interests and all stakeholders are considered to be
intrinsically valuable. 
4) It is managerial: it recommends attitudes, structures and
practices and requires that simultaneous attention be given
to the interest of all legitimate stakeholders. 
The existence of an organization depends on its ability to create
value and acceptable outcomes for different groups of stakeholders
(Jones, 2004). Stakeholders are generally motivated to participate
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in an organization if the inducements they receive exceed the value
of the contributions they are required to make. Different
stakeholders use the organization simultaneously to achieve their
goals. It is pertinent to note, however, that the viability of the
organization and its ability to accomplish its missions of providing
goods and services depends mainly on the contributions of its
stakeholders. 
There are some counterarguments to those of the stakeholder
theory, and prominent among them is the stockholder theory, 
which was popularized by Milton Friedman (1970). This theory
actually existed before the stakeholder theory and was, in fact, the
argument that led to the reaction that birthed the stakeholder
theory; nevertheless, it remains the premise on which critics of the
stakeholder theory base their arguments.   
Friedman states that a corporation’s only responsibility is to make
money and sell products so that people can be hired and paid
(Seitel, 2007). Hence, a business has no business in social
responsibility (Kiipoye & Patrick, 2008). The stockholder theory
argues that corporate involvements in philanthropy distorts the
market as well as robs the shareholders of their wealth. He insists
that the idea of business having social responsibilities is
meaningless, because only people can have such. Since a
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corporation is only an artificial person, it may only have artificial
responsibilities.  
Alexei (2000) agrees with Friedman by stating that it is
questionable why firms should be obligated to give something
back to those whom much has already been routinely given. He
furthers his argument by explaining that contrary to the “enslaved”
portrayal of employees, they are usually paid wages and benefits
by firms for their labour. Also, customers are not stolen from;
rather, they are usually delivered with goods and services in return
for the revenue they provide. Firms are not guilty of taking a free
ride on public provision; rather, they typically pay taxes and obey
the law. 
Still, the shareholder theory projects the separation thesis, which
begins by assuming that ethics and economics can be clearly and
sharply separated (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 2004, p. 364). This
view is supported by Sundaram & Inkpen (2004) who observe that
governing a corporation requires purposeful activity, and that any
purposeful activity has a goal. According to them, the only
appropriate goal for modern corporation managers is maximizing
shareholder value. Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, however, object to
the single-objective view of the firm which distinguishes the
economic from the ethical consequences and values on the ground
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that it leads to a parochial theory that cannot fully account for the
array of human activities. 
Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004, p. 364-369) offer three main
criticisms of Sundaram & Inkpen (2004, p. 350-363). Firstly, they
insist that the stakeholder theory is misrepresented in their article
because all views that did not project shareholder maximization
were lumped together as part of stakeholder theory. Such views
included corporate chartering, unions, consumer interests, care for
natural environment, etc. They point out that though the
stakeholder theory can be many things, it is wrong to assume that it
is everything anti-shareholder. Since shareholders are also
stakeholders, bifurcating the world into “shareholder concerns”
and “stakeholder concerns” is as illogical as contrasting “apples”
and “fruits”. 
Sundaram and Inkpen argue in favour of the primacy of
shareholder value maximization with the following five-point
argument (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004, p. 366):
1) The goal of maximizing shareholder value is pro-
stakeholder
2) Maximizing shareholder value creates the appropriate
incentives for managers to assume entrepreneurial risks. 
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3) Having more than one objective function will make
governing difficult, if not impossible. 
4) It is easier to make shareholders out of stakeholders than
vice versa. 
5) In the event of a breach of contract or trust, stakeholders, 
compared with shareholders, have protection (or can seek
remedies) through contracts and the legal system.  
Secondly, Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004, p. 366) criticise
the five points with five counter arguments as follows:  
1) The stakeholder theory is decidedly pro-shareholder:
values are created for shareholders when they are created
for stakeholders. When managers create products and
services that customers are willing to buy, when jobs are
offered that employees are willing to fill, when
relationships are extended that suppliers are eager to have, 
and when behaving as good citizens of the community, 
values are being created for shareholders. It is not
necessary to posit the two theories as opposed. 
2) The stakeholder theory offers the correct way to think
about entrepreneurial risks: according to Venkertaraman
(2002) as cited in Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004), a
stakeholder approach enables us to develop a more robust
entrepreneurial theory in which the role of entrepreneurial
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risk is better understood. In practice, as opposed to the
world of economic journals, there are often collaborations
between managers and stakeholder groups such as
customers and suppliers to test new products and services. 
In fact, customers and suppliers accept some inherent risks
in the development of new ideas, products and services. 
3) Having one objective function makes governance and
management difficult:  having a single function, 
according to Sundaram & Inkpen (2004), makes the tasks
of managers easier simply because it cuts through
confusing claims and potential responsibilities accorded
managers. The only responsibility of managers is to make
money for shareholders. Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004), 
however, insist that though convenient for managers, the
view distorts reality and encourages a worldview in which
managers exempt themselves from being moral agents who
are responsible to a wide array of groups for their actions. 
4) It is easier to make stakeholders out of shareholders:
this point is considered obvious since shareholders are
already stakeholders.
5) Stakeholders have remedies that shareholders do not
have: it is erroneous to focus on the derivative suits by
shareholders as the only means by which shareholders can
be protected. Since the desired condition is for value
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creation and trade to be self-sustaining (so that parties to
the contract can pay the cost of safeguarding that contract, 
rather than impose it externally on others), the stakeholder
approach is the only move of conceptualization.
Lastly, Freeman, Wicks and Parmar (2004, p. 368) close their
argument by noting that the impression the shareholder ideologists
strive to create is that economic freedom, and therefore, political
freedom, are threatened by the stakeholder theory. They insist that
this view is fallacious. According to them, “Seeing business as the
creation of value for stakeholders and the trading of that value with
free consenting adults, is to think about a society where each has
freedom compatible with a like liberty for all,”  (Freeman, Wicks
& Parmar, 2004, p. 368). Value creation and trade are
complimentary. Hence, the idea of economic and political freedom
being separable should be jettisoned. 
The stakeholder theory has been applied to several studies. One of
the major studies in this category is “Communication with
stakeholders during a crisis: Evaluating message strategies,”
conducted by Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 390-419).  The
study explores message strategies used by organizations in dealing
with crises involving technical details. While applying the theory, 
the authors explain that the nature of the relationship existing
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between the stakeholders and the organization is a major factor in
shaping the response of stakeholders to pressure.   
Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 395) observe that the purpose
of communication during crisis is to influence the perception of the
public towards the organization as well as to maintain a positive
image among stakeholders. It can also be used to restore the
company’s image in case it has already been damaged among
stakeholders. The authors made use of literature to develop an
integrative coding scheme and a parallel set of strategies, which
they referred to as technical translation message strategies. Content
analysis was adopted for the study and 154 accounts representing
10 different technical crises were analyzed.  
From the findings of the study, it was suggested that different
crisis-message strategies were used in communicating with
different stakeholders. It was also discovered that when technical
details were discussed, “Organizations rarely go beyond an attempt
to directly state the technical facts with little or no explanation
provided to the stakeholders” (Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 
1).
Consequent on the arguments in favour of the stakeholder theory
and its application in studies such as the one presented above, the
116
theory has been adopted for this work.  The stakeholder theory is
considered appropriate for this study because of its managerial
nature. It alerts the corporation to the existence of an array of
parties that it is responsible to. In the context of this study, this
theory helps oil companies in the Niger Delta to become aware of
the fact that there are several individuals and groups that are
affected by their actions. Prominent among these parties are the
host communities. The host communities are considered to be
among the most important stakeholders of the oil companies, 
because they are physically connected to the companies. 
Stephens, Malone & Bailey (2005, p. 393) explain that one of the
effective ways to describe the behaviour of organizations is to
adequately take into consideration the nature of their relationship
with their stakeholders. Hence, the stakeholder theory will enable
us to describe the behaviour of Shell, Chevron and Agip after we
have evaluated the nature of their relationship with their host
communities in the Niger Delta. A cordial or not cordial
relationship with the Niger Delta communities will, therefore, give
us a picture of how well or badly the selected oil companies have
behaved.  
Stephens, Malone and Bailey (2005, p. 394) further observe that
the management of an organization may consider one stakeholder
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to be inconsequential one day, and the next day realises that the
same stakeholder demands its total attention. This is described by
Mitchell, Agel & Wood (1997) as stakeholder salience, which they
suggest can shift from time to time.  
The implication of this for our current study is that there is a
possibility that the oil companies once considered their host
communities inconsequential, and thereby failed to give them due
attention. The one sided relationship then resulted into protests and
conflicts, which in turn upgraded the communities to become the
oil companies’ most important stakeholders. Following Stephens, 
Malone & Bailey’s (2005) explanation of the four categories of
stakeholders, that the victims may join the functional publics
during crises, it can be said that the conflicts in the Niger Delta
have engendered the elevation of the communities from the
diffused publics of the oil companies to their functional publics. 
Stakeholder theory also provides a robust approach to corporate
responsibility, unlike the shareholder theory, that parochially
considers only the shareholders as worthy of attention. This helps
oil companies in the Niger Delta to realize that by creating values
for their host communities, they are creating values for their
shareholders. This cannot be better emphasized than by the fact
that their outputs have been greatly reduced due to the crises in the
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area.   If by ignoring their host communities they intended to make
more money for their shareholders, it is quite obvious that they
have achieved the opposite. The companies definitely have more
losses, such as vandalized pipelines and installations, than gains. 
Again, by using the stakeholder approach, it will be realized that
there is no basis for enmity between shareholders and stakeholders, 
since the former is a part of the latter. Shareholders should work in
the interest of stakeholders because there, their interests will be
protected. If, for instance, Shell is ejected from the Niger Delta due
to bad community relations, it will surely affect the investments of
shareholders. Shareholders should, therefore, pressurize oil
companies to become more responsible.  
After the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, private investors
dumped Shell’s shares in Britain in a bid to force the company out
of Nigeria. This move was, however, defeated because ironically, 
the company gained the support of large institutional investors, 
causing the share price to continue to rise (“Private Investors
Dump Shell,” 1995).   
It is probable that, had the whole shareholder body realized their
shared values with the host communities, Shell would have at least
been forced to be more responsible. Thirteen years after that
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incident, it is very clear that the oil companies have still not learnt
any lesson.   
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD OF RESEARCH
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the method used for this study. It comprises
the description of the research design, study population and the
techniques used to select the sample. The chapter also provides
information on data gathering and analysis.  
3.2 STUDY DESIGN
This study adopted triangulation, that is, the use of focus group
discussion, key informant interview and survey. Hence, both the
qualitative and the quantitative research methods were used for a
clearer understanding of the research problem (Wimmer &
Dominic, 2003, p. 108). The rationale for using the qualitative
method was based on three important characteristics as highlighted
by Wimmer & Dominic (2003). According to these authors, a
qualitative research is an interpretative study which allows each
observer to create reality as part of the research process, which
believes in the fundamental difference in human beings and strives
for the depth of the study rather than the breadth of it.  
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This study investigated the nature of the current community
relations of the selected oil companies used for conflict resolution
in the Niger Delta, the strategies employed, variations in
techniques, shortcomings and possible strategic improvements. 
Hence, this method is appropriate for investigating the questions
raised in the study. The focus group discussion and key informant
interviews were the qualitative research designs adopted for this
study. These designs enabled the gathering of qualitative data that
explored the depth of community relations and conflict resolution
in the selected communities in the Niger Delta.  
The quantitative research method, on the other hand, was used in
this study to complement the qualitative data generated. This
became necessary due to the shortcoming of qualitative data in
terms of generalization. Hence, quantitative method, due to its
attribute of sampling the opinion of a large number of people on
specific subjects, was adopted for its capacity to be generalized. 
Also, since one of the objectives of this study is to examine the
host communities’ perception of the community relations strategies
of the oil companies, the quantitative research method will ensure
a representative sample. The quantitative research design adopted
for this study was the survey.   
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3.3 STUDY POPULATION
The population for this study comprised the corporate affairs units
of oil companies in the Niger Delta and the indigenes of Omoku
and Obrikom communities in Rivers State and Eruemukohwarien, 
Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State.  
Three major oil companies in Delta and Rivers States were
selected- Shell, Chevron and Agip. The oil companies were
selected firstly because of their scale of operations in the Niger
Delta, particularly in the selected states, and secondly, because
they had varying records of attacks during crises (Aaron, 2008). 
Consequently, they were considered suitable for the purpose of
examining their different community relations strategies. Shell
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is the subsidiary of
Royal Dutch Shell, a British/Dutch company, and it operates in
Nigeria. Agip, also known as the Nigerian Agip Oil Company
Limited (NAOC), is an Italian company which operates in Nigeria, 
and Chevron is an American company which operates in Nigeria
under the joint venture name, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL). 
The corporate affairs units of Shell, Chevron and Agip were
selected as part of the population because they directly represented
the companies with their host communities. They also executed
and coordinated all the community relations strategies for the
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companies. Hence, they were considered the most appropriate
representatives of the oil companies to provide the information
needed for this study. 
Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta
State, and Obrikom and Omoku communities in Rivers State were
selected because they are oil producing communities. Though the
population had heterogeneous characteristics in terms of age, 
education and socio-economic status, it still had some common
denominators such as geographical location, host to oil companies
and low level of development.    
3.4 SAMPLE SIZE
For the quantitative aspect of this study, a survey was carried out
in the five selected communities in Delta and Rivers states in the
Niger Delta. The sample size was 595 consisting 182 respondents
from Eruemukohwarien, 22 from Tisun, 36 from Kolokolo, 283
from Omoku and 72 from Obrikom communities. The sample size
for this study was informed by the population of the communities
used for this study.  
The population figure obtained before this study showed that the
population in Tisun was 3,415, Kolokolo was 5, 966, 
Eruemukohwarien was 5, 265, Obrikom was 5, 316 and Omoku
was 33, 962. Based on those figures, 200 respondents were
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proposed for Tisun, Kolokolo, Eruemukohwarien and Obrikom, 
while 300 were proposed for Omoku. It was, however, discovered
on the field that the population resident in Tisun and Kolokolo
were 38 and 45 respectively. Hence, the copies of the questionnaire
distributed were reduced. In Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom and
Omoku, the samples selected were affected by the willingness of
respondents to participate in the study because of its sensitive
nature. Nevertheless, the fidelity of this study was ensured by the
random selection of the respondents to ensure the representation of
the communities. 
Nine focus groups were constituted for this study. Four groups
were constituted in Eruemukohwarien: Elders group (6
participants), women’s group (7 participants), youths’ group (8
participants, ages 20-35 years) and young girls’ group (6
participants, ages 16-25 years). In Tisun community, only one
group was constituted because of the low population, and it was
the men’s group (7 participants). The women were, however, not
available for the focus group discussion (FGD). In Kolokolo, two
groups were constituted: Youths/men’s group (7 participants), and
women’s group (8 participants). Only one group each was
constituted in Omoku and Obrikom because of their internal
political issues. The youths were restrained from participating and
the women were also not available. Hence, the elders’ group was
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constituted in both communities (8 participants in Obrikom and 11
participants in Omoku).  
Therefore, a total of 68 discussants participated in this study.  As
can be seen, the numbers of discussants that constituted the groups
vary. The standard number adopted for this study was eight, but in
cases where the target could not be achieved, six was made the
minimum. The exception in the case of Omoku (11 participants)
was because the interview was granted after an elders’ meeting. 
Hence, all those present participated in the FGD.  
Key informant interview was conducted with one Corporate
Affairs/Public Relations representative of Shell and Chevron, 
while Agip’s representative was not available to be interviewed. In
Eruemukohwarien, two elders, women leader and a youth leader
were interviewed. In Tisun and Kolokolo, the oldest men in each
community, as well as the secretary of the Trust that represents
both communities were interviewed.  Two youth leaders and the
Eze-ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku were interviewed. Finally in
Obrikom, the Regent and the women leader were interviewed. This
makes a total of 14 interviewees for this study. 
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3.5 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE
This study made use of three sampling techniques and they were
simple random sampling, systematic random sampling and
purposive sampling techniques. Each of the techniques was used
because of its attributes and the nature of the samples required
from the population.  
Simple random sampling was used to select the communities
studied. All the elements of each population were written on pieces
of paper, rolled up and put in a container. The samples required
were randomly selected from that container, thereby using the
simple random sampling without replacement. Shell’s operations
in the Niger Delta are classified into Eastern area of operation
(Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Rivers States), Central area of
operation (Bayelsa) and Western area of operation (Delta and Edo
States). Western area was randomly selected for this study and
Delta state was selected. Of the local government areas hosting
Shell operations, Ughelli North was randomly selected. 
Eruemukohwarien and Afiesere were also randomly selected, but
Afiesere had to be dropped because of the volatile condition in the
Niger Delta.  
Chevron established an Itsekiri Rural Development Council that
was made up of 23 Itsekiri communities within five oil fields of its
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operations. The five fields are Abiteye, Dibi, Escravos, 
Ughoegungun and Olero. Dibi oil field was randomly selected and
of the six communities in that category, Tisun and Kolokolo
communities in Delta State were selected. Agip also had its
operations in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. After randomly
selecting Rivers State, Obiafu/Obrikom oil location was selected in
Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area. Afterwards, Omoku
and Obrikom communities were finally selected.  
Systematic random sampling was used to select the individual
respondent. In each of the communities, a starting point was
randomly selected and the respondents were chosen according to a
selected sampling interval. Wimmer and Dominick (2003, p. 91)
explain that systematic random sampling is similar in some ways
to simple random sampling but it saves more time, resources and
efforts. They observe that systematic samples are frequently used
in mass media research and that, “since the procedure so closely
resembles a simple random sample, many researchers consider
systematic sampling to be as effective as the random procedure,”
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2003, p. 91). 
The FGD and key informant interview participants were
purposively selected. This technique provided the researcher with
the opportunity to select the respondents who were considered
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exposed to the situation enough to provide the needed information. 
Dawson, Manderson & Tallo (1993) state that it may be foolish to
use random sampling in this context since some of the samples that
would be obtained may not be fit to discuss the required subject.  
3.6 INSTRUMENT OF DATA COLLECTION
This study made use of the focus group discussion, key informant
interview and survey designs. The instrument that was used to
gather data for the focus group discussion was the question guide, 
also known as the question line. The question guide was designed
by the researcher and it had three basic parts (See appendix 4). The
first part was the face-sheet. This page was used to record factual
information such as time, date, and place of discussion. It also
contained the demographic information of the discussants. The
second part contained the actual questions that were asked and the
last part of the guide is the post-interview comment sheet. This
sheet was used for notes after the discussion. Here, details of the
researcher’s feelings, interpretations and other comments were
documented. The focus group discussion sessions were conducted
by the researcher with the aid of interpreters where necessary. 
Data from the in-depth interview were gathered through the use of
two interview guides; one for the representatives of the oil
companies and another for members of the host communities. The
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guides were constructed by the researcher and they contained lists
of questions that were asked from the interviewee. The questions
were simple and flexible; therefore, they encouraged in-depth
responses. Only a few questions were asked so as to give adequate
time for responses.  There were two different interview guides, one
for the Public Relations Officers of the oil companies (See
appendix 2) and one for selected members of the communities (See
appendix 3). For both the focus group discussions and in-depth
interviews, a digital audio recorder was used for data gathering, 
hence, increasing the fidelity of the information gathered. The
interview sessions were conducted by the researcher with the aid of
interpreters where necessary. 
A 22 item questionnaire was designed by the researcher for the
survey (See appendix 1). It contained demographic questions, 
which elicited basic information from the respondents, such as
their ages, sex and other details about their communities. It also
contained questions on the relationship between the respondents’
communities and the oil companies, and questions related to their
perception of the community relations strategies of the companies. 
Copies of the questionnaire were administered by the researcher
and research assistants.  
130
3.7 MEASURABLE VARIABLES
This section presents the major dependent variables that were
measured in this study. The variables are presented below:
1. Frequency of conflict occurrence in the Niger Delta
involving Shell, Agip and Chevron: both quantitative and
qualitative data were generated to measure this variable. 
Copies of the questionnaire retrieved were analyzed using
simple percentage. The focus group discussion and
interview data were analysed through the creation of
themes and interpretation. 
2. Consequences of Niger Delta conflicts on host
communities and oil companies: to measure this variable, 
interviews were conducted in the selected oil companies, 
while focus group discussions, interviews and survey
were conducted among the host communities. 
3. Community relations strategies adopted by Shell, Agip and
Chevron to avoid/resolve conflict: interview was used to
find out the companies’ unique strategies while survey
was used to investigate the communities’ point of view. 
4. Structural differences in the community relations strategies
adopted by the selected oil companies: to measure this
variable, interviews were conducted in the selected oil
companies. 
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5. Host communities’ perception of oil companies’
community relations strategies: to measure this variable, 
survey was adopted. Likert Scale was used for adequate
measurement of perception. 
6. Host communities’ preference of oil companies’ strategies:
interview was used to find out what the oil companies
believed the communities preferred while survey, focus
group discussion and interview were used to find out
what the communities actually preferred. 
  
3.8 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
The notes taken during the focus group discussion sessions were
developed and data were transcribed. The data generated were
carefully considered. The responses were categorized according to
themes and similarities. Codes were generated for each category
and a code book was kept for proper documentation. A log book
was also created in which all the categorized responses from all the
focus groups were entered according to topics of interest. The
presentation of the results included the statement of the findings, 
diagrammatic representation of findings and the discussion of the
various perspectives elicited in the study. For the in-depth
interview, the tapes were also transcribed, thereby creating the
written text of the interview. Information gathered were grouped
based on themes, commonalities, and patterns. After this had been
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done, the results were presented and discussed. As for the data
generated through the questionnaire, they were analyzed using
percentages and presented using simple frequency and cross
tabulation.    
3.9 RELIABILITY  
According to Sobowale (2008), a researcher must subject the
instrument/questionnaire to a pretest before sending it to the field, 
to ensure that it is good enough. Hence, the research instrument for
this study was pre-tested to ensure that it measured what it set out
to measure and to quickly identify the difficulties the respondents
might encounter in understanding the questions. The pre-test was
conducted in Eruemukohwarien, one of the communities used for
this study. After the responses were returned, they were evaluated
and it was discovered that the questions were clear and the
responses were consistent.  
To further ensure the standardization of the instrument, particularly
for measuring perception, the Likert scale measurement responses
were adapted for this study. This was based on the existing
statistical proof that Likert scale is adequate for measuring the
degree of responses particularly with respect to studies aimed at
measuring perception (Wilmer & Dominic, 2003).  
133
Also, the reliability of the instrument was confirmed by calculating
the internal consistency reliability using two methods; split half
and Cronbach’s Alpha. The split half yielded a coefficient of 0.692
while the Cronbach’s Alpha yielded a coefficient of 0.79. The
research instrument was administered once on forty (40)
respondents in Eruemukohwarien. 
3.10 VALIDITY
Efforts were made to ensure the content validity of the
questionnaire by dividing the variables into specific themes that
the respondents could easily relate to. Multiple choices were
provided and the option for the respondents to suggest their
answers was also provided to ensure that the fullest possible data
were generated.  
Expert scrutiny was also employed to ensure the validity of the
instrument. An expert each from the fields of Mass
Communication, Sociology and Psychology scrutinized the
instrument and they agreed that it possessed content validity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, the results derived from the investigation are
presented. The first part of the results is based on the 595 copies of
the questionnaire that were distributed, properly filled and
retrieved from Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo
communities in Delta State and Omoku and Obrikom communities
in Rivers State. The second part of the results is based on the Focus
Group Discussions (FGD) and the Key Informant Interviews (KII)
that were conducted, while the third section of the chapter presents
the discussion of both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
4.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
This section contains data presentation and analyses of the finding
from the survey conducted. Firstly, the socio-demographic profile
of the respondents are provided, followed by data on  conflict
occurrences in the communities, the oil companies involved and a
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general description of the relationship between both parties. The
section ends with a measurement of host communities’ perceptions
of different aspects of their relationships with oil companies. 
TABLE 4.1
COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS
As already stated, this study was carried out in five Niger Delta
communities. The community distribution of the respondents
reveals that the largest percentage came from Omoku, followed by
Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom, Kolokolo and Tisun (Table 4.1). The
relatively low percentages from Tisun and Kolokolo communities
were due to the Itsekiri-Ijaw crises that occurred in 2004, which
COMMUNITY PERCENT
Eruemukohwarien
30.6
Tisun
3.7
Kolokolo
6.1
Omoku
47.6
Obrikom
12.0
TOTAL                            100%
                            n                                       595
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compelled most of the indigenes to relocate to urban centres for
security reasons.     
TABLE 4.2
AGE AND GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of both male and female
respondents by age. It reveals that majority of the respondents
from both gender fell within the age category of 20-35. It also
shows us that there were more female respondents (82.8%) within
this age category than there were males (63.5%). A closer look at
the table also reveals that there is an inverse relationship between
the age categories and the number of respondents within them. 
Hence, the higher the age ranges, the lesser the percentage of
respondents. This observation is true for both the female and male
AGE GENDER
MALE FEMALE
20-35 63.5% 82.8%
36-50 31.1 14.6
51-65 5.1 1.9
66+ 0.3 0.7
Total  
n
100%
334
100%
261
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categories, though again, more females (0.7%) than males (0.3%)
fell into the final category of ages 66 and above.  
TABLE 4.3
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY COMMUNITIES
Age Name of Community
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom
20-35 52.7% 40.9% 72.2% 84.5% 80.6%
36-50 40.1 40.9 27.8 13.4 16.7
51-65 7.2 13.8 .0 1.8 2.4
66+ .0 .4 .0 .3 .3
Total
n
100%
182
100%
22
100%
36
100%
283
100%
72
Table 4.3 provides a follow up to Table 4.2 by showing the
respondents’ age distribution according to their communities. As
can be seen, majority of the respondents from each of the five
communities fell within the 20-35 age range. Considering that the
youths were the most active participants in the Niger Delta crises, 
particularly in terms of restiveness and militancy, it is not
surprising that they had the highest representation in this study. 
This may be due to their activeness and readiness to express
themselves, or their realization that they had more at stake than
their aged leaders. 
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TABLE 4.4
GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE
COMMUNITIES
Gender Communities
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom
Male 65.9% 63.6% 72.2% 47.7% 54.2%
Female 34.1 36.4 27.8 52.3 45.8
Total
n
100%
182
100%
22
100%
36
100%
283
100%
72
In the table above, it can be seen that more males participated in
this study than their female counterparts, except in Omoku. A
possible explanation for this may be found in the educational level
of the communities, as presented in Table 4.5 below. Omoku
appears to be the most educated of the five communities, followed
by Obrikom. It is interesting to note that female participation in
this study also followed the same progression. Hence, we can
safely conclude that the more educated the communities were, the
more willing the females were to express their views. 
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TABLE 4.5
EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS  
Education
Communities
Eruemukohwarie
n Tisun
Kolokol
o
Omok
u
Obriko
m
SSCE or less 95.6% 95.5
%
86.1% 42.0% 68.1%
HND/Degre
e
3.4 4.5 13.9 51.6 29.1
MSc/MA 0.5 0 0 5.7 1.4
Ph.D 0.5 0 0 0.7 1.4
Total
n
100%
182
100%
22
100%
36
100%
283
100%
72
Table 4.5 shows the educational distribution of the respondents
according to their communities. A general look at the table reveals
that though Obrikom had the highest percentage of Ph.D (1.4%), 
Omoku appears to be a more educated community than the others. 
This is because 58% of its respondents had HND/Degree and
above, as against the 31.9% of Obrikom, 13.9% of Kolokolo, 4.5%
of Tisun and 4.4% of Eruemukohwarien. It is also ironic that while
the second largest percentage of respondents came from
Eruemukohwarien, majority of them had SSCE or less. It is even
more ironic considering that Eruemukohwarien is located on the
mainland, between Ughelli and Warri in Delta State, with both
cities being urban centres, while Tisun is located in the creeks with
no single school in the community. 
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TABLE 4.6
OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS FOR RELATING WITH
COMMUNITIES
Channels for Relating with
the Community
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Royal fathers only 3.1% 25% 7.7%
      Elders only 32.0 2.1 6.2
       Family heads only 4.1 3.0 3.1
   Youths only 43.2 8.6 12.2
All levels above 8.8 58.6 70.8
    No level at all 8.8 2.7 0
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
The result in Table 4.6 shows that of the three oil companies, Agip
related more with the communities through the royal fathers, Shell
related more through the elders, family heads and youths and
Chevron generally favoured a combination of the four channels. It
can be observed that on a general level, none of the three
companies was particularly disposed towards the use of family
heads as a channel for relating with the communities. 
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TABLE 4.7
RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS
OCCURRENCES IN THEIR COMMUNITIES
Any conflict
in your
community?
Name of Community
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom
Yes 95.6% 4.5% 66.7% 78.0% 90.3%
No 4.4 95.5 33.3 21.6 9.7
Total
n
100%
182
100%
22
100%
36
100%
283
100%
72
Conflicts may occur when there is incompatibility between the
goals, objectives or values of the oil companies and host
communities in the Niger Delta. The result in Table 4.7 shows that
the highest percentage of conflict acknowledgement came from
Eruemukohwarien, while the lowest was from Tisun. It is not
surprising that Eruemukohwarien returned such a high percentage
because a conflict occurred in the community about a year before
this study was conducted. Members of the community demanded
that their road network should be repaired by Shell but there was
no response from the company. Hence, a demonstration was staged
during which the operations of Shell in the community were shut
down. A year after the incident, the cause of the conflict was yet to
be addressed. Hence, the issue was of current relevance in the
community. Tisun, on the other hand, claimed to be a peaceful
community and this reflected in the respondents’
acknowledgement of conflicts. 
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TABLE 4.8
RESPONDENTS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE FREQUENCY OF
CONFLICTS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES
Frequency of
conflict in
communities Communities
Eruemukohwarien Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom
Rarely 90.7% 100.0% 64.8% 46.5%
Often 6.6 0 22.1 42.3
Very often 2.7 0 13.1 11.2
Total
n
100%
182
100%
29
100%
267
100%
71
       
A look at table 4.8 reveals that conflicts rarely occurred in the five
communities. Tisun was not represented in the table because only
one individual responded to the question and his view could not be
taken to be the representation of the community. The lack of
response in Tisun was expected, however, because majority of the
respondents had earlier claimed ignorance of any conflict in their
community.  
The information on this table, as far as the other communities are
concerned, nevertheless, contradicts that of Table 4.7. In
explaining this contradiction, the respondents claimed that though
they had experienced some conflicts in their communities, violence
was rare. Hence, it appears that conflict in this context was
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interpreted to mean crisis. Considering that a crisis is a situation
that degenerates into a critical stage in which extraordinary
intervention is needed to remedy, it becomes understandable that
majority of the respondents claimed its rarity. Therefore, while the
communities were familiar with conflicts, they rarely experienced
crises. 
TABLE 4.9
RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THEIR
COMMUNITIES AND THE OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED
Conflict in the
communities
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
            Yes 93.8% 81.8% 44.6%
             No 6.2 18.2 55.4
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
Table 4.9 above presents the respondents’ views on the occurrence
of conflicts in their communities and the oil companies involved. 
The finding reveals that more respondents identified Shell as being
involved in more conflicts in their communities than the other two
companies. Considering that Shell has the largest operations in the
Niger Delta, the company is likely to be more involved in conflict
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situations than the others.  On the other hand, Chevron’s operations
are mostly restricted to the Itsekiri communities, leading to the
fewer acknowledgements of conflict involvements. This table
agrees with the finding in Table 4.7, which further shows that the
responses provided in Table 4.8 were referring to crisis rather than
conflict. 
TABLE 4.10
OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Channels of Conflict Resolution
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Elders 5.7% 54.7% 13.2%
Youths 5.7 30.1 13.2
Government 51.5 7.5 60.5
Consultants 37.1 7.8 13.2
Total
n
100%
194
100%
322
100%
28
                                                                                    
                                                                                        
The most preferred channel of conflict resolution by Agip was
through community elders and youths while Chevron and Shell
preferred external channels i.e. the government and consultants
(Table 4.10). By identifying with its host community, Agip tended
to avoid a tripartite approach in resolving conflict with its host
communities. The approach may explain why the degree of
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conflict between Agip and its host communities was less than
Shell’s but more than Chevron’s (Table 4.9) that favoured a
relatively higher use of the channels (Table 4.10). 
TABLE 4.11
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THEIR COMMUNITIES’
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL COMPANIES
Community’s Relationship with
Oil Company
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Cordial 6.2% 39.3% 15.4%
Neutral 5.7 39.0 9.2
Not cordial
88.1 21.7 75.4
Total
n 100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                                        
Table 4.11 above shows that more respondents believed that Agip
enjoyed a cordial relationship with their communities than those
who believed the same for Chevron and Shell. Agip equally
returned a higher percentage among those who were neutral. This
might mean that they did not have any serious complaint against
the company; otherwise, they would have taken a stand. 
Nevertheless, a contradiction exists between the positive ratings of
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the company in this table and the percentage of respondents who
acknowledged its involvement in the conflicts in their communities
(see Table 4.9).  
The answer to this may lie in the channels Agip adopted for
conflict resolution (see table 4.10). Considering that the company
was perceived as favouring internal community structures over
external ones for resolving conflicts, it is understandable that Agip
would enjoy a cordial relationship with the communities. 
Ordinarily, it is a paradox to describe the relationship Agip shared
with its host communities as cordial while more than three-quarter
of the respondents also acknowledged its involvement in conflicts. 
Nevertheless, a cordial relationship is not necessarily one that is
void of conflicts, but one in which avenues are made for proper
mitigation. A look at Tables 4.12 and 4.17 shows that Agip
communicated more frequently with its host communities and the
communities were more satisfied with its conflict resolution
efforts. Hence, in spite of Agip’s involvement in conflicts, its
efforts to mitigate them helped to maintain its cordial relationship
with the host communities.   
Shell, on the other hand, had a larger percentage of respondents
who said it did not enjoy a cordial relationship with their
communities. This result is consistent with the finding in Table
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4.9. Also, Shell’s perceived preference for external assistance
during conflict resolution might have influenced the respondents’
opinion about their communities’ relationship with the company.  
Chevron also returned a predominantly negative perception of its
relationship with the communities. This result contradicts the
finding in Table 4.9. While the table presents Chevron as having
the least claim of conflict involvement, the current table shows that
more than three-quarters of the respondents believed that it did not
enjoy a cordial relationship with their communities. This, again, 
may be associated with the company’s adopted channels for
conflict resolution.  
It appears, therefore, that Agip had a more cordial relationship
with the communities than Shell and Chevron, while Shell had the
least cordial relationship of the three. In general, the communities
perceived their relationships with Shell and Chevron far less
cordial. 
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TABLE 4.12
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE FREQUENCY OF OIL
COMPANIES’ COMMUNICATION WITH COMMUNITIES
                                                                        
The role of communication in building a mutual relationship
between oil companies and host communities cannot be
overemphasized. Communication can be simply described as the
exchange of relevant information between the parties involved. 
Table 4.12 reveals that of the three oil companies under study, 
more respondents believed that Chevron never communicated with
their communities. Considering the importance of communication
in any relationship, particularly one that is channelled towards
conflict resolution, it is not surprising that majority of the
respondents claimed that Chevron did not enjoy a cordial
relationship with their communities. Idemudia (2007, p. 380)
observes that a poor communication flow between host
communities and oil companies “Creates huge latitude for
Frequency of Company-
Community Communication
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Never
2.6% 4.2% 73.8%
Once in a while
89.7 55.7 18.5
Often
7.7 40.2 7.7
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
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misinterpretation and misinformation.” This, therefore, explains
the frequent conflicts between the Niger Delta youths and the oil
companies. 
Shell returned the highest percentage among the respondents who
claimed it communicated once in a while with their communities. 
Shell’s inability to commit to frequent communication with the
communities was probably one of the factors responsible for the
frequent attacks on the company.  This result may be one of the
factors responsible for the company’s level of involvement in
conflicts with host communities (Table 4.9) and the lack of cordial
relationship with them (Table 4.11). 
Also, a higher percentage of the respondents believed that Agip
communicated often with their communities. This result is
consistent with the findings so far in this study.  No doubt that the
company’ communication with its host communities contributed to
its rating as the most cordial of the three oil companies under study
(see Table 4.11).  
Going by the result in this table, majority of the respondents
believed that Chevron never communicated with their community, 
Shell communicated once in a while and Agip communicated
often. Hence, it can be said that as far as the respondents were
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concerned, Chevron had the worst communication record of the
three, Agip had the best, while Shell was average.    
TABLE 4.13
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
                                                        
                                                        
In assessing strategies for peaceful coexistence with host
communities and oil companies’ corporate social responsibilities, 
respondents were asked about their perceptions regarding the
companies’ development efforts in their communities. By
development we mean the establishment of schools, building of
clinics/hospitals, provision of boreholes and other similar social
amenities.  The finding presented in Table 4.13 indicates that Agip
was perceived to have contributed more to community
development than Shell and Chevron. While this result
corresponds with the finding presented in Table 4.12, which shows
Company's Contribution to
Community Development
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Yes 6.2% 51.2% 9.2%
Sometimes 78.4 41.4 43.1
No 15.5 7.4 47.7
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
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that Agip enjoyed a cordial relationship with the communities, it
contradicts that of Table 4.9, in which more than three-quarters of
the respondents claimed that the company was involved in the
conflicts in their communities. This contradiction may be
explained by the communities’ claims that though Agip
contributed to development, they sometimes had to protest and
demonstrate for such contributions to be made. 
Shell, on the other hand, returned its highest percentage among the
respondents who claimed it contributed once in a while to
community development. Respondents’ perception, so far, has
shown that Shell did not engage the communities enough as to win
their goodwill. Also, of the three oil companies, the highest
percentage of respondents believed that Chevron did not contribute
to community development at all. A study conducted by Idemudia
(2007) reveals that all the Niger Delta villages surveyed expected
development benefits from the oil companies, as part of their
entitlements as host communities. Failure to deliver such benefits
automatically engendered hostility from the communities. The
finding in Table 4.13, therefore, explains one of the sources of
hostility towards oil companies in the Niger Delta.  
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TABLE 4.14
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’
CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMUNITIES BEFORE EMBARKING
ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Consultation with Community
before executing Development
Projects
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Never 8.2% 9.8% 78.5%
Once in a while 84.5 47.0 16.9
Often 2.1 31.3 1.5
Very often 5.2 11.9 3.1
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                                                                      
One of the major ways by which host communities can be allowed
to participate in deciding their own development is to be consulted
by oil companies. Consultation in this context implies a meeting
between two or more parties to consider a particular question, 
which in this case is the question of development. Table 4.14
presents respondents’ answers to the question on the oil
companies’ consultations with the communities before embarking
on development projects. Of the three oil companies, Chevron
returned the highest percentage, 78.5%, among the respondents
who claimed it never consulted with its host communities. Shell
consulted the communities once in a while, as claimed by 84.5%, 
while more than four out of ten respondents said Agip both
consulted often (31.3%) and very often (11.9%). 
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This table reveals that majority of the respondents were of the
opinion that Chevron never consulted with their communities
before embarking on development projects, Shell consulted once in
a while, and Agip consulted both often and very often.  Although it
can be observed that Agip had its highest percentage (47%) in the
“once in a while” category, this does not negate the fact that it
performed much better than its counterparts in the “often” and
“very often” category, which means it had better and more open
community involvement.  
Though the responses in Table 4.14 may be viewed as limited
considering that the social status of the respondents will
significantly influence their privilege to witness or even participate
in negotiations between oil companies and host communities, it
may still be argued that awareness cannot be ruled out. The
communities possess structures which give responsibilities to
representatives and mandate them to report to the people they
represent during town hall sessions.  
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TABLE 4.15
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ POSITIVE
INFLUENCE ON THEIR COMMUNITIES
From Table 4.15, Agip was perceived to have the greatest
influence on its host communities. This means that the company
had the ability to favourably affect the communities using its
presence to the benefit of its hosts. This is interesting and a serious
indictment on Shell, the oldest and the biggest of the three. It is
little wonder that the company has suffered more from the
militants than the others. On the other hand, we see that Shell was
perceived as having the least influence on the communities. 
Though Chevron was in-between Shell and Agip in assessment, a
look at the table shows that of the total number of respondents who
shared their views on the company, 58.4% (a combination of
strongly disagree and disagree) were negative about its influence
on their communities. 
Company Positively
Influences the Community
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Strongly Disagree 63.9% 10.7% 49.2%
Disagree 9.3 13.4 9.2
Undecided 14.4 8.0 12.3
Agree 4.1 32.7 16.9
Strongly Agree 8.2 35.1 12.3
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
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TABLE 4.16
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR COMMUNITIES
Company Communicates
with Community Effectively
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Strongly Disagree 8.8% 8.6% 29.2%
Disagree 35.1 21.7 38.5
Undecided 42.8 12.2 9.2
Agree 3.6 30.4 16.9
Strongly Agree 9.8 27.1 6.2
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
According to Table 4.16, Agip again remains the most open oil
company with a majority of 57.5% saying that it either agreed or
strongly agreed that the company had better and effective
communication with the host communities. A look at previous
tables shows that Agip has maintained far better relations than
others. Chevron and Shell follow in that order. 
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TABLE 4.17
RESPONDENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH OIL COMPANIES’
CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES
Satisfaction with Company's
Conflict Resolution
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Highly Dissatisfied 53.1% 18.2% 46.2%
Dissatisfied 20.1 18.5 40.0
Undecided 16.5 18.8 7.7
Satisfied 4.6 25.9 1.5
Highly Satisfied 5.7 18.8 4.6
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                                             
                                                                                         
Table 4.17 reveals that respondents were most satisfied with Agip
in terms of conflict resolution. Again, this result is consistent with
the previous findings in this study. It is also not surprising, 
considering that communication is one of the major preconditions
for successful conflict resolution and the company was perceived
to have had a better and more effective communication than the
others (see Table 4.16).  
On the other hand, Chevron was considered by the respondents to
have exhibited the least satisfactory conflict resolution of the three
oil companies. A combination of the “strongly disagree” and
“disagree” response categories shows us clearly that Chevron
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returned 86.2% dissatisfaction rate among the respondents. 
Chevron was closely followed by Shell with 73.2%.  This finding
crystallizes another aspect of the issues the Niger Delta
communities had against the oil companies, which was poor
response to conflicts. It also, to some extent, explains the enduring
conflicts in the region; the conflicts were either not resolved to the
satisfaction of the communities, or were not resolved at all, thereby
leading to the degeneration of the problems.   
TABLE 4.18
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ READINESS
TO NEGOTIATE DURING CONFLICTS
The company is ready to
negotiate during cconflicts
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Strongly Disagree 23.2% 9.5% 44.6%
Disagree 8.8 14.9 20.0
Undecided 20.1 14.9 10.8
Agree 7.2 36.3 20.0
Strongly Agree 40.7 24.4 4.6
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                                  
                                                                                        
A look at Table 4.18 indicates that Agip and Shell were perceived
by respondents to be more willing to negotiate with their host
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communities to resolve their conflicts. This should not be
surprising because the two companies have different reasons to
negotiate. Agip, as we have seen in previous analyses, has been the
most open and communicative of the three oil companies under
study. It, therefore, would like to discuss its disagreements more
readily than others. 
Shell, on the other hand, has had more conflicts than other
companies, probably because it has the largest operations in the
Niger Delta. This means that whether it likes it or not, it must
negotiate its numerous conflicts, the medium notwithstanding. It is, 
however, ironic that in spite of the company’s perceived readiness
to negotiate, almost three-quarters of the respondents were not
satisfied with its conflict resolution (see Table 4.17). 
Just about a quarter of the respondents said Chevron was ready to
negotiate its conflicts with the communities. This is likely to be
related to the relative size of the conflicts the company has had to
face and perhaps, the size of the sample expressing views on this
matter.  
159
TABLE 4.19
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE REDUCTION OF CRISES
FREQUENCY THROUGH OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNICATION
                                                                  
In Table 4.19, Agip’s communication was perceived by
respondents to have reduced crises frequency in the communities. 
This finding suggests that effective community relations can
actually reduce crises frequency in the Niger Delta. Agip was
followed by Shell, with 42.8% of the respondents either agreeing
or strongly agreeing that its communication reduced crises
frequency in their communities. It is interesting to note that though
majority of the respondents had earlier said that Shell was less
effective in its communication and they were less than satisfied
with its conflict resolution, the company’s communication was still
perceived as having reduced crises frequency. The answer to this
may lie in Shell’s readiness to negotiate, as shown in Table 4.18
Company’s Communication
reduces crises frequency
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Strongly Disagree 20.6% 11.3% 43.1%
Disagree 14.9 21.1 46.2
Undecided 21.6 17.9 0
Agree 37.6 30.1 4.6
Strongly Agree 5.2 19.6 6.1
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
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above. Over three-quarters of the respondents said that Chevron’s
communication did not reduce crises frequency in their
communities. This result is consistent with previous findings in
this study. It also suggests that Chevron’s relatively fewer conflicts
(see Table 4.9) were not as a result of its communication with the
communities. 
TABLE 4.20
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’
FULFILMENT OF PROMISES
Company fulfils promises
Resident oil company
Shell Agip Chevron
Strongly Disagree 51.0% 11.9% 53.8%
Disagree 13.4 18.2 29.2
Undecided 14.9 15.8 3.1
Agree 6.7 29.2 6.2
Strongly Agree 13.9 25.0 7.7
Total
n
100%
194
100%
336
100%
65
                                                     
                                                                                 
Table 4.20 reveals that Agip has maintained its lead among the
other companies. It was perceived as having fulfiled its promises
by a majority of 54.2%. This result reveals, perhaps, the most
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valuable factor responsible for Agip’s perceived cordial
relationship with the communities. The company’s readiness to
negotiate would have been a waste if it did not fulfil its promises. 
Chevron was, however, perceived as the least trustworthy, 
followed by Shell. Considering this finding, therefore, it is not
surprising that both companies were perceived by more than three-
quarters of the respondents as not enjoying cordial relationship
with the communities (see Table 4.11). 
4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
As it has been earlier stated in this chapter, this study comprises
the quantitative and qualitative aspects. Having presented the
quantitative data above, the qualitative data are reported in this
section. The qualitative data was generated from eight focus group
discussion sessions and thirteen key informant interview sessions. 
It is important to note, at this point, that Agip, one of the
companies under study, declined any interview, thereby reducing
the comparison we can make among the oil companies. 
Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of the data generated was
carried out. Themes were created to aid clarity and easy
presentation. 
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4.3.1 The Community Relations Structures of the Oil
Companies  
Fig. 4.1
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’
STRUCTURES FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS
Figure 4.1 illustrates the structures of Shell and Chevron for
relating with host communities. Shell’s major structure is the
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Government and Community Relations Department (GCRD). 
According to the company’s representative, the department has the
dual function of maintaining good relationship with the
government on one hand and the communities on the other. 
Maintaining a favourable relationship with the government is
crucial for the creation of enabling environment for business.  
Also, on the other hand, since the communities inhabit the physical
environment in which the business is executed, the company must
also seek their goodwill. Considering the audience involvement
strategy (GMOU) that has been adopted by Shell, which will be
discussed in greater detail later in this work, the GCRD’s
responsibility does not include identifying the needs of the
communities. The communities identify their own needs and
present them to the GCRD through their representatives, while the
Department makes arrangement for the funding.   
The GCRD is further broken into three units for effective
operation. The first unit is the Eastern area of operation, which
includes Rivers State, Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers. The second is
the Central, and it focuses on Bayelsa State. The third is the
Western area of operation, which covers Delta State and Edo State. 
The primary responsibility of these units is to relate with every
party that is connected with any of Shell’s current or potential
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projects. First, the company identifies such parties; it then develops
and maintains a relationship with them. For instance, when Shell
wants to explore oil in a community, after making necessary
arrangements with the government, it approaches the leadership of
the community to seek their consent and support. After this has
been done, it tries to develop and maintain a good relationship with
the community by opening a line of communication and attending
to the complaints of the people while the project lasts. 
Shell also makes use of external structures in relating with the
communities. External structure, in this context, refers to
independent individuals, organizations or bodies that offer
professional or humanitarian assistance to the company in the
process of building a cordial and practicable relationship with the
communities. Shell’s external structures include consultants and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
The consultants are used both to relate with the communities and
to enlighten them on whatever Shell is trying to achieve. For
instance, if Shell wants to embark on a project in a particular
community, it engages the services of consultants to penetrate the
community and to enlighten members of the community on the
inherent benefits of the project. According to Shell’s
representative, “Those consultants would have to be professional, 
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development consultants who understand the dynamics of
development and also what the community’s perception might be.”
NGOs are engaged to help guide the communities with respect to
the execution of the agreements in the global memorandum of
understanding, which shall be examined in greater details later in
this report. Both the consultants and the NGOs are evaluated based
on the objectives of their engagements, which may vary, 
depending on circumstances surrounding such engagements, while
GCRD serves as a coordinating office. Shell’s representative was
of the opinion that they have been effective in their operations so
far. 
Fig 4.1 also presents Chevron’s structure for relating with the
communities. Chevron has a Corporate Office which is responsible
for the packaging and representation of the organization, among
other responsibilities. Packaging in this context, more or less, 
refers to branding; the entirety of the organization’s identity and
reputation among its publics. Located in the Corporate Office is
the Community Engagement Unit, which is directly responsible for
liaising with the communities. Chevron’s representative explained, 
“What we try to do is that each of our braches in a community has
in-house somebody who serves as a contact, like a public affairs
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contact.” The contacts are known as Community Engagement
Representatives (CER).  
As in the case of Shell, Chevron also makes use of external
structure in relating with the communities. Chevron makes use of
NGOs but not consultants. According to Chevron’s representative, 
the company works with NGOs to build capacity in the
communities. The NGOs also work with the communities to draw
up development plans that will be presented to the company for
assistance. He further explained:
We make use of quite a lot of
NGOs to create a type of
relationship with the communities
that is professional when we want
to do peace assessment, total
relationship assessment. When
you want to change the way they
think about some things, we use
NGOs. 
When we compare the structures of Shell and Chevron, we will
observe that Shell has a more centralized structure than Chevron. 
Shell has three regional units attending to the entire Niger Delta
area. This style of operation can aid easy administration since there
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are not too many units to focus on. Chevron, on the other hand, has
a structure that is represented in each of the company’s branches in
the communities. This brings the company closer to the people and
can help to establish company presence.  
Fig 4.2
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNIQUE COMMUNITY
RELATIONS STRATEGIES OF SHELL AND CHEVRON
The community relations strategies that are unique to each of the
oil companies are illustrated in Fig. 4. 2. As can be seen, one of the
unique strategies of Chevron is the way it practices its corporate
social responsibility (CSR). The company’s representative
explained that while the host communities are undeniably part of
Chevron’s most important communities, one should not lose sight
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of the fact that Chevron is partly owned by NNPC and even the
Nigerian government, thereby making the entire nation its
community. Consequently, Chevron makes constant effort to keep
in touch with all its communities. According to the company’s
representative:
We have this volunteer programme; we
encourage our employees to go and
contribute to the society and we support
them. For example, we have someone who
was sent to Nasarawa University to go and
lecture twice in a semester. 
According to him, some other employees teach in University of
Lagos (Unilag) and University of Ibadan (UI). He went further to
say that:
We know people who will contribute money, 
even as employees, if you raise 1 million
naira, Chevron will give you another 1
million naira to go and do all these services
to the community. I can tell you how many
computers have been given to students of UI, 
and so many other things. Just to let you
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know that we also go beyond dealing with
communities now. We have built several
hospitals among other things we are doing
(in the host communities).  
Another community relations strategy that Chevron utilizes is the
Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU). This strategy
was adopted in 2005. Chevron’s representative explained that
though the GMoU was originated by Chevron, it has been adopted
by other oil companies. Hence, one may not be able to classify it as
being unique to the company anymore. According to him, the
company has redefined its community engagement strategies in
such a way that it does not have to deal directly in developing the
communities anymore; rather, the communities are now
responsible for their own development. He explained:
The GMoU works to provide the
communities in such a way that the ideas are
original to them. We then authorize this
body to then work with the stakeholders- the
communities and NGOs- to draw up their
own development plan. So, they draw up
their own development plan, and then
implement their projects. They are the ones
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that will design the project, they are the
ones that will get contractors, and they are
the ones that will supervise it. If they need a
school, they are the ones that know where
they need the school and what kind of school
they need
Fig. 4.2 shows that Shell also makes use of GMoU as a strategy for
community relations. Shell adopted the strategy in 2006, but it
became fully functional in 2007. While explaining the reason for
adopting the strategy, Shell’s representative said that initially, the
company signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with each
community for activities it wanted to undertake.  
For example, if we want to move a rig from
Community A to Community B, we go and
sign MoU saying what we will do or not do, 
and the community signs. By the time you
want to remove the rig to another place, you
sign another thing with another. So, in a
typical operation, you may have several
MoUs you have signed for that same
community. That meant that in most cases, 
sometimes, the resources to follow them up
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or to implement whatever has been agreed, 
or to even remember that we had signed… to
manage it properly became a challenge
more or less. 
In operating the GMoU, Shell categorizes the communities into
groups taking into consideration their local government areas and
their ethnic affinities. Members of each group meet together to
decide their own development, thereby taking the lead in the
developmental process, rather than the company. The company’s
representative further explained that “GMoU means that out of a
thousand-five hundred communities we have been dealing with
before, and signing all those MoUs in different forms, we are
saying, we are grouping them into 67.” The 67 groups of
communities are referred to as clusters, and each cluster has a
Cluster Development Board (CDB). The CDB serves as the overall
governing body that determines what the basic needs of the
communities are. 
Shell provides each cluster with the financial support by giving it
money for a fixed period of five years. Within those five years, it is
expected that the money would be used by the cluster as they
determine their own development. The fund is renewable after five
years. Shell’s representative also stated, “They (the clusters) are
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also free to go to any other organization and look for money, 
because by the virtue of their underdevelopment, they have to do a
lot more for themselves.”  
Shell’s representative again identified other strategies he
considered unique to the company and the company’s business
ethics was one of them. According to him, “If you claim you are a
good neighbour, the things that you do will show that you are
mindful of your neighbours.” Being mindful, according to him, 
means doing things that are beneficial to the communities and
minimizing any negative impact. For instance, the company should
be able to apologise if the communities are offended. 
Shell also considers making information available to the
communities as one of its community relations strategies. 
According to the company’s representative, “We are always
relating with the communities. Because they have to know what is
going to happen and how it affects them, and gives them the
opportunity to express themselves.” He went further to say:
If they feel that you have been consulting
them very well, or putting them in the know
of what’s been going on, you are not hiding
anything from them, or you are honest and
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transparent as it should be or can be, then
the level of trust will be very high. 
  Another unique community relations strategies of Shell is its
business principles. The company claims to have what it refers to
as the Statement of General Business Principles, which serves as
the company’s guideline for all its activities. The company’s
representative claimed that “Even if you do find it elsewhere, it will
not be the same way we express it here, so, that may be the
uniqueness. Those principles are our guiding principles, the frame
work within which we relate”
  
Shell’s representative concluded on the issue of uniqueness of
strategy by saying that Shell may use the same tactics that
everybody has heard about, but the uniqueness is in how it is
actually used to achieve desired results in a particular situation. 
Hence, uniqueness does not necessarily mean that the strategy does
not exist elsewhere. He went on to say:
For example, every organization might have
heard of what we call a town hall session or
workshops or seminars, and they have it, but
the thing is, what is the content of it; what is
it you are trying to achieve? If you say, “I
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want to have a town hall session as a
stakeholders engagement strategy or
community relations,” what will you be
discussing? How are you going to start the
discussion? Who are you going to invite?
Those are the elements that create that
uniqueness that I am talking about
4.3.2 The Internal Structures of the Communities
Fig 4.3
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF TISUN AND
KOLOKOLO COMMUNITIES
Tisun and Kolokolo communities share a similar structure in terms
of the leadership of the communities. The Council of Elders is the
apex unit which oversees all the activities in the communities. The
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elders also settle disputes at every level in the communities. The
Council is headed by a Chief and as at the time this study was
conducted, the chiefs of both communities were residing in Warri, 
a major city in Delta State. This is because the communities are in
the creeks and are grossly underdeveloped. The implication of this
is that the chiefs may not be able to adequately represent their
people since they are not subjected to the same living conditions.   
The next level of leadership is the Trustee or Trust, as the
communities preferred to call it. The Trust acts as the executive
decision making body of the two communities. It represents the
elders in negotiations with the oil companies and also serves as the
communities’ link with the larger society. The Trust has its own set
of executives for easy administration and this includes the
chairman, secretary and treasurer among others.  
After negotiating with the oil companies for a job, for instance, the
Trust takes the allocations to the youth executives for further
distribution. According to a member of the youth executive in
Kolokolo, “Then we will now sit down and brainstorm and share
the work. Then if the job is ten allocations, we will always get
some amount that will come to the youth. Then we will fix people
up.” Some active elders of the communities also get some
allocations when such is available.  
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Hence, if the government or the oil companies want to execute a
project in the community, the Trust represents the communities in
the discussion with them. Members of the Trust too do not reside
in the communities; a youth in Tisun community said, “They are
members of this community, born and brought up here then, but as
their post was beginning to enlarge, they relocated to the
township.”
The National Youth is the next level after the Trust. The major
responsibility of the youths is to work to maintain the community. 
The youth executives focus mainly on sharing job allocations. The
youths report to the Trust while the Trust in turn reports to the
elders. The Trust mediates disputes among the youths and the
elders do the same for the Trustees.  
The women in Tisun and Kolokolo are not officially in the
administrative hierarchy; nevertheless, they are a force to reckon
with. They have access to every level of leadership in the
community and they play an advisory role. Culturally, the women
in Tisun and Kolokolo are not seen but they are heard. Though
they seem politically passive, they are actually major pressure
groups in their communities. An elder in Tisun community said the
following about the role of the women in the community:
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They are helping us the men; there are
some issues that we feel we cannot go into, 
we can tell the women to represent us. 
Because, if there is a fight between two
communities now, and we see that if we
men go there, it will cause problem, we
send some women there, and there will be
no problem. 
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Fig 4.4
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND
OBRIKOM COMMUNITIES
Omoku and Obrikom, as in the case of Tisun and Kolokolo, have
similar administrative structures. The Council of Elders (COE) is
the ceremonial head of the communities because it is the traditional
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institution that oversees the traditions and culture of the
communities. This Council is also called the “Amaala”. Though
the Council of Elders is seen as the first, in the actual sense, the
Council of Chiefs (COC) is the highest policy making body of the
community. This information is presented in the figure above using
dotted lines to indicate the functional position of the COC. 
Whenever a project is to be executed in the community and the
company gets a contractor to undertake the project, such a
contractor must first inform the Council of Chiefs before
commencing the project. 
Next on the hierarchy is the Community Development Committee
(CDC). This is a government approved institution that sees to the
development of the community. The CDC negotiates with the oil
companies on behalf of the community, while reporting to the
Council of Chiefs. The committee comprises selected members of
the community. 
The Women Association is the next in line. Unlike in the case in
Tisun and Kolokolo, women are actually given a place on the
administrative hierarchy in Omoku and Obrikom. This may be
because the latter communities are larger and the women are more
enlightened. Another reason that may be responsible for the
official recognition of women in these communities is their
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organized nature, since the women have an association. 
Nevertheless, the women in Omoku and Obrikom perform, more
or less, the same function as the ones in Tisun and Kolokolo, 
which is to advise their men.  
The youths are seen as the vanguard of the communities; they
work and report to the Council of Chiefs. When the communities
have needs and there is no favourable response from the oil
companies, the CDC usually allows the youths to represent the
communities after receiving the necessary clearance from the
Council of Chiefs. In some occasions, however, the Council of
Chiefs, the CDC and the youths represent the community together, 
with each of them sending their delegates.  
All the units in the communities report directly to the Council of
Chiefs. According to one of the chiefs in Obrikom, “Every other
ruling arm revolves around the Council of Chiefs; be it CDC, 
Women Association, Council of Elders, or the youths. The Council
of Chiefs is the highest policy making body.” This structure is
unlike that of Tisun and Kolokolo communities in which one level
of the hierarch reports to the one directly above it. Hence, we can
say that while the former communities practice the vertical form of
administration, the latter communities practice the central form. 
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The functional structure of Omoku and Obrikom is illustrated in
Fig. 4.5 below. 
Fig 4.5
THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND
OBRIKOM COMMUNITIES
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Fig 4.6
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF
ERUEMUKOHWARIEN
Fig 4.6 shows us the structure Eruemukohwarien community
operates. From the figure, we see that the first administrative organ
in the community is the Council of Elders. This council serves as
the traditional head of the community. It is, however, not directly
involved in policy making; rather, it plays an advisory role.  
Next to the Council of Elders is the Central Governing Council
(CGC). The CGC is the highest policy making body in the
community and consists of a president and his cabinet. In the past, 
the members of the CGC were elected into office, but in recent
times, selection has been favoured over election. One of the youths
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who participated in the focus group discussion explained, “We
used to elect people before, but we realized that with election, 
people go by violence, threats, etc, so we decided to go by
selection from each of the street that makes up this community.”
This has, however, not reduced the violence. One of the visits to
the community, during this research, coincided with the selection
day, and the scene witnessed was that of commotion. It was
gathered that some youths were not satisfied with the selection, 
hence, the village was in a state of confusion.  Nevertheless, one of
the most important functions of the CGC is to represent the
community in negotiations with oil companies and the
government. 
The youth executives coordinate the activities of the youths in the
community. The youths usually maintain and clean the community. 
They also organise protests whenever they are dissatisfied with the
activities of the oil companies. The next administrative body is the
Employment Committee. This committee identifies employment
opportunities and engages individuals who can fill up the space.  
The women in Eruemukohwarien are not officially on the
administrative hierarchy, as in Tisun and Kolokolo, but they have
access to every level of leadership in the community and they play
an advisory role. They help to stabilize the community, particularly
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in times of conflict. Also, in the event of a conflict, if it gets out of
hands and the men will be endangered if they maintain active
participation, women are sent. According to an elderly woman, 
during the focus group discussion, “When the company is not
doing well… the whole community women will now gather, they
will now dance from here to the Shell yard.” Another woman
explained it further saying:  
If there is going to be a protest, 
because of Shell with their
forcefulness (military engagement), 
the community will allow the
women to do the protest. Because
when they see that the youth are
there, the forces will become
violent, so instead of the youth to go
there, the women go for the protest. 
The women in Eruemukohwarien community also make use of
symbolic communication in passing across their messages to
members of the community. They have a special drum they only
beat when there is a serious issue they wish to voice out.  
Whenever they sense an impending danger, they beat the drum to
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converge and holding leaves, they dance around the community. 
According to one of the youths:
They (the women) have a different
drum. If the women’s drum sounds, 
you know that there is something
going wrong, because they don’t
beat the drum anyhow. They call the
general meeting, they advice the
youths and the elders and whosoever
for peace- they want peace, they
don’t want their children to be
scared away from the place- they
call their children to order for peace
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4.3.2.1 Leadership problems in the communities
Fig. 4.7
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP
PROBLEMS IN THE COMMUNITIES
Some of the participants in the focus group discussion (FGD) and
key informant interview (KII) sessions identified the existence of
leadership problems in their communities. As can be seen in Fig. 
4.7, several factors were identified as the causes of their problems. 
One of the factors that the participants believed were responsible
for leadership challenges in their communities was the failure of
their leaders to empower the communities. A young woman from
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Kolokolo, during an FGD session, claimed that though the
community had money and the chief was rich, he never used the
money to help members of the community; rather, he built houses
in the community. She went further to say:  
To me, without the chief in this community, 
I will make it, because if I can stand, and I
can successfully complete my schooling
next year, I will become a petroleum
engineer. I know my rights, chief will not
help me, and with my application letter, I
will not come and meet chief because he
will not help me. But I want to go to
different places to spread my light; so, that
is why I am saying that even if chief does
not want to help me, how about those
people that are here, that have really
suffered a lot?  
A further discussion revealed that in Kolokolo, the women endured
rigors to feed their families. While their husbands were
predominantly fishermen, the women made their living from
picking Periwinkles; small edible marine snails. They would wade
through waist deep mud for long hours before they gather a few. 
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One of the women had four children to cater for, and according to
her, “Periwinkle is 600 naira, garri (Cassava flour) is 350 some
people sell 400. If you use that 600 naira to buy garri, there is
nothing remaining. ” The women expressed their desire to engage
in businesses, but claimed that they had not been assisted by their
chief. 
Another factor that was identified as a cause of leadership problem
was non-residential leaders. This was particularly the case in Tisun
and Kolokolo because the communities were in the creeks. The
oldest man residing in Tisun (several indigenes had relocated to
bigger cities) said, “Even our leader…he is from this area, yet, he
doesn’t know this place.”  One of the youths in Tisun said, “Most
of our people that govern stay up land there and don’t know what
we feel here, they don’t feel it. They stay upland there, they stay in
light.” Even members of the Trust, who negotiated on behalf of the
communities, did not reside in the communities. This, therefore, 
raises the question as to how a leader can effectively represent his
people when he does not live among them. A respondent said, 
“The one that used to pain me most is this, the people that are not
staying here, those are the people that used to enjoy the goods of
this place.”
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Some participants also claimed that the leaders in their
communities oppressed the youths. They were of the opinion that
common fund was spent indiscriminately, thereby endangering the
future of the youths. They said there was no plan put in place to
invest in the youths. One of the young girls in Eruemukohwarien
said, “But most of the things we are seeing in this community are
not really helping us. Most of the elders,  most of the time, they
oppress the youth.” Another youth said, “The elder come, the ones
that are in the front, pack all the money and give themselves.”
Also, sabotage was identified as another cause of leadership
problem in the communities. It was observed that this factor cut
across all the communities, since it was mentioned by most of the
participants in one form or the other. One of the forms in which
they believed sabotage manifested was their leaders blocking
external aids from coming to the communities. A young woman in
the FGD session in Kolokolo said:
  Wetin dey even pain mi self be, …
anything you wan do for us, may be
they (the leaders) fit block you for
town there, them fit say nothing dey
there, no mind them. Maybe better
thing wan come out now, our leader
them go take am. (What pains me is
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that, anything you want to do for us, 
the leaders may block you in town. 
They may say, “There is no problem
there, don’t mind them.” When good
things are coming our way, our
leaders would take them.”)
Scholarship was another issue in which sabotage was claimed. 
Some of the respondents in Kolokolo explained that whenever
scholarship was due to their community, the community leaders
would seize it and keep the money for themselves. During an FGD
session, one of the young women said, “We have money in this our
community. They (oil companies) give us scholarships. Sometimes, 
we submit our results, but our leader would seize it. So, we have
the money, but our leader is the one that owns the money.”
Also, as far as job allocations were concerned, some participants
said they were confused because they didn’t know who to blame, 
whether the oil companies or their leaders. A youth from Kolokolo
claimed that the youths made several recommendations, but
nothing came out of them. A young woman in Kolokolo insisted
that the leaders were either bribed or they themselves bribe to fix
other people up for job allocations due to the community. She
further said about their leaders, “They have work in town, but they
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sell the work to another different country (expatriates), some of the
countries that are not parties to the assets of this community, yet
they give them work.”  
Another woman said, several times, the leaders would collect the
names of the women in the community and use the list to process
allocations, “But when the result comes back, our names are not
present, then the big women carry the money and run.”
Emphasizing the same point, a woman said:
You know all of us as we dey here so, they
don use our names ehn, e don even pass five
times. When dem dey carry book come they
say make we write, say they wan give us
loan, we go write, after we don write, the
loan don come out, them no give us
anything. They just use our name collect
money. (You know, as we are all here, our
names have been used more than five times. 
They (the leaders) come with books to write
our names, saying they want to give us loan. 
After writing and the loan is given, they
would not give us anything. They just use
our names to collect money)
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Yet, another woman had this to say, “Na so them (the leaders) dey
do, oh, na lie. If dem wan give us money, e no go pass N500 or
N2000, they no dey bring am (loans) come, but dem go use our
name. (That is what they do, and it is all a lie. If they give us
money at all, it won’t be more than N500 or N2000. They don’t
give loans, they only use our names.) ”
The last, but not the least, cause of sabotage identified by the
participants was that some of the leaders sell out to the oil
companies. The leaders who were considered guilty of this were
not only elders, but mainly indigenes working for the oil
companies, particularly at the management level. According to His
Royal Majesty Eze Imordi, the Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi
(Usomini Mornarch) in Omoku, the oil companies could have
meant well for the communities, but the indigenes working for
them were sycophants.  He said:
Most of our children know as much as the
Italians too. There is no reason they should
owe allegiance, so much so, that they should
betray us. I say betray, yes, betray in the
sense that some of them try to protect the
interest of the companies they are serving. It
is true that they are to protect the interest
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because it is where they feed, but if they are
over doing it, it’s like over pampering a
child. The sabotage comes from our people. 
“Don’t mind them, just give them one naira, 
one naira is okay instead of ten naira they
are due for.” Sabotage! “I want promotion
master; there is a way I can do it. They are
my people, I’ll talk to them.” Sabotage! He
wants promotion. 
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4.3.3 Communities’ Perception of the Direction of
their Relationship with the Oil Companies
Fig. 4.8
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE COMMUNITIES’
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RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL COMPANIES
VIOLENCE
FAIRCORDIAL
COMMUNITY’S
RELATIONSHIP
WITH OIL
COMPANIES
DELAYED
RESPONSES
SOME
CONSIDERATI
ON FOR
ILLITERATES
SOME
BENEFITS
FEW
JOBS
POOR
INFRAS-
TRUCTURE
WRON
G
PRIORI
-TY
UNEMPLOY-
MENT
NEGLECTPOOR
EDUCATION
NOT
CORDIAL
POVERTYPOLLU-
TION
COMPANY
MUST BE
PRESURIZED
TO ACT
INADEQUATE
EMPLOYMENT
195
Fig. 4.8 illustrates how members of the communities viewed the
relationship between the oil companies and their communities. 
There were three main response categories; some were of the
opinion that the relationship was cordial, some others said it was
fair, while some still said it was not cordial. All of these responses
were supported by the reasons the participant responded in that
particular way. 
Participants who responded to the first category, which said the
relationship was cordial, were of the opinion that the oil companies
had done a lot for the communities for which they were
appreciative. One of the reasons given for this position was that the
companies provided some benefits for the communities. 
According to one of the chiefs in Eruemukohwarien, who also
happened to have worked with the oil companies in the past, “The
oil company is our friend because it is developing our village.  If
not for the oil companies, so many people will not be eating, 
because the government is not giving anybody food, it’s not
employing people.”
The Chief also mentioned the oil companies’ monetary
contributions to the Niger Delta Development Commission
(NDDC) as mandated by the Federal Government of Nigerian. He
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opined that the companies had been playing their part though it
was not certain what NDDC was doing with the money. He went
further to highlight the contributions of Shell to Eruemukohwarien
during his tenure as the president of the Central Governing
Council, which included six market stalls, water facilities, and road
network. The Chief also said that Shell usually consulted with the
community before embarking on developmental projects, and
when the community made demands, Shell would tell them to wait
for another financial year for it to be incorporated into the
company’s development plan. He stated emphatically that “Shell
has done enough, Shell has done enough; it is the government that
matters now.”  
Also in Obrikom, the women leader said that Agip built a market
for the community. The company also built a health center and was
already making plans to build a Women Development Center. 
Considering all of those, she stated that the community had a
cordial relationship with Agip. 
The second reason that was given by the respondents, who agreed
that their community had a good relationship with the oil
companies, was that the companies provided few jobs. Of course, 
they believed that the allocations were not enough but they got
them notwithstanding. One of the youths in Kolokolo described the
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job allocation process. He stated that if, for instance, Chevron has a
dredging job, it would be handled by the Nigerian Westminster
Dredging and Marine Ltd. According to him:
Westminster Dredging will now bring from
their staff- most of their staff will come
together with us. The job will last for six
months, then they will now tell the
community that, since the job will not last
more than six months, let us give you four
allocations. Then, maybe the community
executives will now tell Westminster that the
four allocations is not enough for our
youths, because we have a lot of youths, that
are not working in the community. 
Fig. 4.8 also presents a second category of responses, and this
includes the participants who were of the opinion that the
relationship between the oil companies and their communities was
fair. The participants said that the oil companies were making
efforts, but there were still some gray areas to be looked into. The
reasons they gave for the fair relationship were; some
consideration for the illiterate or uneducated members of the
communities; the companies’ responses were usually delayed, 
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there were inadequate employment opportunities; and the
companies required pressure before they made their contributions
to the communities. These reasons are presented below.  
The participants who said that the companies had some
consideration for illiterates in the communities explained that
education should not be made a criterion for everything. They
insisted that not everyone could be educated due to uncontrollable
circumstances. According to a youth in Tisun:
No be everybody na him be graduate, but
them dey push only graduate, graduate for
here, that is why militants full everywhere. 
Some of the boys in this community, not only
in this community self, they have nobody to
run to. It gets to a time, maybe you lose your
father, you left the school because there is
no body to help. You can struggle on your
own so te, you don tire, you will just be
trying to survive, many like that… it is just
like a discouragement to those who no go
school. (Not everybody is a graduate, but
they focus only on graduates here. That is
why there are many militants everywhere. 
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Some of the boys in this community- not
even this community alone- have no one to
run to. Some have lost their fathers, so they
had to leave school because they had no
assistance. They struggle on their own until
they become tired; merely trying to survive. 
There are many like that… it is a
discouragement for those who can’t go to
school.)
Some participants also said the oil companies usually offered
delayed responses. They explained that anytime anything was
needed in the communities, or whenever there was an oil spillage
and the communities had informed the oil companies, they would
delay their response. In most cases, the damage from the delayed
response would end up being more than that of the incident itself. 
Also, some participants said their communities’ relationship with
the oil companies was fair because there was inadequate
employment. They admitted that there was employment, but they
were grossly inadequate. A youth in Kolokolo claimed that there
were several graduates in the community, but they were not
employed by Chevron. He said, “Only very few of us are working, 
the rest of the boys fish; or if there is any building job in this town, 
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they roll wheelbarrow to pack concrete before they feed their wives
and children.” He further expressed his dissatisfaction with the
unemployment situation in the community by hypothetically
stating that if only five people were employed out of a hundred, 
what would become of the remaining 95? If on the other hand, 
80% were employed, at least the remaining 20% would be catered
for.  
Another participant from Tisun stated that his community was not
benefiting from Chevron as far as job was concerned. He said that
for instance, whenever Chevron’s representatives came to the
community to flag off a project that would last for three months;
they would only employ one or two people from the community. 
According to him, those employed “May not even work two
months there self, if you work one and a half months there, thank
God. When you now do the work finish, you will now remain like
that (without a job) for five to seven years. You will struggle to
even get spoon.”
A past youth president in Eruemukohwarien explained that the
community had no representative in Shell. The few who were
employed at all were assigned menial tasks such as cutting grasses, 
digging drainages and doing security work. Those employed were
paid between N10, 000 and N12, 000 only. He lamented the fact
201
that even those menial jobs had been withdrawn, particularly the
security jobs, and the indigenes were replaced by soldiers. He went
on to state that only three indigenes of the community worked with
Shell and they were mere contract staff. Two of those individuals
were employed only when the community staged a protest. 
According to him:
Last year, after serving about 15 years or
so, they were converted to their junior staff. 
Also, one of our boys was employed this
year as a contract staff CLO in Brass. Apart
from that, no other person, and we have
plenty of them roaming about. 
Another youth in the community agreed with the earlier participant
by stating that positions that should have gone to the community
legitimately, being an oil producing community, were given out to
others. He cited the instance of the Community Liaison Officer
(CLO) position in Shell that was not given to the indigenes of the
community. According to him, “They (Shell) went to the Hausas, 
Igbos and the Yorubas who did not even have oil, then people who
did not have oil you are now using them as a CLO who did not
even know our pains.”
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The last reason that was given for the fair relationship between the
oil companies and the communities was that the companies had to
be pressurised before they make their contribution to the
communities. One of the youths in Kolokolo said, “Chevron is a
company that always needs iron hand, but we don’t want to use
anything violence.” An elder in Eruemukohwarien observed that
while there were tarred roads, water and light in the southern part
of Nigeria, until his community fought, they didn’t get anything. 
He said, “Each time we demand things which ought to be given to
us naturally, we have to demand it by force, go to demonstrate, go
to protest for a long, long time, before they listen.” He went on:
Just yesterday, Otorogun was blown up. 
Otorogun had been attempted many times. 
They (oil companies) and the government
are saying that where there is peace there
will be development, we are peaceful here, 
but we are not seeing development. 
Another elder in the same community expressed his agreement
saying, “The Federal Government, they like the areas that are
operating under militant activities, that is why they normally focus
their attention on the people of Bayelsa, and other places where
militant is operating.”
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The third category of responses on the relationship between the oil
companies and the communities is that the relationship was not
cordial. Poverty was one of the major reasons given for this
position. The participants explained that they had to struggle to
survive and to maintain their families. A young woman in
Kolokolo explained that the women in the community usually
gathered Periwinkles and sold them to cater for their families. 
According to her:
Before twelve, you go see all of us dey pack
dey go. See how poto-poto dey reach us for
here. We dey jump for poto-poto dey pick. 
We be not pick this thing you dey see for
here, we no go eat. Our children no dey go
school, unless we get this thing… na suffer
we dey, if you dey this village for just two
days, you go see the suffer wey we women
dey suffer so. (Before12pm, you will see all
of us going to pick Periwinkles. We wade
through mud as we pick them. If we don’t
pick what you see here, we cannot feed. Our
children will not go to school unless we pick
it. We are suffering. If you live in this
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community for two day, you will see the
suffering the women undergo).   
The young woman also stated that of all the women who took part
in the FGD, there was none whose husband was working. She said, 
“Our husband no get anything wey dem they do, so without this
thing (Periwinkle), we no dey chop o. So the thing e don tire us.”
A young girl also expressed her helplessness saying that she came
home for holiday, “To have some money to go back to school, my
mother doesn’t have, my father doesn’t have- we need help in this
our community.” Another young girl explained that she never had
the opportunity of going to school. According to her:
Even my mother, my sisters, a lot of our
friends, they are really suffering in this
place. My mother has a lot of children, we
are ten in number. So, since I was a baby, 
my mother used to use periwinkle to train
us. How can you use money to pay for
school fees, when the money to eat is not
there? So, please, anything you can do to
help us in this community. 
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Another reason that was cited for the not cordial relationship with
the oil companies was pollution. Pollution was cited as a major
problem throughout the Niger Delta. The participants identified
water pollution as one of the pollutions they experience in their
communities. According to one of the youths in Tisun, whenever
the oil companies dredged in his community, there was always a
possibility of pollution. He explained that a little leakage could
result in a spill, thereby causing the crude oil to flow into the
water. He said, “Once it (the leakage) causes the oil spillage, those
of us who go for fishing, we will not be able to kill any fish.”
Another youth in Kolokolo supported this comment by saying, 
“Since Chevron pollutes the water, nobody can fish; the whole fish
run away, some of them  die.” Yet, another youth said, “Our
swamps are polluted, we have lost our original aquatic animals. 
We used to have shrimps.”
Air pollution was also mentioned as one of the pollutions
experienced in the communities.  Gas was constantly flared in the
communities and the air was almost always polluted. A youth from
Eruemukohwarien said, “I can tell you, the hazard they (oil
companies) expose us to here is much, if you stay here for the next
three to four hours now, you will see the flare.” Another youth, 
while describing how polluted the air was said:
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As this your shirt is now, if sun is shining
and you wash this T-shirt, just go and sun it, 
within 30mins or 40mins time, come back
and look at it- it will be black because of the
flare. You know, what we inhale in is
dangerous. 
The participants stated that the air in their communities was so
polluted that it affected the rain water. One of the youths in
Kolokolo said, “If we have rain now, the water that drops, 
tomorrow morning, check it, it is going to be black, and that is
what we drink.” Not only is the atmosphere polluted by gas
flaring, thereby causing acid rain, the flare also corrode the
aluminum roofing of the houses. One of the participants said, 
“Look at our zincs (roofing sheets), when the time comes, you will
see it practically- the fume that is falling on top of the zincs. You
cannot drink the water coming from the rains.” Another
participant said, “Our zinc, they go black. And our cloth, when we
spread them, they change colour, so it affects us, even our water
and our every other things.”
207
The participants also said that the gas flaring usually went with a
lot of noise and vibration, which they considered unhealthy. 
During the FGD session held with the old women in
Eruemukohwarien, one of the women said, “Midnight, when you
sleep in the night, you will feel the shaking; the house will be
making noise. We don’t even know now whether in time to come, 
earthquake will even happen here” This means that there was
usually a lot of noise and vibrations at night. According to one of
the elders in Obrikom, during the FGD:
Another thing they (oil companies) are
doing which is worrying us is pollution- air
pollution. We hear this noise, in fact, if you
stay here at night, you will not hear people
in the next room. Vibration every time;
sometime you have this vibration to the
extent that the walls crack. All of them are
as a result of vibration from the gas plant. 
The land was not exempted from the areas the participants had
noticed pollution. According to a youth in Eruemukohwarien, “I
was made to understand that the village had a very fertile soil of
which crop used to grow very well. But now today, not even grass
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is growing, talk less of crops.” One of the young men in Tisun
said, “If you go to the forest, no big tree is growing because of oil
activities; there is fire pollution everywhere.” Some of the
participants were also of the opinion that the oil that was being
extracted from the land in their communities was responsible for
the lack of fertility of the land. 
Poor infrastructure was another reason cited for the not cordial
relationship between the oil companies and the communities.  It
was an irony that communities in the Niger Delta would lack
decent water supply, but unfortunately, that was the case. One of
the young men in Tisun said, “Look at the community now, 
common water, we don’t have to drink. Assuming we take you to
the well we drink from in this community, you will pity us.”
Another man supported this, saying, “We still drink from the
Jacob’s well, the well our elders and ancestor left in this place. As
you are going to Kolokolo now, you’ll see a pond with greenish
stuff, that’s the water we still drink.” One of the elders in Tisun
went on to provide a detailed description of the well:
The Jacob’s well is where we drink water
from, at the bottom of that palm tree. You
will have to dig the bottom of the palm tree, 
as you are digging, when frog comes out, 
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water will just gush out of that place, and we
drink it plus the spit of the frog. Jacob’s
well, the one that was dug during
Abraham’s days, no elder in this community
knows how they dug that well. So, what do
we do now? If the thing is drying up, we
look for where we can get frog to come out
from under the tree, as we dig it. Why won’t
we engage in mutiny my brother?
A similar experience was reported in Kolokolo. The participants in
the village also lamented over the kind of water they had to drink, 
which was in no way better than the one described above. A young
girl who only visited the community during her holidays said, “We
used to drink the water before, but I don’t even go near the water
anymore because it will purge you. We now always drink pure
water. We buy it for N20 here. The pure water that is sold for N5, 
we sell it N 20 here.” In Eruemukohwarien, one of the elders said:  
Once in a while they (oil companies) throw
peanuts at us, they go to the schools, and
they give us one or two classrooms, they
give us water. Sometimes, we use the water, 
but it may not function again for the next
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twenty years. They will not come back until
there is uproar again. 
Some of the respondents also complained about the state of power
supply in their communities. The participants claimed that in
Eruemukohwarien, there was no power supply, whereas, there was
power at the Shell office close by. A youth in the community said, 
“That very power there is directly from NEPA to Shell and the
power line goes through this land, we also requested for that, but
they ignored it. As you can see, there is no light.” A participant in
Tisun said that the entire village was not electrified. According to
him:
See that young man, he’s the only young
man that managed to buy a generator
through fishing, and that is the only way we
can see. Every day now, and now that
Obasanjo has given us phone, we go there
and charge our phones. That’s the only man
that succeeded in buying generator. 
The participants also complained about the state of the roads in
their communities. In Eruemukohwarien, one of the elders said that
Shell built a road network in the past, but the road was bad and the
company would not repair it. Another elder said
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The only thing we demand from the State
Government and SPDC (Shell Petroleum
Development Company), they could not do
it, they failed woefully. We did not ask you
to come and pay us. For example, if you go
to Rivers State, you will see that they pay
some of the community people. In the
riverine area, some of their old men are
placed on salary. But here, there is nothing
like that. Just to give us road, only road, we
demanded and they refused. They went to
the army barracks and brought lorries of
army men to come and kill us. 
A youth in Eruemukohwarien also expressed his displeasure about
the road in the community. He said, “We have some roads that
have turned into a breeding place for mosquitoes. You cannot
sleep well in your environment due to bad roads. No drainage, 
nothing.” While the participants in Eruemukohwarien, Omoku and
Obrikom lamented their bad roads, those in Tisun and Kolokolo
didn’t even have solid ground underneath them to start with. One
of the young men in Tisun said, “Look at my shoe, if you don’t
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wear rain boot, you can’t pass here. The tide is low now, if the tide
is full, we will begin to readjust our rain boot again.” Another
man in the same community agreed with him saying, “You see that
there is mud, you passed on top of planks, we just set them in case
of visitors, otherwise, if it is me and my brother, we just match the
mud.”
Another infrastructural complaint that the participants had was
about the physical structures in their communities. One of the men
from Tisun noted that Chevron started building a primary school
for the community since 1997 and was yet to complete it as at
2009. Another man in the same community insisted that there was
no major infrastructure that indicated the existence of any oil
company in the community. He said the oil companies usually
claimed to the outside world that they built storey buildings, 
schools, and borehole amongst others, in the community. He, 
however, argued that if that was the case, there would still be signs
of them. According to him, “Militants no destroy those one o (the
structures), there has not been earthquake here, abi? Those things
sink inside the ground?  No! They say the terrain here is bad, how
much will it cause Chevron to sand-fill this place?”
In Obrikom, the women leader complained about the state of
health in the community. She said, “We are talking of hospital, 
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particularly an eye clinic, because the flame of the gas is
disturbing us. So, we need something like that, but they’ve not
come up to help us.” Also in Tisun, one of the men said:
No health centre here. It is now that they
are just building something, but it is not
functioning now. If someone is sick here and
you have no money, it will not be possible to
move the person. If a sick person is coming, 
those waves and everything, before you can
rush that person to Koko or Sapele… many
people have died like that, just like that. This
has caused a number of deaths
He also claimed that the oil companies did not respond to the
health needs of the community, even during emergency. According
to him, “If we’re sick here, we cannot run to them (Chevron) for
medical care or anything; they just lock their gate.” An elder in
Kolokolo described the difficulty they encountered whenever they
want to leave the community for health and other reasons. He said:   
If someone wants to travel from anywhere, 
maybe to Sapele or anywhere at all, if you
don’t get yourself to the river, you will not
get a boat. And before you get yourself to
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the river, it will take you a long time. We
don’t have engine (speedboat) that will
make the movement short. So, if you want to
travel tomorrow, you must leave today so
that you can meet up. If you leave here that
afternoon, before you get yourself to that
side, it will be evening, then you’ll sleep at
the mouth of creek there, then tomorrow
morning, you will board the morning
speedboat. That’s the way we travel here. 
Fig. 4.8 shows us that wrong prioritising was listed next among
the reasons the participants considered the oil companies’
relationship with their communities not cordial. One of the youths
who participated in the FGD session in Eruemukohwarien claimed
that every company must have a document called “CASHES.”
According to him:
Each of those alphabets represents words, 
and those words, the first alphabet which is
C represents community, that is, the
company must settle community first, then
followed by affair, then the S stands for
safety, then H stands for health, then E
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stands for environment, the last S is
security. So, with the present status here, 
they forgot the first alphabet which is the
community… they jumped to the last
alphabet which is security. 
He insisted that Shell preferred to invest in employing armed
forces for protection rather than to solve community problems. He
observed that the initial incursion of the company into the
community was without military protection, which he credited to
the company’s initial willingness to work with the community. He
further stated:  
They (Shell) will tell the army that, “You
must be very careful where you are going;
the people are very bad o!” But by the time
the army stay one month- I mean one week, 
two week, three weeks- they see that what
they said about the people is not true. They
begin to make friends, they come to the town
here and they buy drinks. They sit with us
and we drink together; they even make
friends with our girls. 
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The participants also complained about unemployment in their
communities. It was a general situation across the five
communities that were used for this study. One of the elders in
Eruemukohwarien said, “The oil companies, they do not employ
our people, our graduates are not employed by the oil companies. 
Our engineers, the big ones who go to the big schools, they are not
employed by the oil companies.” He lamented the fact that the few
casual workers that were employed by Shell were even being
gradually dropped. He also said that in about 40 years that Shell
had been operating in the community, all the indigenous CLOs that
had been employed by the company had been on contract. Another
elder recounted the experience of a friend:
Recently, a lawyer from this area was
annoyed, and he resigned from Shell. He
was in Shell for upward of 15years and was
not made a Shell staff. The man was
annoyed and said, “I have served you for 15
years and you can’t make me a staff!” He
resigned. It’s as bad as that.
In Tisun community, most of the men resorted to fishing for lack
of job opportunities. One of the elders said that the situation
usually discouraged youths who had left the community from
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returning. According to him, “Only those people that have
nowhere to go and nothing to face, like us, come back to do the
fishing.” Another aspect they considered distressing was the fact
that other ethnic groups were brought in to work in the oil
companies. The issue was raised in each of the five communities
used for this study, which implied that it was a general notion
among the communities in the Niger Delta. According to a young
man in Tisun:
There are people there who didn’t even go
to school at all, just like us. But they are
working there (in Chevron). If you go there, 
you see Hausa, they are laundry people. 
Hausa, doing laundry here in the Niger
delta! Yorubas, coming here to work! They
stay in the house boat, they board chopper, 
and they board plane. 
The youth leader of Obrikom said that the community had a
graduate association. According to him, the association was
established to deal with the excuse the oil companies gave in the
past that there were no graduates in the community to employ. 
The association’s major task, therefore, was to encourage
education, monitor the number of graduates in the community, 
and push for placements in the oil companies. He also expressed
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the same sentiment that had previously been expressed by
participants in Eruemukohwarien, Tisun, and Kolokolo:
If you go to AGIP now, you will see our
boys- young boys and girls- doing menial
jobs. You don’t see them in big offices. It is
the people from the north, the Yorubas, and
the Igbos that you see in all the offices. 
Employment is very hard for our boys. 
The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien also explained how his
community got committed to education as a means of securing
better placement with Shell and how the efforts had not yielded
any result. He said:
Formerly, our youths were not the type that
went to school. But we saw the day to day
activities of Shell, and publications in
newspapers that they needed graduate. 
Sometimes, Shell would tell us that our boys
were not educated, so, they would not
employ anybody. Today, I can tell you that
75% of the community’s boys are graduates. 
Some have graduated, some are still in
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school, but they are all struggling, even to
train themselves to become something
because of the challenge between us and oil
company (Shell). Even then, they are not
still helping matters. 
  
Neglect was the next reason given for the not cordial relationship
between the oil companies and the communities. In
Eruemukohwarien, the participants complained that the
community had been neglected by Shell. They claimed that the
neglect was such that Shell’s flow station in the community was
not named after Eruemukohwarien, and there was not even a
signboard to indicate the existence of the community.   
A chief in the community insisted that all other flow stations were
named after their host communities, and felt that it was a
deliberate ploy by Shell to ignore the community. One of the
youths said, “We are so surprised to see the only land terminal in
the whole country, the name of the place (Eruemukohwarien) is
not on the map of Nigeria.” The power station, flow station, and
terminal are named after Ughelli, a major town some miles away
from Eruemukohwarien, hence, the grudge the community had
against Shell. The leaders of the community feared that, just like
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in the case of the name, other benefits too might have been
diverted.  
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku discussed another
aspect of the neglect. He talked about some communities that
were referred to as exit communities. Though they were not oil
producing communities, the oil must be evacuated through them. 
According to him:
If the man who owns that access route or
pipeline does not allow you to put the pipe, 
how do you evacuate the oil to the refinery?
The people known as exit community
landlords are suffering equally as the man
who owns the oil wells. A man has pipeline, 
he has access route, yet you have dug that
place to use to do your job, render the place
useless. The man can no longer go there to
use the place for farming. Sometimes when it
rains, it will be over flooded, and some
companies are careless enough not to fence
it; some children, during the rainy season or
flooding, go there to look for either snails or  
edible frogs. I will say that the law should
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state that they must fence the place. These
are the calamities that are befalling people. 
There was such a case I was handling…
where two brothers fell into a pit and died. 
An elder in Tisun summed up the point by saying, “Grievances
between the youths and the company, which brought about this
Niger Delta violence, is because of this neglect.”
Poor education was the final reason given for the not cordial
relationship between the oil companies and the communities. A
young girl in Eruemukohwarien complained about the state of
education in the community. She said that most parents could not
afford to train their children. She also pointed out that there were
no teachers in the school so the students roamed the streets. She
went on to say, “Science students in our schools hardly do
practical, and you know that without practical, a science student
cannot go anywhere.”  
An elder in Tisun also said of his community, “Chevron will build
school, but for them to bring teachers to come and teach these
children, they will not bring them; they just put the school there
like that.” A young girl in Kolokolo explained that she stayed most
of her life in the village without education. The crisis that occurred
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in the community, which led to her escape to the city, gave her the
opportunity to go to school.   
A woman in the same community raised the issue of scholarship. 
She said, “Children full ground and they no go school; we no get
scholarship. (There are many children and they don’t go to school;
we have no scholarship).” In Tisun, one of the men also said, 
“Even those of our people that Chevron gave scholarship to for
two three years now, they have not even be able to pay the money
to the beneficiaries. Most of all those things cause crises.”
Fig 4.8 shows that all the factors highlighted in the third category
above, if unchecked, have the tendency of degenerating into
violence or crisis. They are, in fact, part of the reasons for the
current conflicts. It was observed during this research that though
the communities claimed to be peaceful, most of the participants
displayed violent tendencies or support for conflict due to their
frustration. For instance, one of the youths in Eruemukohwarien
said, “When one is tolerant to some extent, he will like to react. 
You see, I have no other choice than to react.” Another youth in
Kolokolo, while reacting to the oil company’s excuse that there
was no employment for the uneducated said:
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If you tell me say I no go school, so I no fit
work for Chevron, na bad thing. If na gun I
fit carry, I go carry am. So anything thing I
fit do I go do make I survive. This is what
cause calamity. (If you tell me that because I
did not go to school, I cannot work for
Chevron, it is bad. If I can take up arms, I
will, because I must survive. That is the
cause of this calamity)
The FGD sessions stirred up some emotions among the respondent
and one of the men in Tisun said, “Even as we are talking to you, 
I’m feeling another grudge like taking a cutlass.” Another man
concluded his own contribution by saying, “It’s worth carrying
gun for. I’m telling you, it’s worth carrying gun for. Then people
will stay up there (in government) and begin to blame people
saying, ‘Kill them, kill them’.” Yet, another man said:
If they want to solve these issues, they
should come, because they are saying
amnesty, the thing may degenerate again to
another thing. Personally, I can decide to do
undo. Do you think this boys will not do
undo if they are treated like this? From what
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we are seeing now, we will always continue
to get war. 
4.3.4 Factors Responsible for Crises or Non-Crises in
the Communities
Fig 4.9
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Fig 4.9 illustrates the responses of the participants to the question
of whether or not there had been crises in their communities with
the oil companies. The figure also presents the factors that
determined whatever position that was taken. As expected, all the
responses to the question fell into two categories; those who
admitted to crises in their communities and those who denied
same. 
The participants who admitted that crises had, at one time or the
other, occurred between their communities and the oil companies
offered different reasons for their position. One of the reasons
given was that the oil companies represented the government. 
While the government could not be attacked directly, the oil
companies could. Hence, the companies were attacked so as to get
at the government. According to one of the elders in
Eruemukohwarien:
That is why the tension grows on Shell. No
matter what Shell does, it cannot pacify the
community because it is Shell that is seen in
the community; they don’t see the
government. The government is not coming
here to work, but Shell is coming here to
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work. So, it is you (the oil company) taking
my land that I’m seeing, but the government
is standing at your back. 
He opined that the government was the reason for all the militancy
in the Niger Delta. He said, “They (militants) are not doing it
because they are angry with Shell, no, they are doing it because
they are angry with the government; but the government is
hiding.” He also said that the government collected money from
the oil companies just to divert same for their own benefit. Another
elder in the community insisted that notwithstanding the Federal
Government’s law that the land belongs to the government, some
people still reside on it and farm it. Hence, the government owed
the communities some compensation. He cited United States where
he claimed the owners of the land owned the oil. 
Another cause of crises in the communities is poor infrastructure. 
The poor state of the roads was a major concern for the
communities. One of the youth in Eruemukohwarien observed, 
“From the entrance of this our community to Shell yard, they
tarred that place to their facility. Shell tarred the road to their
facility, but when you enter the main village, it is a mess.” He
stated that the road was the cause of the community’s recent
conflict with Shell. Another youth said that in the first place, Shell
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destroyed the roads with its heavy trucks; therefore, it ought to take
responsibility for it.  
Some of the participants also said that crises were allowed in their
communities so as to attract the attention of the oil companies
and the government. They explained that the government seemed
to be focusing on the communities where there were conflicts, 
while the relatively peaceful communities were ignored. They
therefore argued that a way to gain the attention of the companies
and the government was to allow crises.  
One of the elders in Tisun said, “Those people that are harsh to
them (oil companies), we used to hear that they used to satisfy
them. But we who are lenient with them now, they don’t satisfy
us.” An elder in Eruemukohwarien also said that it was when Shell
reported the community to the government because of the conflict, 
that the governor knew for the first time that there was an oil
company in the community.  
Some participants were also of the opinion that some of the
conflicts experienced in the Niger Delta had political undertone.  
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku was of the opinion that
politicians gave guns to the youths to help them rig elections. 
According to him:
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They (politicians) trained our boys; they
used them to win election and then
abandoned them. Now, some of them
(youths) go into crude oil; they give it to our
enemies. Our friends who turn to be
enemies, who sell the guns, train them there
at the high sea. The pirate people are our
boys.  
One of the men in Tisun also agreed with the suggestion of
political involvement. In his own case, he felt that the act was
perpetrated by some influential persons in the communities, not for
elective offices, but for personal gains. He said:
Some riots and demonstrations are
masterminded by the big people in the
community for selfish ends. They may be
seeking contracts, so, if they are not given, 
they will go and motivate the people to
demonstrate- with the people thinking that
they are demonstrating for roads and water
to the oil companies. But the masterminds
go back (to the oil companies) to say, if they
had been given the contract, the
229
demonstration would not have happened. 
They would even assure the company that
the next demonstration may be bloody.  
The last cause of community crises that was mentioned was the
companies’ failure to keep to agreements. An elder in
Eruemukohwarien stated that whenever a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) was signed, the oil companies would
selectively fulfil the agreements. According to him, “The bad thing
there is that they don’t carry out this MoU to the fullest. They will
do some things; if you talk about employment, they will abandon
those ones. They will do some road projects and leave some.”
The second category of responses to the question of whether or not
there were crises in the communities comprises participants who
denied the occurrence of crises in their communities. These
participants also identified the factors responsible for their opinion. 
One of the reasons they gave was that their communities had
peaceful heritage. One of the elders in Obrikom explained that
from the origin of the community, their forefathers had told them
that the community must be calm and peaceful; hence, militancy
was not condoned in Obrikom.  
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One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien also claimed that the
community was peaceful and that they always tried to avoid
anything that could cause trouble. The Omoku youth leaders also
said, “We are peace loving people, we are not violent. That is why
you can’t find any militant activities in this place.” He went further
to say, “If we see the militants crossing the boundaries, we always
alert the soldiers or armed forces, for them to be aware of what is
trying to encroach into our area.”  
The fear of invasion was another reason given by the participants
who denied the occurrence of crises in their communities. This
sentiment cut across the five communities; the need for safety. 
According to one of the youths in Eruemukohwarien:  
We know quite well that if we go by that
(violence), the Federal Government will just
troop in army to bomb the whole place, and
we know that we cannot fight the
government. You can see we are in the land;
the Ijaws are in the water. When they do
anything at all, they just enter the creek and
that is all. Where do we run to? We have no
place to run to. Before you do anything, 
soldiers have rounded you up. So, if we do it
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(blow up installations) now, we are just
punishing ourselves. Most of us here, our
fathers and mothers are from this town, if
we destroy it, where do we run to?
One of the men in Tisun also explained that his community did not
stand a chance against the military force employed by the oil
companies and the government. According to him, “We don’t
fight. Who are we going to fight with? Can somebody with spoon
go and fight someone with hammer? The issue is that there is
subjugation, total subjugation. The powerful are oppressing the
less privileged.”
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien stated that a lot of Shell’s
facilities were based in the community, such as gas plant, flow
station, compressor station, fire safety station and the only land
terminal in Nigeria. He said:
Tampering with anything there will cause
problem. It’s a small thing! One can just go
there and do something small, and cause
explosion. Then when there is explosion, 
Shell will come and say, “What is
happening, let us settle”. But if you do it, 
what of your safety?
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Another youth from the community noted that the oil companies
surrounded themselves with solders and mobile police (MOPOLs), 
hence, making them inaccessible. He said, “There is no room to
make or create crises because of what is guiding the companies. 
Like I said, they brought the soldiers, the MOPOLs, and the police, 
to guard them in order to siphon our oil without compensation.”
Fig 4.9 shows that respect for elders is another reason for the
absence of crises in some communities. One of the youths in
Eruemukohwarien said, “We are hearing of the Ijaws blowing up
the whole place there. We cannot do that because we have elders
here, and we the youths, we listen to our elders.” Another youth
explained further saying:
Sometimes our youths, once we are about to
do something, the elders would call and say, 
“Stop there.” Everybody will just listen to
the elder because we have fathers at home. 
Otherwise, maybe something bad would
have happened in this community. Yes, it is
as a result of the respect the youths give to
the elders. 
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Some of the participants also cited the fear of God as one of the
reasons for the absence of crises in their communities. They
claimed that they knew what they could have done to the oil
installations in their communities. According to one of the youths
in Eruemukohwarien, “If not for God, we know what to do now!
We know where to go to blow all those things up. But we don’t
want to do that. Even forget about security there, we know what to
do, but we don’t want to do it.”
Some of the participants claimed, lastly, that their respect for the
law was another reason for their restraint. One of the elders in
Eruemukohwarien said, “We want to abide with the government
laws, we don’t take laws into our own hands to do something bad
to the company.” The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku said:
As a non-violent community, we cry out, we
follow our matters constitutionally. We don’t
believe in violence because violence can
never do well to any man at all. When you
are shooting, you don’t know who the bullet
will touch; whether your brother is passing
through the way it touches, you don’t know
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4.3.5 Effects of Crises on Host Communities and Oil
Companies
4.3.5.1 Effects of Crises on Communities
It is very important, at this point, to mention that as far as crises are
concerned, the experiences tend to differ from community to
community. The crises experienced in Eruemukohwarien, Omoku
and Obrikom were generated as a result of their protests against the
oil companies, while those of Kolokolo and Tisun were as a result
of them hosting oil companies. What this means is that Kolokolo
and Tisun communities were allegedly attacked by the Ijaw
communities because of the perceived benefits they enjoyed from
the oil companies, which in actual fact, according to the
participants, were only mirage.  
The Ijaws launched an attack against the Itsekiri communities and
according to a young girl in Kolokolo, “They even burnt a lot of
villages in this place, to make those people run for their dear
lives.” One of the men in Tisun also said, “I’m above 40 years, we
(Itsekiris and Ijaws) have been living together for so many years, 
and even intermarried- no crisis. But the crises started when oil
companies started coming here.”  
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The secretary of the Trust provided further explanation about the
crises by stating that the Ijaws fought the Itsekiris for two years, 
because they believed that the Itsekiris were blocking them from
the oil. According to him, “They laid siege and it was as though
they launched a genocide against the 23 Itsekiri communities, 
because they have more oil than the Ijaws.”  He said the Urhobos
also join the Ijaws, until they realized that the Itsekiris were not the
problem, so they faced the government. According to him, “Most
communities were razed to the ground and all escape routes were
blocked. The attacks were mostly at night. They even went to Warri
to kill the Itsekiris there.”
Having identified the two dimensions of crises experienced in the
communities under study, the following sub-sections examine the
effect of the crises generally on the communities. 
Loss of Lives and Properties
One of the major effects of the crises on the communities was the
loss of lives and properties. According to one of the men in Tisun, 
the crises devastated the entire community, causing people to lose
the little possession they had gathered over the years. He narrated
the experience:
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People died. Behind that house, about three
people were buried. This man (a
participant) was living with about four boys;
nearly all of them were killed, I think he was
the only boy left among them. Some women
were butchered and their heads were
carried away. The eldest man in this
community, the eldest man that governed the
community, was beheaded too, and they took
his head away. He had a block house; they
demolished it, and set fire everywhere, they
set it ablaze. Some people died, not because
they shot them, not because they beheaded
them; some people slept in the bush, some
corpses were not found. For instance, one
woman, Akele, the corps was not even
discovered. She just ran inside the bush, 
died there and was buried by crabs or
anything. 
Another man in Tisun said that the crisis really reduced the
population of the community. The entire community was reduced
to nothing and everybody had to start building from the scratch. 
One of the women in Kolokolo said, “Those who had, they have
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nothing now because of the crisis. So, this crisis has caused us a
lot of things and it has destroyed a lot of things in our community.”  
Neglect by the Oil Companies
Most of the participants complained that the oil companies usually
withdrew during or after crises. A man in Tisun noted that before
the crises, the community’s relationship with Chevron was so
cordial that representatives of the company would come and
discuss with the community and inquire about their problems. He
explained that, even at that time, the community felt cheated by the
oil companies, but at least they showed up. He said:
They came here frequently. They made
promises and we clapped to those promises. 
But the promises didn’t yield any dividend;
though it sometimes encouraged us that
maybe tomorrow they would come, tomorrow
they would come, until the crises came. So, 
the only thing we benefited from that regime
was that it encouraged us, “don’t worry, it
will soon be better.” Those were the only
benefits we benefited, because we saw their
faces. 
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Another man said, “We no longer see Chevron around this area. 
All we know is that they cut us off; they barricaded the place. If
you go where they are now, they have barricaded it.” An elder in
the community said, “They (Chevron) are using what other people
are doing to react to the community.” A youth in Kolokolo said
that despite the fact that he and a couple of other youths did
surveillance work for Chevron, guarding oil installations and oil
wells, they were not allowed into Chevron’s facility. He said that
their reports were submitted to the security operative at the gate of
the company. 
The women leader of the Obrikom Women Association also
agreed that the oil companies usually withdrew in the event of
crises. According to her:  
We had little clashes- crises I should say, 
here in Obrikom community. But they have
been somehow resolved now. Since those
crises, the community has not been having
normal/nice relationship with them (Agip). 
You know Agip, they even like a community
that makes problem. Because when your
community is making problem, when these
239
people (community representatives) go, they
(Agip) will say, “Go, go, go (stay away), 
your community is making problem.” They
don’t want to put their mouth (intervene), 
and indirectly, they’re using that time to
their own gain. They use that to excuse
themselves. 
The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien agreed with the views of the
Obrikom Women Association leader about the oil companies’
disposition towards crises. He said, “Let me tell you one thing first
of all, if there are crises in a community, all these oil companies
are happy, because they make their money through that process.”
He went further to accuse the oil companies of instigating inter-
communal crises. He created a scenario about Efeoto and
Eruemukohwarien communities to explain his point, saying:
Shell can manipulate to set problem between
both communities. So, when there is problem
in these two communities, Shell would be
happy in their operations. They would make
more money because they would not come
here (Eruemukohwarien) to do anything, 
and they would not go there (Efeoto). We
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would then say, “If Efeoto man reach there
(Shell office), there would be problem,” and
they will say, “If Eruemukohwarien man
reach there, there will be problem.” So, 
Shell on their own will be happy; instead of
settling issues, they cause the problem. They
will not settle it; they will just leave the
matter like that. Not until both parties
understand themselves that, “We are losing
o, let us settle,” they will not settle, because
they make their money from there. 
He also explained that Shell may randomly select a person in the
community and pay him a small amount to get a job done. Not
only would the company get the job done cheaper than if it were to
go through the official community channel, it would also set the
entire community against the person who did the job. Hence, while
the community would be divided over the issue, Shell would carry
on its business. He said:
Instead of settling crisis, they believe in
setting more fire. Like all this boys
(militants), if you look at it critically, Shell
contributed to the problem that is bringing
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these crises today. But the thing is now
robbing both Shell and state government, 
and even other companies around. So, I do
not think Shell has any way of settling
matters, in fact, they believe in 419 to dupe
people and get whatever things they want
and get out. 
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku complained that before
the crises, any time there was a case of spillage and it was reported
to the oil companies, they would respond and even compensate the
community. After the crises, however, they stopped responding. 
He said, “Yes, everybody is aware that while there are crises, we
get nothing.”
Harassment by members of the Armed Forces
Another major effect of crises on the communities was the
harassment by military men. Of course, the forces were engaged by
the oil companies and the government. A youth in
Eruemukohwarien recalled the protest staged by the community, in
which the community women denied Shell’s staff access to the
company’s facility. According to him, “The next thirty minutes, 
there were forces all over the whole place; there were heavy forces
from the government.” He explained that after government’s
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intervention and the eventual promise by Shell to repair the road, 
the road still remained as it was. He said:  
Then by tomorrow, if we cry back again to
say we would rather do or die, they will
troop in their army and just start killing
people innocently here. And the army, they
themselves, they know quite well that this
people are suffering, but they are under the
control of the Federal Government, they
asked them to go and do mess there. 
The participants also complained that the oil companies labeled
members of their communities as criminals. Hence, it became a
standard procedure to always surround themselves with forces and
also use same against the communities, without waiting for reasons
to do so. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said:
There is something that Shell has been doing
and I don’t like that thing. Maybe if they
have a contract, like Abaimuna, when the
contract starts, you'll be seeing them
bringing in soldiers, MOPOL (mobile
police), to disturb us and we are not
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disturbing them. We are not disturbing them
from not doing their work. 
Lack of Development
The participants were of the opinion that their communities were
underdeveloped as a result of the crises. An elder in Tisun
explained that the crises led to the destruction of the structures in
the community, both physical and social, thereby making the
community not conducive for habitation. According him:
You hardly see babies like these in the town
anymore because there is no school. The
ones who can afford to take their children to
the township do. But you will still see some, 
maybe as you were coming you saw some, 
those ones, they don’t even go to school, 
they can’t read “A.”
The eldest woman residing in Kolokolo complained that she had
only suffered since she returned to the community; having escaped
along with every other person in 2004, when the crises occurred. 
While most of her mates never returned for fear of recurrence, she
claimed that she could not desert the community. Having returned, 
however, she returned to nothing. According to her, “Crises are
244
very bad. The crises have destroyed many things in this Niger
delta. It is the crises that made us to come down, down, down.”  
As at the time the FGD was conducted in Kolokolo, the few
villagers had just returned to the community, therefore, the
community was still largely deserted. According to another woman
in the community:  
Na the crises make us come down small, 
make us fall this way. If you come this
village before, wey them never pump this oil, 
we get things, but since the crises, 
everything has gone down. We no fit go
thief, we no fit go be ashawo, na him dey
make us suffer this way. (The crises reduced
us this way. If you came to this village
before oil exploration began- we had things, 
but since the crises, everything has gone
down. We cannot steal and we cannot go
into prostitution, which is why we suffer this
way.)  
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Fear of Future Attacks
Some of the participants expressed the fear that their attackers
might return, particularly in Kolokolo and Tisun. Consequently, 
they did not feel safe living in the community. One of the men in
Tisun noted, “Even some of us that survived the crisis are not
willing to come down again and experience that one in life. Those
who have relations who can take care of them in town, they don’t
come back.” Another man stated that some members of the
community lived in the township even though they were not
accustomed to the terrain. According to him, “Those men and
women that were born and bred here, they are not used to the
town. So, when they stay there, they don’t live long. They die;
people will just die any how like that.”
4.3.5.2 The Perceived Effects of Crises on the Oil Companies
The participants also expressed their views on how they felt the oil
companies were affected by the crises. Among the effects they
mentioned are:
Insecurity
One of the major ways in which the crises affected the oil
companies was in the area of security. The crises had generally
made the companies automatically suspicious of the communities, 
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thereby reducing the amount of direct interactions between them. 
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien observed, “You go to the
yard (Shell installation) now, you will see army. They (Shell) will
tell the army that, ‘You must be very careful where you are going;
the people are very bad o!’ ” But after a while, according to him, 
the army men would develop a cordial relationship with members
of the community. 
In Tisun, the participants explained that the oil companies were
always suspicious of the community, including the youths they
employed as casual staff. According to one of the youths:
Even us, there are some youths that they
(Chevron) have engaged in the surveillance
business i.e. guarding their own oil
installations and oil wells. Even those that
are working as surveillance, they don’t
allow them to enter the company, they just
get to the gate, and submit their report to the
gateman and go back. 
Another youth agreed with him saying:
Like we now, we work there (Chevron). We
cannot stay there except Yoruba’s… come to
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work there. It is the forest we trek through. 
Someone like me, I trek from here to go and
work there, then in the night, I trek back. 
Inside the forest! Not as if they created a
road there o, we pass the forest and we use
our feet to create the road- foot path
ourselves. 
Low Productivity
The participants observed that the productivity of oil companies
usually drops during crises. One of the chiefs in Eruemukohwarien
opined, “When there is problem in the Niger Delta, when there is a
lot of uproar in the riverine, I think it’s only half they (oil
companies) produce, so, that’s why the oil producing now is
costly.” For instance, the protest in Eruemukohwarien led to
Shell’s facility being closed for a week, which disrupted the
production schedule of the company. 
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4.3.6 Oil Companies’ Community Relations Strategies
for Conflict Resolution
Fig 4.10
OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNITY RELATIONS
STRATEGIES ADOPTED FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Fig. 4.10 presents the community relations strategies the oil
companies claimed they use during crises. It can be observed from
the figure that one of the strategies of Shell was to pull out of the
community during crises. Shell’s representative was quick to
differentiate between a crises and an issue. According to him, 
“When something becomes crisis, it’s like you’ve run out of all
avenues of dealing with an issue.” He explained that he was more
comfortable with the term “issue” since there were always issues in
the communities. He went on to say:  
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The issue might be development, they
(communities) may say, “Well, we have not
seen the impact of what the company is
doing,” or they may say “The government
has abandoned us,” or all kinds of things
that they may have at the back of their
minds. So, we tend to see them as issues. It
may even be about the environment, they
may talk about environmental degradation-
it’s an issue. 
He admitted that Shell had witnessed some issues escalate into
crises and the Ogoni experience was a case in point. Hence, 
whenever an issue became a crisis, according to him, the company
adopted appropriate strategies in dealing with it. Giving the
example of Ogoni, he said, “We (Shell) then said, ‘Let this not
become complex, we can’t let this escalate. So, in that case, we are
going to pull out.’ ” He went on:
In the Ogoni issue, the best way, as far as
the company was concerned, was to pull out, 
so that people can sit down and think
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critically about what needs to be done. And I
don’t think we have any regrets for pulling
out. It helped the community to rethink and
it also helped us as well. So, what we have
done in Ogini, like I said, is more or less in
the extreme. We have not had any other
crisis, that has got to the stage of us pulling
out. 
Another community relations strategy that Shell claimed to use
during crises was dialogue with the communities. Shell’s
representative said that the company did a lot of discussion with
the communities. He also said that the company carried out its
stakeholders’ engagement in a proactive manner by making all
efforts to help the communities understand its own side of the
story. Not only that, Shell’s representative explained, “We also try
to put our feet in their shoes to say, ‘What if we live in those
communities? What if what they say is true?’ ” The company tried
to achieve all that through dialogue.  
Shell also solicited the help of the government during crises. 
Shell’s representative explained that it was not the company’s
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responsibility to lead the processes of development; hence, the
government was usually engaged. He was of the opinion that some
of the crises in the Niger Delta were as a result of transferred
aggression by the communities; the communities were dissatisfied
with the government and they took it out on the oil companies. He
explained that the communities had expectations that were mostly
unfulfilled. He said:
Whose fault is it? They (communities) may
start telling you it’s because of Shell, but
that is not the truth. Because, if Shell wasn’t
there, maybe they still wouldn’t have had
electricity. But because they cannot see the
government, which is supposed to take the
lead in the development, they cannot feel the
impact. They have a State Governor who
hasn’t been to their communities, they have
a Local Government Chairman who sits in
Abuja and does not go to see the
communities. And they know that the
government makes X amount of money from
oil, and the money doesn’t get to them. The
next person they see is the oil company, 
which will then tell them, “Listen, I pay my
tax to the government, go and collect from
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the government.” So, it becomes an issue of
who really should they be looking up to. 
That’s why I’m saying that it’s all about
perception. 
As far as Shell’s representative was concerned, the company’s
engagement of the government was for the sake of challenging it to
take responsibility for its people. He said:  
Engage government officials; get them to
understand that development really should
be what they should be thinking about. How
they use the resources from oil production is
paramount because that will bring stability. 
So, indirectly, we are saying, “government, 
you take the lead and we will follow you, we
will support you.” That’s another strategy in
itself. 
Shell also made use of situational approach when dealing with
conflicts. The company believed that the situation determined the
approach. Shell’s representative said, “It’s not a hard and fast rule
for the ones that we have used for specific situations, because it
depends on the situation.” He explained that what happened in
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Ogoni may not recur in other communities. Events may be of a
different scale and magnitude; hence, the company would adopt
the best strategies considered most suitable for current situations. 
He went on:
That’s why I say a lot has changed, and our
strategies have changed over times, so, it’s
not static. If we feel- based on experience
and what we feel, or we see happening, or
what people are telling, or the communities
are telling us- that there is need for change, 
we also adapt and move on. So, it becomes a
process; community relations is a process. 
It’s not a static activity, it’s a process, and
it’s quite dynamic. 
Community initiative was another strategy that Shell’s
representative claimed the company used during crises. He
explained that it involved allowing the communities to initiate the
idea of their own development. According to him, that would
ensure their satisfaction and consequently, a resolution of the
crises. He further said, “If for example, in a particular cluster says
‘Education is our major need,’ it could decide to focus on
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education. Another group might say, maybe infrastructure; roads. 
They decide what they need to do.”
Shell’s representative explained that there were two major factors
that informed the company’s reaction or position in situations;
first, Shell would determine the nature of the issue and second, it
would try to understand what its role should be. According to him:
  
It has to be noted that Shell, as a company, 
does not have the primary role of developing
communities. It’s not our primary
responsibility. The primary responsibility of
development in the communities is the
government’s. So, whatever we do in the
community is a contribution to the
development process. That’s why we said we
need to know where we draw the lines.  
It can be derived from the above that Shell determines its level of
involvement as well as what it considers to be its legitimate
responsibility before it embarks on any community engagement
programme. 
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Chevron also identified community initiative as the major strategy
it used during crises. In fact, the company’s representative
considered other techniques subsumed under it. According to him, 
community initiative, as a strategy, “Makes the communities the
driver of their own development. I think it makes the communities
responsible for their development.” He asked rhetorically, “When
you (the community) are the one who is responsible for what a
company does in your community, what do you want to fight that
company for?” Hence, he considered community initiative as a
strategy that was both preventive and mitigating in nature, as the
case may be. 
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Fig 4.11
THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES
IDENTIFIED WITH THE OIL COMPANIES BY THE
COMMUNITES DURING CONFLICT AND THE
COMMUNITIES’ RESPONSES
Fig. 4.11 shows the community relations strategies that the
communities have identified with the oil companies during crises. 
Having considered the strategies that the oil companies claimed
they used during crises, it becomes pertinent to examine the
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perception of the recipients on the subject. Hence, the strategies
identified by the participants are presented below:
No Communication at all
Some of the participants claimed that one of the ways they had
seen the oil companies deal with crises situations was to cut off all
lines of communication with their communities. They were of the
opinion that the companies usually withdrew rather than make
efforts to establish a viable line of communication with the
communities. One of the elders in Tisun observed, “No way to
pass, you cannot pass; you cannot communicate with them (oil
companies).”
Dialogue
The participants also identified that the oil companies used
dialogue as a community relations strategy during crises. One of
the youths in Eruemukohwarien explained that Shell sometimes
invited the leaders of the community for meetings where the
problems on ground were discussed. In Kolokolo, one of the
youths said that whenever the activities of Chevron negatively
impacted the community, the leadership would go to the company
to negotiate compensations.  One of the elders in Obrikom recalled
that there was once a better relationship between the community
and the oil companies, than what was being witnessed at the time. 
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He was of the opinion that dialogue played an important role then. 
According to him, “Far back in 1980s, Agip was sending people to
come down to the playground for Agip and the community to
discuss, and the community will tell them the way things affect
them.”
A youth from Tisun said that the Trust of the community usually
negotiated with Chevron on sensitive issues. He further said that
sometimes, the community would force the company into dialogue. 
Giving an instance, he said:  
When the community mobilized the women
to stop Chevron’s operation for two weeks, 
Chevron now sent their PA, public affairs;
some of them are working in Leki, and some
of them are working in Port Harcourt. They
will now bring these people to come and
negotiate with the executives in the village. 
One of the elders in Obrikom also said that the oil companies did
not usually initiate the dialogue; they merely responded whenever
they were invited. According to him, “They don’t send their own
representatives into the community to meet with the head and other
members of the community. No, they don’t do that; unless when
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they are invited by the Traditional Rulers’ Council.” The leader of
the Obrikom Women Association also agreed, saying that the oil
companies forcibly embraced dialogue when they wanted to douse
tension.  
Some of the participants also described how the oil companies
engaged the communities in dialogue. One of the chiefs in
Eruemukohwarien said that the companies would usually send the
Community Liaison Officers (CLO) to discuss with the
community. Another elder in the community said that the CLO
“Links with the community to have the discussion, he then carries
the discussion back to the management.”
A closer look at Fig. 4.11 will reveal that the arrow pointing from
dialogue to the community is bidirectional. This means that not
only did the oil companies make use of dialogue to communicate
with the communities, the communities also used it in return. 
According to one of the elders in Obrikom, “What we do is that we
do not go into violence, we talk to them, trying to call them.”  
Provision of amenities
The participants claimed that the oil companies sometimes
embarked on some development projects just to placate the
communities. They were, however, of the opinion that most of
260
those projects were either shabbily done or not completed. 
According to one of the elders in Obrikom, “They (Agip) were able
to build for us a health centre here, but if you go there, no drugs; it
is not equipped. If you see the civic centre that we are just coming
from now, it is uncompleted. These are the things we are
suffering.” Nevertheless, a chief in Eruemukohwarien claimed that
Shell had tried in his community as far as amenities were
concerned. He said, “In fact, they always come up with one or two
projects.”
Military Intervention
Military intervention was a strategy that the participants believed
all the oil companies under study had in common. In fact, in
Eruemukohwarien, the participants were of the opinion that
military intervention was Shell’s most preferred strategy. 
According to one of the youths in the community, “They (Shell)
prefer using force, but that will not bring peace to the community.”
Another youth said, “When they go round, they go along with
army and MOPOL (Mobile Police) to scare the owners of the
resources out of their facility.” He went on:
For now, the oil company (Shell), they look
at the host community as a thief, a robber or
261
what have you. Because, those Shell people, 
when they want to come to the community, 
they come with a number of army, police, 
and the rest. Even going there, they force
you not to be close to where they operate. 
Another youth from Eruemukohwarien explained, “They believe in
the security, so that if we say we demand something, and they say
no, because of the security, we cannot force them to do it.” Still, 
another youth was of the opinion that the money that the oil
companies should have used to develop the communities was
diverted into security. A youth from Tisun also said, “They’ve left
us in abject poverty and now they even chase us with guns.”  
The situation became further complex because, apart from the
military men’s primary assignment of protecting the oil companies, 
they also resorted to harassing the communities. According to the
youth leader in Omoku:
Even the military men, instead of doing what
they were supposed to do, they started
extorting money from people. Look at this
place, Omoku Timber Market, if people here
want to go and carry their wood, they will
262
pay the military men; at every check point
where an army man is on duty, they will pay
the army man N300 or N400 just like that, 
before they cross with their wood. 
Government Intervention
The participants stated that the oil companies made use of
government intervention as one of their strategies during crises. As
far as the participants were concerned, the oil companies and the
government were partners in the business of depriving the
communities of their entitlements. One of the youths in
Eruemukohwarien said that the military invasion in the community
was a product of the agreement between the oil companies and the
government. While recounting a particular conflict witnessed in
the community, in which the women blocked Shell’s access route, 
he said:
At the end of the day, Shell took us to the
State Government. They didn’t know what to
do, but they took us to the State Government. 
At the end of the day, the governor said we
should go, that they are going to do the
road. 
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Recounting the same incident, an elder in the community said, 
“Shell now ran to the government. Some legislators came and said
the governor was not on seat, he travelled, ‘When he comes back, 
we will put up a system, before the well finishes, we will tar the
road.’ ” He complained that it was about a year since the incident
occurred and construction was yet to begin on the road. Another
youth in the community felt that Shell pushed them to the
government, and the government deceived them about the
construction of the road. He further said, “Government is backing
it (Shell) up, that’s why we are not having a good relationship.”  
Apart from hiding behind the government, the participants said that
the oil companies also blamed the government for the
underdevelopment in the communities. The participants felt that it
was quite convenient for the oil companies to direct them to the
government while expecting that the government would not be
intimidated. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said:
What we are even saying now is that Shell
now, they are even telling us that our
problems are not in their hands but in the
hands of the State Government, under the
Federal Government. They said whatever
thing they are suppose to do in the
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community, they are supposed to pay part of
it and State Government will pay part of it. 
But at times, State Government is not trying
to do anything. 
Giving Gifts to Leaders
Some of the participants also claimed that the oil companies gave
gifts and contracts to some of their leaders. According to a youth in
Kolokolo, “Chevron gives contracts to our people, gives contracts
to our Trust, gives contract to our executives; even they give
contracts to the youth.” As far as he was concerned, the contracts
had positive impact on the community. The youth leader in
Omoku, however, saw the gifts given to community leaders during
crises as an influence to make them compromise. According to
him, “Whenever the chiefs raise their protests, they (oil
companies) find an avenue to maybe send some token to them to
calm them down.” He further explained:
When the oil companies see that the demise
(damage to the community) is high, they will
now find a means of going to, maybe, one or
two of the chiefs, and give them some token
to calm them down. Whenever they do that, 
and other people discover that these people
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are signing away, and the companies are
liaising with one or two people, while it is
something that concerns the community in
general, they (community) will now revolt
against it. When they (companies) now want
to have a situation with the community, they
will now invite you to come to Port Harcourt
and they will lodge you in a hotel, so that at
the end of the day, they will corrupt you. 
You forget about why you were sent there, 
you forget your mission to that place. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/Global Memorandum
of Understanding (GMoU)
In the earlier presentation of the community relations strategies of
the oil companies, it was revealed that both Shell and Chevron
differentiated between the MoU and the GMoU. It was also
obvious that they both adopted the latter as an improvement on the
former. Consequent on Agip’s decline to grant an interview, the
inability to establish through any literature that the company
adopted GMoU, and the constant mention of MoU by the
participants from Omoku and Obrikom where the company
operates, it was concluded that Agip still made use of MoU. In
respect to MoU, therefore, one of the elders in Obrikom said, “The
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MoU is the major thing which we write sometimes once in three
years, four years, or even seven years, as the case may be.” He
further said:
Let me say for the past ten years, they don’t
just come to do any project; they do the
projects according to what we agreed in the
MoU. And the MoU, once written, they don’t
do any other projects apart from what is in
it. The bad thing there is that they don’t
carry out this MoU to the fullest. They will
do some things; if you talk about
employment, they will abandon those ones. 
They will do some road projects, and leave
some. 
The next strategy the participants said the oil companies used
during crises was the GMoU. From the focus group discussion and
key informant interview sessions, it was clear that only very few of
the participants knew what the GMoU was. One of the men in
Tisun said of the GMoU: “They (Chevron) said they have an MoU
with all the communities around here, all around here, that they
had a negotiation.” An elder in Kolokolo also said:
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There is one committee in this community, 
called the GMoU. The GMoU people, these
are the community people who represent all
the six communities, all the Itsekiri
communities. These are the houses they have
built for almost about four or five years they
have been in position now… these two
bedroom flats wey see so.   
The clearest understanding of the GMoU was displayed by an
indigene of Kolokolo, who was the secretary of the Trust. 
According to him, the GMoU was the brainchild of Chevron and it
catered for 23 oil producing communities in five oil fields. He said, 
“Anything that has to do with funding is under the auspices of the
GMoU.” He mentioned the five oil fields, and they were Dibi, 
Olero, Ughoegungun, Escravos and Abiteye fields. He explained
that Chevron no longer dealt directly with the communities, rather, 
it went through the council; the Itsekiri Rural Development
Council (IRDC). A distinction was made between the Trust and the
IRDC; Trust was a set of community representatives cutting across
all interest groups within the community at the community level, 
and the IRDC comprised two representatives from each
community Trust within the cluster and other stake holders at the
cluster level. 
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The Trust’s secretary further said, “The primary aim of the GMoU
is to address the issue of development and employment. In the last
3 years, the communities have witnessed the presence of Chevron
more than the previous 33 years.” He said the GMoU was first
signed in April 2005 and then reviewed in June 2009. He further
explained that there was a working document that stated the terms
of the agreement. According to him, “Chevron does not give room
for negotiation. The company only negotiates with sub-contractors
on the job available, and they then release it to the council. So, the
council does not have a say or negotiate.” This is contrary to the
impression of the participants from Tisun and Kolokolo that the
Trust negotiated with Chevron on behalf of their communities. 
Still, he claimed that Chevron was making good effort in the area
of funding, particularly for the council. He also said that the
company usually fulfilled its promises.  
The other participants from Tisun and Kolokolo, however, did not
agree with the secretary on the benefits of GMoU and the efforts of
Chevron. One of the youths in Kolokolo said:  
In 1997, after the community leaders don go
(to Chevron), we as youth, we will go on our
own, we will meet the director of the
company and say, “abeg please o, we are
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from Kolokolo community. Abeg, we need
some things o”, they will honour us, and
give us. But after they don bring the GMoU
come, nothing like that dey happen. (In
1997, after the community leaders would
have gone to Chevron, we, the youths, would
also go to meet with the director of the
company saying, “Please, we are from
Kolokolo community. Please, we need some
things.”They would honour us and give us. 
But after they brought the GMoU, things like
that don’t happen anymore.)
The women in Kolokolo also agreed that they got less from
Chevron after the introduction of the GMoU than they did before
it. According to one of the women, “When the GMoU start, we no
dey see any Chevron for this town. That time wey GMoU never
start, we still dey see Chevron for this place. (Since GMoU started, 
we have not seen Chevron in this town. Before GMoU stared, we
used to see Chevron in this place.)” Another woman said, “Before, 
before, Chevron people dey give us some small money to help us, 
but since the GMoU, we did not achieve anything, no money, no
anything self. (In the past, Chevron used to give us little amount of
money to assist us, but since the GMoU, we have not seen
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anything; no money, nothing.)” Yet another woman agreed with
the previous two saying:
We no dey get helper for Chevron that side. 
Before Chevron start wetin they start
(GMoU), them they give job and them still
dey pay better money, but this one wey
Chevron don start so, no work, no money. 
Na suffer head the boys take commot for this
community. (We are not assisted by
Chevron. Before Chevron started what it
started, it used to provide good employment
with good pay, but now that Chevron has
started it, there is no job and no money. It is
the suffering that drives the boys away from
the community.)
The oldest man living in Kolokolo also described the benefits he
enjoyed from Chevron before the GMoU was adopted, saying:
Chevron dey give food every two weeks,  the
food wey dey give us, na dat one we go
survive on, because as I dey so, I no fit work
for here, if my pikin no give me, I no fit
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chop. But that time when the food dey come, 
I dey feel fine because I no dey stress dey
find these things. (Chevron used to bring
food every two weeks and we lived off that
food. Because, as I am now, I cannot work;
if my child does not give me money, I cannot
feed. But that time when food was provided, 
I felt fine and did not undergo stress to get
food.)
On the other hand, the communities also made use of some
strategies to communicate with the oil companies. One of those
strategies was dialogue and it was presented earlier in this work. 
The other strategies claimed by the participants were writing and
protest. 
Writing
The participants identified writing as one of the major ways their
communities communicated with the oil companies. The youth
leader in Eruemukohwarien said, “If we need anything from the
government or we want anything from the Shell, which we do and
they neglect, there is nothing than to write.” He further explained
that the letters were always written through the leaders in the
community. In Kolokolo, one of the youths stated that whenever
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there was a spill and the water was polluted, “The executive would
write a letter to Chevron, asking for a percentage for the fishermen
in the community.” Also, whenever Chevron sent allocations to the
community, the Trust usually wrote to the company to present the
nominations.  
The Obrikom Women Association leader said that the community
wrote whenever Agip’s attention was needed. According to her, 
“When you write to them, that is, Letter of Audience, they will give
you audience date. And at times, they prove stubborn.” One of the
youths in Eruemukohwarien also agreed that his community wrote
to book appointments. He said, “In this area, it is just writing;
booking an appointment with them by writing a letter of an
audience. That is how we use to relate with them.” He also claimed
that the companies sometimes failed to respond. According to him, 
in case of any need, “We put it in writing, but still, we are not
getting anything out of it.”
One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien said that the community
did not only write to demand for things from the oil companies, 
they also wrote to express gratitude. According to him, “When we
get projects, we write a letter of appreciation to them for what
they’ve done, and this brings more because you are encouraging
them.”
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Protests
Another strategy the communities used to communicate with the
oil companies was protest. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien
said that the community did not embrace violence; hence, protest
was the next option available to them. He said:
We talk to them (Shell), trying to call them. 
If the worst comes to the worst, what we do
is to go in numbers, in large numbers, to go
and protest with placards, to tell them that, 
“What you are doing is not good.” At that
stage, we may draw their attention to come
and discuss or they will invite us to discuss. 
The Obrikom women leader also agreed that sometimes the oil
companies did not respond to mere discussions and writing. 
According to her:  
When you write to them (Agip), and they
refuse, then you use force to go, by
mobilizing people. Like women now, there
are things we’re looking for, so, a time will
come now, we will write to them again. 
When they refuse, we will mobilize ourselves
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and go for demonstration. That time, at least
they will hear us. Like last week, the youths
had a demonstration over there, and now
they’ve called them to make peace with
them. 
The youth leader in Omoku said that the only way the youths
displayed their displeasure concerning any undesirable activity of
the oil companies was to protest. He emphasized that the
community was not given to violence. The Eze-Ogba Nwadei
Ogbuehi in Omoku also agreed that protest was one of the most
effective ways to secure the community’s entitlements. According
to him, “We cannot be tired to fight on. If a man does not say, “I
am here!” I know for sure they would not know he is there. Unless
you cry out, and when you cry out, you will surely be heard. So we
will cry the more.”  
4.3.7 Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Oil
Companies’ Community Relations Strategies
Having presented the perspectives of the companies and the
communities on the community relations strategies used by the oil
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companies during crises, it becomes pertinent to evaluate the
effectiveness of those strategies also from both perspectives. 
Oil Companies
When asked about the effectiveness of the strategies engaged by
Shell, the company’s representative was positive about the results
generated so far. He commented on the use of the GMoU, saying
that while he might not be in the position to speak for other
companies who also engaged the strategy, Shell’s version had
achieved much of the desired impact. Nevertheless, he said that the
company would still work more to improve its achievements, 
because it could not claim to have reached the mark yet. While
explaining the indicators of the effectiveness of Shell’s GMoU
strategy, he said:
Before now, they could have been the same
communities that would have come here to
demand that Shell should give their children
scholarship. But because of the way the
GMoU is structured, they know they have to
take development in their own hands, sit
down in their communities, and think of
what they want development to mean for
them, and how they want to do it.
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He cited the example of a particular community that decided that
instead of pressuring Shell for scholarship, they would use the
money provided by the company for their development to make the
scholarship available. Since each community was to decide on its
own development focus, that particular community decided on
education. 
On the other hand, Chevron’s representative also said that the
company’s strategies had been effective. He said that there had
been significant improvement in the company’s relationship with
the communities since the strategies were adopted. According to
him, “We have not had any crisis that has led to them
(communities) shutting us down. When you (the community) are
the one who is responsible for what a company does in your
community, what do you want to fight that company for?” He
emphasized that things are getting better between Chevron and the
communities. He said, “I mean, if you pick out the issues of
militants and criminalities, I can say that we have a very positive
operational community.”
Communities
Considering that the communities were the recipients of all the
community relations strategies of the oil companies, it became
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pertinent to examine their views of the companies’ efforts.  Of all
the participants who took part in this study, only one person said
that the companies’ strategies were effective. The participant, an
elder in Eruemukohwarien, specifically commended Shell’s
communication with his community. He said, “It’s very effective. 
Very, very, effective. Very, very, effective, their communication is
very effective.”
Some other participants felt that the oil companies’ strategies were
just fair. For instance, the Obrikom women leader said that the oil
companies’ activities were forced by the communities and were
not willingly done by the companies.  One of the chiefs in
Eruemukohwarien also said that Shell was making fair effort to
pacify the community by offering some assistance. He too was, 
however, not satisfied with the company’s overall performance. An
elder in Obrikom also said, “We are partially satisfied, but not
much, not 100%, really. They’ve not done enough to our own
satisfaction, but we know that we can say they are trying to their
own little power, but that is not our own satisfaction”  
The largest group of participants said that the community relations
strategies of the oil companies were not effective at all. Most of
them opined that the best strategy any oil company could adopt
was to go to the grassroots. They said the companies would miss
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the point of the whole situation if they observed the communities
from a distance. One of the men in Tisun said:
Now, if really they are not wicked- and I see
the reason many people carry guns- if they
were not wicked, this is the source of their
oil, can’t they one day, come here and talk
with us and see things for themselves? They
can’t come and discuss with us! They will
not come here, they will send some groups
of people who may, “may”, I’m not specific, 
who may not even represent the people well. 
They are not coming here, that’s the
problem, because they don’t see for
themselves. 
Another reason some of the participants claimed that the strategies
of the oil companies were not effective was the oil companies’
failure to respond to their demands. The women in
Eruemukohwarien said that whenever there was a need in the
community, they would dance to Shell and the company’s
representatives would persuade them to return home, promising
that the company would look into it. However, the promises were
hardly ever fulfilled. One of the women said, “It’s been one year
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now since we protested for the road. You can see the whole town
today; if you walk round the whole town, you will see how it is that
nothing is coming.” The youth leader in the community also said, 
“They (Shell) never come o, they don’t do anything on their own
unless when you ask. They don’t hearken to our cries, they come to
deceive us and go.”
One of the chiefs in the same community said:
Since 1958, see the road in the community, 
see all the cracks in all our houses and all
the zincs, see them. They have been burnt by
the smoke from the gas which they flare into
the air. There was a time they came, they
said they wanted to assess all those things;
they assessed, they went, but there was no
response or compensation at all.
Some participants also mentioned failed promises as their reason
for claiming that the oil companies’ strategies were not effective. 
The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien said that even when the
community dialogued with Shell and promises were made, there
was never a result. Hence, he concluded that dialogue was not
working. He went further to cite an incident in which Shell failed
to live up to its promises. According to him:
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There was a time we tried to arrange a kind
of seminar with them (Shell); they said they
were going to arrange it. I think they called
it Participatory Rural Appraisal or
something like that. So, we really organised
it and they asked us to list 30 projects that
could make this community a nice one. We
listed them. But up till now, since the year
2001 or so, it was only one project that was
done and I think that was the coastal bus, 
ok, two coastal buses. We’ve been
dialoguing since how long now? If
somebody tells you that this is a place where
oil has been extracted from since 45 years
ago and the community is still like this, will
you actually believe it?
One of the elders in the community recalled the protest staged
against Shell concerning the community road. He said, “They
(Shell) talked all sorts of political issues here; they talked, talked, 
and talked, and then they left. So, what happened? They finished
their job, and they left. The road is still there.” One of the youths
in the community accused Shell of not coming to fulfil the
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agreements made in the MoU. According to him, “Sometimes, they
(Shell) don’t use to do it, like what they signed last year, it has not
been implemented till now. They will just do something very trivial
and forget about the others.” He went on:
They (Shell) will like to deceive you. The
issue is that, whenever they come, they will
respond to your call, but after the MoU, they
will go back, being blocked to the
degradation of the community. And that is
why they are not effective, because what
makes you effective is when you have a
Memorandum of Understanding and you
implement it. That means you are active, you
are effective, and there will be peace. 
Everybody will smile.
He also stated that Shell saw the leaders as “automatic control
buttons,” that once the company could meet with them and pacify
them, everyone else in the community would fall in line.  He
blamed the poor relationship between the company and the
community on that method of operation. As far as he was
concerned, the leaders represented the community and they should
project the interest of the community and not theirs.  
282
4.3.8 Communities’ Preference for Community
Relations Strategies
Fig. 4.12
OIL COMPANIES’ PERCEIVED COMMUNITY
PREFERENCE FOR DEALING WITH THEM
Fig. 4.12 presents the strategies the oil companies perceived to be
the preference of the communities. Having examined, so far, the
oil companies’ perceptions of the challenges in the communities, 
the communication structures of both parties and the community
relations strategies engaged by the oil companies, it becomes
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necessary to evaluate the companies’ perceptions of the strategies
the communities actually prefer. If there is an affinity between
what the companies think the communities prefer and what the
communities actually prefer, the foundation would have been laid
for a cordial relationship. Hence, the following are the
communities’ preferred strategies, as perceived by the companies:  
Transparency
The oil companies believed that the communities wanted to be
informed about the activities of the companies taking place on their
land. They were also of the opinion that the communities required
transparency from them in terms of the development projects that
were embarked upon. According to Shell’s representative:
  
For one, the community will want the
company to be as transparent as possible. 
But at the same time, obviously, that
transparency will mean that you have to
give as much information away, and that
information is commercially sensitive, so, 
you can’t just tell them everything they want
to know at that particular point in time.
This means that information would be made available to the
communities excluding the commercially sensitive part.  
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Consultation with the communities
The companies were also of the opinion that the communities
wanted to be consulted when making decisions that affect them, 
such as the dredging of new sites, execution of development
projects and other related matters. According to Shell’s
representative:
If they(communities)  feel that you have been
consulting them very well, or putting them in
the know of what’s been going on, you are
not hiding anything from them, or you are
honest and transparent as it should be or
can be, then that level of trust will be very
high. 
Chevron’s representative also stated that consultation with the
communities was a very important community relations strategy. 
He said, “It is also the community strategy that provides maximum
power, that maximizes communication between company and
community, which ensures transparency.”
Community Initiative
Another community relations strategy that the oil companies
believed the communities preferred was community initiative. The
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companies were of the opinion that the communities would rather
draw up their own development plans, than depend on outsiders to
do it for them; since they were more conversant with the
challenges they were faced with. Shell’s representative explained
that making decisions on behalf of the communities would be
difficult because such a task would require asking the question, 
“What do the communities want?” and according to him, “It’s a
very broad question because communities are different. What
Community A prefers may not be what Community B prefers.” The
representative from Chevron also agreed that the communities
should take responsibility for their development. According to him, 
the strategy the communities would prefer is “The strategy that
makes the communities the driver of their own development. I think
it is any strategy that makes the communities responsible for their
development.”  
Provision of Amenities
The companies also identified provision of amenities as one of the
strategies they believed the communities preferred. According to
the representative from Shell, “Most communities have aspirations
of development; they want electricity, they want water, and they
want schools.” He said the company made the money available
while the communities determined their own development
priorities. He gave an instance, “One of the clusters (of
communities) decided that they were not going to be building
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schools or roads, they wanted to be sending their children outside
this country on full scholarship to go and study. And they sent 12
of them to the US.”
The representative of Chevron also agreed with Shell by
identifying the provision of amenities as a viable strategy. 
According to him, it is a strategy “That upholds the rule of law, 
and that can assist the development of the community with respect
to infrastructure and other forms of development.”
Fig. 4.13
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Fig. 4.13 presents the actual community relations preference of the
communities. As can be clearly seen, the elements that constitute
the actual strategic preference of the communities are more
elaborate than those identified by the oil companies. The elements
are the following:
Withdrawal of Military Forces
The first strategy the communities wanted the oil companies to
adopt for better relationship was to withdraw the forces from the
communities. They said it would be the first step that would lay the
foundation for peaceful cohabitation. According to one of the
youths in Eruemukohwarien:
If they (Shell) want to work successfully, let
them go back to the first time, that first time
when they came as civilians. They should
forget security and face the community. But
now, we do not understand each other, the
security now differentiates us; they cannot
hear from us, we cannot hear from them. So, 
to make cordial relationship, they should
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stop all those nonsense- running to the state
governments, running to JTF. 
The youth leader also agreed with this:
We are looking to the government to also
come in, and also advice the oil companies, 
because if the government had come in and
advised the companies, the company
wouldn’t have been using the soldiers and
some other war forces to intimidate the
community. 
Better Employment
The participants also said that it would be a strategic move for the
oil companies to look into the issue of employment in the
communities. They believed it would get the youths off the streets
and make them less susceptible to restiveness. According to the
leader of Obrikom Women Association:   
I will say it is a very simple thing because
the oil companies know that the place
they’re working is the people’s land. At
least, they are supposed to provide
employment, as much as possible, to help
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people from that community. I feel that if
they provide employment, there would be
fewer militants. 
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku also commented
on the issue of militancy. He explained that the amnesty
granted by the Federal Government would be pointless if
employment was not provided. According to him:
The young men are dropping the guns. We
have been watching as they are dropping
them. If they drop and they have no job, and
the government does not fix them
somewhere, they can decide to return. 
Government should give them job, they
should do something; the government should
not play fun over this issue. 
One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien argued that it would be
useless for the oil companies to give scholarships to students if
there was no employment for them after their education. He then
suggested that the oil companies should identify the staffing needs
at their oil wells, and request for qualified indigenes to fill them. 
He stated that if about three indigenes were employed every year, 
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on a rotational basis among the communities, the company-
community relationship would be cordial. 
Also, the youth leader in Omoku advised the oil companies to
empower the youths by creating employment opportunities, “So
that peace can reign, not only in our domain, but also in Nigeria
as a whole.” The women in Eruemukohwarien also appealed to the
companies to empower women by creating women friendly jobs. 
They also recommended, “They (Shell) should place women that
are from 50years upward, who cannot work, on salary.”
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien insisted that the companies
must employ indigenes as community liaison officers (CLO). He
said, “When you (oil companies) talk of Community Liaison
Officer, you should employ somebody from the oil producing
community; that person will mediate the problem. So, without all
these things put in place, the relationship will not be there.” He
also suggested a raise in the salaries of casual workers. Some other
participants also believed that employing indigenous CLOs would
give their communities a representation within the companies. 
Company’s Physical Presence
It was discovered in this study that the most popular strategy
among the participants, which they believed would go a long way
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in resolving company-community problems, was the companies’
physical presence in the communities.  When crises began in the
communities, the oil companies became recluses, surrounding their
facilities with high fences and security men. One of the youths
from Eruemukohwarien said that the oil companies should leave
out the military forces and come to the communities themselves. 
He said, “If they really want a good relationship, they should come
down and put things in place.” He warned that if the situation was
not attended to immediately, it might degenerate further and
become uncontainable.  
One of the men from Tisun also agreed that the oil companies
should go to the grass root. He said:
They (Chevron) should come down to the
community to discuss what we need and
what we want to get, not that they negotiate
with the people in the township, and it
doesn’t affect us. Because those people will
go and negotiate with them, and thereafter, 
we that are suffering the mosquitoes will not
know anything. They have to come and hear
our problem, to know what we are suffering. 
292
He lamented that the American manager of Chevron would go to
Lagos, a non-oil producing state and sometimes fly straight to
Escravos, which he described as a mere reservoir from which oil is
lifted, yet the oil producing communities were neglected. He said, 
“Like here now, we have over thirty-something wells here that
produce oil. They can fly from Warri to Escravos, and then back to
Lagos where they go back to America.”  
Another man said that the oil companies should not believe all they
hear about the communities; rather, they should visit them. He
went on:
We heard that the deputy president is an
Ijaw man; has he gotten to the place where
they drill the oil? The president, has he
gotten here? But he is benefitting from this
place, they carry the money abroad. Let the
company’s representatives come here and
see for themselves. 
The youth leader in Omoku also agreed that the best approach was
for the oil companies to visit the communities. He said:
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We have a Civic Center, they can come to
that place, and stop calling people to come
to Port Harcourt and lodging them in hotels
and deceiving them. They should come
down, we have a civic center, and everybody
would see them. So that the people that the
community would have chosen as their
spokespersons would then speak and the
entire community would hear whatever thing
they are discussing. 
Education
Another strategy that the participants said they would prefer was
education. In Tisun, one of the men suggested, “The children here
are supposed to have free education from primary to university
because we don’t have much population.” One of the elders in
Obrikom also said, “If the oil companies were able to say, “Ok, 
create job opportunities and create scholarship awards for the
youths,” it will enable peace to reign in the community, and even
in the company itself.”
Some of the young girls also advocated for female education. One
of the girls in Eruemukohwarien suggested that female education
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would prevent teenage pregnancy which was rampant in the
community. According to her:
They (Shell) should try, at least, to create a
kind of education for the females. Because
what’s happening nowadays is that you see
young girls, they're nursing their babies, 
young girls of let me say fifteen, fourteen, 
downwards, you see them carrying babies. 
She also suggested sex education for the girls in the community. 
She said that though formal education might keep them off the
streets and get them occupied, sex education would enlighten and
help them to take responsibility for their lives. 
Skill Training
Some of the participants emphasized their preference for skilled
training as a strategy for achieving crises resolution. They were of
the opinion that not everyone could have the opportunity to go to
school; hence, provision should be made for the uneducated
members of the community. One of the youths in
Eruemukohwarien said, “They say all fingers are not equal. For
those who cannot further their education, where they can learn all
those work should be provided.” He went on to suggest:
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Even some of the educated ones are still
trying to make something out of their lives;
to get one job or the other, because in
Nigeria today, work is not easy to get after
leaving school. So, at least, if they can
establish the training institute in this
community, it will help the younger ones
who are coming up, particularly those who
can’t afford education, to learn a trade and
make a living. 
One of the men in Tisun was of the opinion that learning a skill in
the community would also stem the migration of youths to the
township. He said:  
They (Chevron) should bring skill
acquisition here, because a few days ago, 
we had some of our brothers, when they got
tired here, they just went fishing. Some, to
get fire wood, they would say “No, I no fit
again, I wan go learn scaffolding,” “I wan
go learn rigging.” They all ran to town to
learn. But if such a thing is here, we will
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know that an oil company is working around
us. 
Some of the participants also suggested that the oil companies
should train youths in the technical areas the companies would
need, so that they could be gainfully employed. One of the youths
in Eruemukohwarien also suggested the adoption of school-on-
wheels that would provide mobile training for several
communities. He cited the example of the one organized for the
community girls earlier, saying:
At the end of the exercise, they gave our
young girls some sewing machines, hair
dressing materials and other things. So, they
can reorganize it. There are so many of
them (youths) who cannot further their
education because they came from very poor
families, and because of the poverty of their
parents, they cannot go to school. 
One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien further suggested a
technical school or a skill acquisition centre since the community
is an industrial area. He also supported the idea of the school-on-
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wheels, explaining his role in organizing the previous one in the
community. According to him:
When I was in government (as the president
of CDC), I brought the school-on-wheels
into this community, and about four other
communities- tailoring, welding, electrical, 
e.t.c.- for six good months. Many of those
children are now working in NEPA, doing
their own self help, and some doing
business. So, if we build that skill
acquisition centre, people like us, who have
retired home now, can go there and give a
touch. Give a touch and give our knowledge
without even taking a kobo. This is our
contribution; teach them so that they can
acquire skills. This guy will go down and
look for his own job and do things on his
own. 
Company-Government Partnership
Some of the participants stated that they would appreciate the
strategy that would involve a partnership between the oil
companies and the government. They believed that the joint
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venture would help to develop the communities better. This
partnership would also terminate the regime of trading blames
between the two parties. 
Company-Community Partnership
The participants also suggested that there should be cooperation
between the companies and the communities. The women leader in
Eruemukohwarien pleaded for the community and Shell to work
together. She said it would make receiving things easier, and the
women in the community would be happy with that. One of the
elders in Kolokolo said, “Our people say hand wash hand makes
hands clean, that’s the most important watchword for the
community and the oil company. So, let us parley, we have to be
our brother’s keeper, we have to hold them and they hold us.” He
also said that peace should be the watchword in the relationship
between the two parties. The women leader in Obrikom gave the
following advice to the communities where militants operate:
I would say that they have to put their heads
together to stop violence because it would
give them bad names, and they would not
actually get what they’re looking for. If they
continue to drive away all the workers and
the white men, it would be hard for them to
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get what they’re looking for; everybody
would be afraid of living in that place. And
if there is nobody in those offices in the oil
company, I don’t know if they will go and
talk to the guards. 
Effective Communication
The participants considered effective communication indispensable
if there would be peaceful cohabitation between the oil companies
and communities. The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien advised:
Whenever they (Shell) come for a
Memorandum of Understanding with the
traditional rulers, with the CDC, and the
youths, whatever has been agreed on must
be implemented. By so doing, there would be
effective results for the people in question. 
The company should be sincere with the host
community.  
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien advised that if the oil
companies communicated with the communities through the
proper channels, they would enjoy a cordial relationship with the
communities. According to him:
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We listen to our elders, we do not kill our
leaders, we respect them. So, they (oil
companies) can easily meet our leaders and
say, “Look o, look o,” and our leaders will
call general meeting, saying “Look o, Shell
came o, this is what they said o.” At the end
of the day, we must reach an agreement;
instead of them intimidating us with the state
governments and forces and all those things. 
Provision of Infrastructure
The last strategy that was stated as the preference of the
communities was the provision of infrastructure. One of the men in
Tisun said that the community suffered without electricity while
Chevron’s facility always had power supply. He said, “If these
people could extend their light to us, if they could extend their
water to us, at least they would have done something better for the
community.” The women leader in Eruemukohwarien said that the
roads in the community were bad and they inconvenience
commuters. She appealed to Shell to help repair the roads.  
The oldest man in Kolokolo also said that infrastructure was very
important. He dwelt particularly on the issue of transportation. 
According to him:
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This jetty now wey we dey walk so, we need
concrete jetty, not this wood because the
wood no dey last, na every year we dey put
am, this wood is not good. Because if water
dry, all the water-side dey dry dey go, so, 
without that jetty now, we cannot move
forward like that. Even if stranger dey come
for the community now, if water dry, your
boat go stop for a far distance, then you go
come dey enter water dey trek to where you
dey come, before you go come enter town. 
(We need concrete jetty because this wooden
one does not last; it has to be replaced
annually. During the dry season, the water
dries up, thereby hindering easy movement. 
If a stranger comes to the community, and
the water has dried up, the boat will stop a
long distance from here, and the stranger
will have to walk the distance.)
In conclusion, the participants in this study agreed that there could
be a better relationship between the oil companies and their
communities. They expressed their readiness to get along with the
companies provided the companies demonstrated a sense of
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responsibility in executing their businesses. They also insisted that
all middle men must be excluded while both parties foster a direct
mutual relationship. 
4.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
4.4.1 Introduction
This section synthesizes and simultaneously interprets both the
quantitative and qualitative data that are presented in the preceding
section of this section. Not only is the discussion based on the data
presented, it is also based on existing literature on the subject. 
Furthermore, the discussion is carefully guided by the adopted
theories for an insightful understanding of the complexities that
characterise the relationship between oil companies and their host
communities. 
4.4.2 Discussion
The data generated in this study are discussed according to the
research questions that precipitated them. Hence, the research
questions are presented first and then the data are engaged in
answering them. 
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1) How often have conflicts occurred in the Niger Delta
involving Shell, Agip and Chevron and what are the
causes?
Conflict is a complex phenomenon arising from human
interactions. Sociologists, social psychologist and scholars in other
related fields have noted in their studies of human interactions that
conflict is inevitable in human societies (Otite, 2001; Zartman, 
1991; Folarin, 1998). Some scholars have even contended that
conflict is a normal process of development in the society (Park &
Buress, 1921). Hence, that there is conflict in the Niger Delta is not
abnormal. The abnormality, however, arises because the situation
defers solutions because every effort made to resolve the conflicts
has failed to yield positive result.  Also, the conflicts in the Niger
Delta have further underdeveloped the region, thereby contesting
the assertion that it is a normal process of development.  
The society is perceived by conflict theorists as an arena where
groups contend for power or benefits (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). 
Members of the society may or may not be fully aware of this
contention, depending on their level of involvement. The findings
of this study show that people of Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom, 
Omoku and Kolokolo communities were more aware of conflict
situations than those in Tisun community. Table 4.7 shows this
clearly. It is ironic that residents of Eruemukohwarien who were
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the most aware of conflicts in their area also said conflicts rarely
occurred in the community. This seeming contradiction arose from
the respondents’ misinterpretation of conflict to mean crisis. They
explained that though they had experienced some conflicts in the
community, violence was rare.  
Hence, considering that a crisis is a situation that degenerates into
a critical stage in which extraordinary intervention is needed to
remedy, it becomes understandable that majority of the
respondents claimed its rarity. Therefore, while the communities
were familiar with conflicts, they rarely experienced crises. The
results also reveal that Shell was more involved in conflicts in the
communities than Agip and Chevron. This may be due to Shell
having the largest operations in the Niger Delta.  
From the foregoing discussion, it has been established that
conflicts occurred in four of the five selected communities at
varying frequencies, while Tisun claimed that it had not witnessed
conflicts. It becomes pertinent, therefore, to explore the reasons
behind the two positions and their implications for the oil
companies.  The qualitative data provide us with insight into the
conflict prone and conflict free communities. Fig. 4.9 illustrates the
reasons provided by the two parties; those who acknowledged
conflicts and those who denied them.  
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One of the reasons given by the participants who acknowledged
the occurrence of conflicts in their communities was that the oil
companies represented the government. They insisted that the
government and the companies conspired to rob them of their dues. 
They also observed that the oil companies ran to the government
when there were conflicts in the communities, which further
proved the governmental support they enjoyed. This situation is
explained by the conflict theory which posits that individuals or
groups struggle to maximize their benefit in a society, which
inevitably contributes to social change. The government and the
communities struggled over the natural resources in the Niger
Delta because the economy of Nigeria depended on the oil and the
communities believed that they were not well compensated. This
struggle, therefore, led to social strain in form of conflicts and a
not cordial relationship between the two parties.  
By aligning with the government, the oil companies earned
themselves an enemy in the communities. The implication of this
for them was that for as long as the government continued to fail in
its responsibilities in those communities, the oil companies would
continue to be victims of transferred aggressions. It would be risky, 
therefore, for the companies to push the blames of
underdevelopment to the government and hide behind it, because
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whichever way, they would serve as the “body-shield” for the
government by taking most of the attacks. 
In any society, the government has the sole responsibility of
ensuring development. Political campaigns are focused on
proposed development agenda and electorates vote based on their
judgement of the candidate with the best development plan. 
Though there have been arguments back and forth on the roles of
businesses in the development process, the concept of social
responsibility has come to be generally accepted. In fact, 
companies that fail to be socially responsible are liable to conflicts.  
The participants of this study complained about the state of
infrastructure in their communities. While they were aware that the
government had the main responsibility of improving their
infrastructure, they also said that it was the oil companies, and not
the government, that undertook oil exploration in their
communities. Hence, the companies were expected to stand up to
the challenge. The situation became more complex when they
observed that the facilities in the oil companies residing in their
communities were modern and well maintained, while the
communities were left without such amenities.  
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Some scholars also noted the affluence exhibited by many oil
workers as well as political office holders in sharp contrast to the
social deprivation of most residents of the Niger Delta (Ibaba, 
2005; Obi, 2004; Esparza & Wilson, 1999). Akinola (2009)
observes that among the major infrastructural challenges in the
communities are poor roads. For instance, the only transportation
in island communities in the Niger Delta was by water ways
through the aid of in-board and out-board engine boats, flying
boats, and canoes. 
Also, it was noted in this study that some of the communities
engaged in conflicts so as to attract the attention of both the oil
companies and the government. They claimed that the duo paid
more attention to communities that posed threats to them while
they abandoned the ones that were relatively peaceful. Though the
participants insisted that their communities did not condone
militancy, they expressed the possibility of adopting violence if it
would guarantee them the same attention that the restive
communities enjoyed. The stakeholder theory supports this finding
by explaining that diffused publics may become functional publics
when there is conflict (Dougherty, 1992; Ray, 1999; Stephens, 
Malone & Bailey, 2005). This means that the relatively peaceful
communities may be considered inconsequential by the oil
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companies until they become actively involved in conflict, thereby
winning the full attention of the companies.  
Another important cause of conflicts that was identified by the
participant was politics. It was revealed that during electioneering
periods in the past, some politicians engaged some youths as
political thugs. Those youths were given arms, which were not
retrieved after the elections. Since the politicians did not have any
use for the thugs afterwards, they resort to violence.  
A different dimension of the politics that was identified was the
one used by influential members of the communities. It was
discovered from the FGDs sessions that some leaders used the
youths in the communities to demonstrate against the oil
companies to achieve their ends. That was a betrayal of trust
because the demonstrators were led to believe that they were
demonstrating for public good, whereas, they were only being used
to win contracts. The case would be more pathetic if some of them
lost their lives in the process, while fighting another man’s war.  
One of the complexities of the situation was that the oil companies
would give the contracts to those leaders, and the people would
continue to demonstrate; while the companies would not be able to
comprehend what else the people wanted, the people would be
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frustrated with the companies’ “lack of response.” Hence, both the
oil companies and the masses were victims of the plot by the elite
in the community (Edafejirhaye & Edafejirhaye, 2008). This
further underscores the complex nature of the Niger Delta
conflicts.  
The Gramcian Marxist perspective of conflict theory states that
one of the ways the ruling class gets its subordinates to consent to
its domination is by linking its interests to those of the subordinate
class (Pease, 2003). This means that the influential members of
those Niger Delta communities made the people believe that they
were aiming at the same goal, thereby allowing themselves through
their own consent, to be used against the oil companies. 
The last cause of conflicts that was identified by the participants
was the oil companies’ failure to keep agreements. The companies
were accused of either selectively implementing, or not
implementing at all, the agreements reached with the communities. 
In a bid to force them to keep the agreements, therefore, the
communities resorted to conflicts. The implication of this for the
oil companies is bifurcated; firstly, the companies would lose their
credibility among the people, and secondly, the violence against
them might continue. Folarin (1998), while identifying sources of
310
conflict, says that communication breakdown can result in conflict
and it can be engendered by failed promises. 
According to Wallace & Wolf (2006), for conflict to be
controlled, one group must be able to, at least temporarily, 
suppress its rivals. If this assertion is true, we can also argue that
one group may deliberately submit to its rivals to control or avoid
conflict. Fig 4.9 reveals that some of the participants denied the
occurrence of conflicts in their communities. Though they were
exposed to similar conditions as the conflicting communities, they
presented some interesting reasons for deliberately avoiding
conflicts. Among the reasons was the peaceful heritage of their
communities. The participants claimed that their forefathers had
instructed them to maintain peace in the communities. Hence, from
one generation to another, they had made efforts to keep to that
instruction. They also claimed that it was the insensitive attitude of
both the oil companies and the government that forced them into
uncharacteristic demonstrations and protests.   
Another major reason given for the lack of conflicts in the
communities was the fear of military invasion. It was discovered in
the course of this study that this was one of the strongest reasons
for peace in some of the communities. Some participants admitted
that they would have engaged in violence to force the oil
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companies and the government to respond to their requests but for
the safety of their families. They stated that jeopardizing the
security of the communities was too much a price to pay for any
benefit. Omoweh (2010, p. 5) also acknowledges this finding when
he states, “…the state deploys its military to oppress and dominate
the people to foster its ruthless exploitation of the region.”
While some of the participants condemned militancy, others
identified with the militants saying that they were fighting for the
entire Niger Delta. A major concern that comes to the fore at this
point is that, though the selected communities for this study
claimed they did not condone militancy, they might still find other
violent means of expressing themselves in the future. This is
because they have the motive and the intense emotion to become
violent; all they lack is the will, and this may change if, according
to them, the communities remain neglected.  Hence, there is the
tendency for them to shift from being passive communities to
active ones. This may also result in a shift in the balance of power
as it has been witnessed in the communities where militants use
terror to subdue the oil companies and the government. 
Some of the participants also identified the youths’ respect for the
elders in the communities as one of the reasons for the lack of
conflicts in their communities. This displays the role played by the
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cultural setups of the communities. While the youths were more
vibrant, the elders were considered wiser. Hence, the youths
claimed that whenever they felt like reacting with violence against
the oil companies, the elders would call for restraint, and they
would listen. This may be a major sphere to explore while seeking
a lasting solution to restiveness in the Niger Delta. The oil
companies and the government can sincerely explore the cultural
setup to foster a better relationship with the communities. 
It was also interesting to discover that the fear of God was
mentioned as one of the reasons for the lack of conflicts in some
communities. Some respondents claimed that they could have
attacked the installations of the oil companies “If not for God.”
While a comment such as this could have been ignored as just a
matter of speaking, it was observed that the respondents made a lot
of references to God during the FGDs and KIIs. There were also
side comments about the communities depending on divine
intervention for solutions to their problems and the people praying
to God for peace. Also, during the interview session with the
women leader in Obrikom, she mentioned that a special prayer
session was organized to pray for the community. Considering all
the above, therefore, it becomes clear that religion plays an
important role in the lives of the people in the selected
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communities; hence, this channel can be explored for the sake of
peace in the Niger Delta.  
Lastly, the participants in this study mentioned that their respect
for the law also helped to prevent conflicts in their communities. 
They insisted that they would follow the legal process to express
their displeasure with the oil companies. As far as they were
concerned, the law, though slow, was better than violence. 
All the responses provided here show that the selected
communities for this study were active publics (Baskin, Aronoff &
Lattimore, 1997). The situational theory identifies active publics as
those who recognise the problem, recognise the constraints and are
actively involved in the situation. As can be seen, the respondents
recognised their major problem to be lack of development in the
communities, they considered the oil companies and the
government as their constraint, and they believed that the problem
was a threat to their well being. 
2) What are the consequences of the conflicts on host
communities and oil companies?
Functionalists consider societies and social institutions as systems
in which equilibrium is created through the interdependence of all
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parts. While they do not deny the existence of conflicts, they
believe the society naturally evolves means of controlling it. 
Sandole (1993) bases his argument on this when he identifies the
stages of conflict as initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, 
abatement, and termination, and claims that peace is the ultimate
target of conflicts.  
In the Niger Delta, conflicts have not resulted in peace; therefore, 
the functionalist approach is not applicable. Though the conflict
theory focuses on the shifting balance of power among rivals rather
than the creation of equilibrium, the theory still falls short of
addressing some peculiar situations in the Niger Delta. For
instance, both oil companies and host communities have incurred
losses in the course of the conflicts. In this context, therefore, the
stakeholder theory is more applicable. The theory posits that the
interrelationship between an organization and its stakeholders
engenders a kind of connectivity that makes any situation, whether
positive or negative, bear consequences for both parties. 
  
In agreement with the foregoing, the findings in this study reveal
that conflict is like a double edged sword that cuts on every side. 
Both the oil companies and the communities were affected by the
conflicts. While reflecting on the consequences of conflicts on the
communities, some participants said that there had been loss of
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lives and properties. As much as violence might have seemed a
practical way of attracting the attention of the government and oil
companies, the participants claimed that it also destroyed, in just a
moment, what had been built over time. The conflicts left behind
bitter memories that those who experienced them would rather
forget. The participants in Tisun and Kolokolo explained how their
communities were razed to the ground, leaving the survivors to
begin their lives all over again. They also noted that the population
of their communities had been drastically reduced, either by death
during the crises, or unwillingness of some survivors to return to
the communities afterwards. 
The participants observed that their communities suffered neglect
from the oil companies whenever there was a conflict. As could be
expected, the oil companies usually withdrew from the
communities during conflicts. The participants stated that at such
times, they did not get anything from the oil companies. It was
observed that whenever there was an inter-communal conflict, the
oil companies would refuse to get involved, insisting that the
communities settle their differences before coming to make
requests.  
It was even suggested that the oil companies appreciated inter-
communal conflicts because it made the communities turn against
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one another, thereby paying less attention to the companies, and
making less demands. Hence, having become aware of this, the
communities tried to maintain peace with one another so as to
forge a formidable front against the oil companies and the
government. Aaron & Patrick (2008) agree with this notion by
stating in their report on a study carried out in the Niger Delta that
host communities to oil companies, particularly Shell, are usually
divided due largely to the companies’ notoriety for playing off one
group against another.  
This creates the impression that while the oil companies claim that
the communities are their stakeholders, they actually place the
interests of the shareholders above that of the communities by
seeking to make profit at all cost. It is also noteworthy that had the
conflicts been between the oil companies and their shareholders, 
withdrawal would not have been an option. But then, the
shareholders would not have resorted to vandalism because of their
investments.  Nevertheless, Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004)
argue that the competition between shareholders and stakeholders
does not arise because values are created for shareholders when
they are created for stakeholders. Hence, the oil companies should
not sacrifice one for another. 
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Another major consequence of conflicts in the communities was
the invasion by military forces. The oil companies engaged the
services of security agents to forestall vandalism and abductions. 
The participants, however, complained that the forces interfered
with the normal flow of communal activities by restricting
movements and harassing commuters. They even mentioned that
the force members extorted money from commercial drivers at
their various check points. The participants were particularly
disturbed because they felt that the oil companies brought in the
armed forces so as to make them untouchable while they syphon
the communities’ wealth. While the companies considered
themselves safe due to military presence, the communities
considered themselves unsafe for the same reason. 
It is an understatement that conflict underdevelops. If there was
anything that all the selected communities had in common, it was
the lack of development. Though this was considered by the
participants to be the outcome of the conflicts, it was also noted
that there was no remarkable development before the conflict. The
participants identified education and infrastructure as some of the
areas in which their communities lacked development. The vicious
cycle was such that the communities resorted to conflicts so as to
address the lack of development, but the conflicts ended up
underdeveloping them further. Hence, whichever way, the
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communities always had developmental challenges to contend
with. Watts (2009) agrees with this finding by observing that there
was no running water, electricity, roads and functioning primary
schools in the oil producing communities in the Niger Delta.  
The participants also identified the fear of future attacks as another
consequence of conflicts. They admitted that there was always the
fear, whether active or latent, that the conflicts might recur, hence, 
their inability to be at rest. Consequently, members of the
communities migrated to the cities, thereby depopulating the
communities and over populating the cities. This also has its
implication for development because some of the communities
now lack the formidable number that can make them a force to
reckon with. The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) report in 2006 says, “People fear attacks by hijackers, oil
bunkerers, hostage takers, youth gangs, …and the crossfire
between militants groups, and between them and the government
law enforcement officials,” (UNDP, 2006: 306-311). 
On the other hand, the participants also identified the consequences
of conflicts for the oil companies. One of the consequences that
were identified was insecurity. The participants said that the oil
companies felt insecure in the communities as a result of the
conflicts. A tell tale sign of it was the engagement of military
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security operatives and their inaccessibility to the communities. 
The participants recalled that before the conflicts in their
communities, staff of oil companies visited the communities
frequently without fear. In recent times, however, the companies
have kept their distance. It was so bad that the companies even
kept their indigenous staff members at arm’s length. The
companies probably feared that those staff would be used to work
against them from inside. Watts (2009) quoted the International
Herald Tribune of April 22nd, 2007 as follows:
Companies now confine employees to heavily
fortified compounds, allowing them to travel
only by armored car or helicopter…One
company has outfitted bathrooms with steel
bolts to turn them into “panic” rooms, if
needed. Another has coated the pylons of a
giant oil-production platform 130 kilometers, 
or 80 miles, offshore with waterproof grease to
prevent attackers from climbing the rig…
Some foreign operators have abandoned oil
fields or left the country altogether. (p. 37)
Low productivity was the second consequence of conflicts for the
oil companies, as suggested by the participants. They explained
that anytime there were conflicts, the production of the oil
companies would reduce because there would not be a conducive
environment for business. The several protests and demonstrations
that led to the closure of the companies’ facilities for some days
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also disrupted the anticipated volume of production. As much as
the oil companies avoided questions on the effects of the crises on
their operations, there was a consensus among them that losses
incurred due to spillages during vandalisms and shut-ins during
protests and demonstrations run into billions of dollars. 
3) What are the community relations strategies employed
by oil companies to avoid/resolve conflicts with host
communities?
Though some scholars have argued that the community was fast
disintegrating in the face of globalization as engendered by
increase in mobility and communication, others have countered the
argument that the community was a reality that could not be
ignored (Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997). In recent times, 
individuals and agencies have begun to pay special attention to the
reality of the community. They emphasized that though
organizations might be preoccupied by regional, national, and
international community relations programmes, they ought not to
forget their immediate communities, i.e. their host communities. 
This, therefore, necessitates the adoption of viable community
relations strategies by the oil companies.  
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As illustrated in Fig. 4.10, one of Shell’s community relations
strategies during conflicts was dialogue. The company’s
representative stated that the company discussed a lot with the
communities. He explained that dialogue was part of the
company’s efforts to understand the communities. During the
process, the company usually attempted to view issues from the
perspectives of the communities so as to understand their
challenges. The Independent Monitor of May 10, 2010 reported
that Shell organized a workshop in which it engaged the members
of Degema Local Government Area (DELGA) Cluster I, in Rivers
State, on developmental issues, particularly as related to the
GMOU execution. 
Another strategy that Shell’s representative stated that the
company used during conflicts was the involvement of the
government. Shell insisted that it was not in its place, but the
government’s, to lead the process of development. Hence, the
company involved the government so as to encourage it to take
responsibility for its people. He stated that the conflicts the
company endured in the communities were as a result of the
communities’ displeasure towards the government. He explained
that if the government would take responsibility for the
development of the communities, the challenges would reduce, and
the violence against the company would stop.  
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Shell’s representative also pointed out that but for the presence of
the company in the communities, some of them would have still
been without basic amenities such as water, power supply and
good road. He stated that some governors and local government
officials had not even been to some of the communities; hence, 
much of the development so far was owed to Shell. This claim, 
however, may be misleading because some of the Niger Delta
communities did not have those said amenities. In some
communities where they were available, they were mostly not
functional.  
Nevertheless, personal observation during this study revealed that
in the communities where the amenities were available, oil
companies’ presence was felt more than that of the government. 
Hence, the situation might have been responsible for the perceived
attitude of the oil companies that the communities did not have a
choice but to settle for whatever was provided. 
Shell also made use of the situational approach to deal with
conflicts in the communities. The strategy was reactive in nature
rather than proactive, because it was the issue encountered that
determined the strategy that was adopted. Shell’s representative
explained that the company had been exposed to different issues, 
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and sometimes conflicts, in the communities that required different
techniques to resolve. He insisted that there were no hard and fast
rules as far as conflicts were concerned because the technique that
worked for one might not work for another.  
For instance, since Shell had to pull out of Ogoni, there had not
been any need to repeat the action elsewhere. He stated that
another characteristic of the situational approach was its dynamic
nature. It changed with time while drawing from past experiences. 
He saw community relations as a process which required its
strategies to be adapted to situations constantly. It can be observed
from the above, therefore, that the situational approach determined
the application of the other strategies used by Shell during
conflicts. Whether or not Shell would pull out, dialogue, or involve
the government would depend on the situation being encountered. 
Community initiative was identified as another strategy that Shell
made use of during conflicts. The strategy involved pushing the
development decisions to the communities so that they could take
responsibility for themselves. Shell’s representative said the
strategy had the potential of satisfying the communities and
eventually resolving conflicts, since the development plans would
be initiated by them.    
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Shell also pulled out of the concerned community during conflict. 
Shell only reserved the strategy for extreme cases, which had not
occurred since the Ogoni crisis. The company’s representative
explained that Shell decided to pull out of the community to keep
the conflict from escalating. He also insisted that the company had
not regretted the action because it gave the people the opportunity
to sit and critically think on what ought to be done, and it also
helped the company to reassess its relationships. The strategy
involved the company shutting down its operations completely in
the community and evacuating its equipment so as to discontinue
productions. This result agrees with the conflict theory which says
that for conflict to be controlled, a group must be able to suppress
its rival, even if it is temporarily. The Ogoni community was able
to win both national and international support to pressurise Shell
into withdrawing from the community before the crisis could be
controlled.   
Here, Shell’s claim raises the question as to whether the company
vacated Ogoni community voluntarily or not. Media reports at the
time showed that after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the
company came under much pressure from Ogoni community, the
entire Niger Delta region, human right organizations, international
communities and sections of its shareholders (AM News, 1995). In
view of that, the pull out can hardly be referred to as voluntary. 
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Nevertheless, the company also admitted that pulling out was only
an option when there was none other. 
In the case of Chevron, community initiative was the only
community relations strategy that was mentioned. While Shell
believed that the situational approach comprised the other
strategies, Chevron claimed that whatever strategy it would adopt
for any conflict would be based on community initiative. 
Chevron’s conception of community initiative was similar to that
of Shell because it involved allowing the communities to chart
their own path for development. Chevron considered its use of the
strategy as being preventive rather than curative. The logic was
that a full-fledged conflict could be prevented by allowing the
communities to adopt their own developmental approach. The
communities would not have to fight the company if they were the
determiners of their own fate.  
Jones (2004), while explaining the stakeholder theory, states that
the existence of an organization depends on its ability to create
value and acceptable outcomes for its different stakeholders. The
community relations strategies adopted by the oil companies show
their realization that their existence in the Niger Delta depends on
their ability to create value for their host communities. From the
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above, it can be seen that the companies are making deliberate
effort to court the communities, which is a clear indication that
they have identified the communities as a fundamental part of their
stakeholders.  
Bronn (2006) also comments on the need to adapt strategies to
communities. He explains that multinational companies operate in
different countries; hence, they must note that the acceptance of
initiative in one country does not necessarily mean its acceptance
in another. By implication, the oil companies must always take the
communities into consideration before designing strategies. In
order to keep existing in the Niger Delta, the oil companies are
making efforts to build profitable relationships with the
communities. The question now is whether the outcomes are
acceptable to the communities or not.  
Since community relations is premised on the principles of
communication, and communication is bidirectional at least, it
stands to reason that community relations strategies cannot be
assessed without considering the views of the recipients. Hence, 
the participants in this study shared their views on the community
relations strategies they identified with the oil companies during
conflicts. One of such strategies was that the oil companies never
communicated with the communities during conflicts. Some of the
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participants claimed that the companies usually withdrew from the
communities, thereby becoming inaccessible to the people. They
said that the companies would fence off their facilities and cease to
communicate with the communities during conflicts.  
Considering the strategies claimed by the oil companies, it can
easily be seen that withdrawal from the communities was not one
of them. This, therefore, shows that there is a contradiction
between the active participations claimed by the oil companies and
the withdrawal identified by the communities. 
Some other participants identified that the oil companies made use
of dialogue during conflict. They said that the oil companies
sometimes called the leaders of the communities for dialogue. 
They also said that some other times, the companies would require
some pressure before agreeing to a dialogue. Some participants in
Eruemukohwarien explained that whenever Shell wanted to
dialogue with their community, the community’s liaison officer
(CLO) would be sent to discuss with them, who would then report
to the company. It can be observed in this case that there is
congruence between the strategy claimed by the companies and the
one identified by the participants. 
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Provision of amenities was also identified as one of the community
relations strategies used by the oil companies during conflicts. The
participants said that the oil companies provided some amenities so
as to placate the communities. While some claimed that the
projects were either shabbily executed or not completed, like the
uncompleted and dilapidated school in Tisun and the nonfunctional
water projects in Eruemukohwarien, some others said that their
efforts were commendable, like in the case of the Health Centre in
Obrikom. When we compare the strategy identified here and the
ones claimed by the oil companies, it will be noticed that the
companies did not mention the provision of amenities as one of
their strategies. In fact, according to the companies, the
communities were responsible for their own development.  
The participants also identified military intervention as another
strategy used by the oil companies during conflicts. According to
them, the companies engaged the military for protection from the
communities. They observed that the companies did not come with
securities during their initial incursion into the communities and
could not understand why the new development was necessary.  
Since the selected communities for this study considered
themselves relatively peaceful, they insisted that they were being
misjudged by the oil companies and the government. Some
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participants insisted that bringing in the military was not in good
faith; it was done to protect the oil companies from having to
compensate the communities. Some participants also observed that
the military personnel mounted road blocks in the communities
from which they extorted money from the people.  
The traditional Marxist perspective of the conflict theory explains
the oil companies’ use of forces by stating that one of
multinational companies’ modes of domination is the use of
military force (Pease, 2003). In the Niger Delta scenario, the oil
companies’ initial domination was economic, but consequent on
the evolution of conflicts, military intervention was introduced as a
protective measure. Notwithstanding other purposes for
introducing military forces into the communities, it also seemed to
have served as a means of subduing the communities.  
Comparing the communities’ responses here with the companies’
claims of strategies used during conflicts, it can be observed that
there was no single mention of military engagement by the
companies. While the companies claimed that they concentrated on
working with the communities to resolve conflicts, the
communities insisted that the companies’ military protection made
them inaccessible. Considering the rate of kidnapping and
vandalism in the Niger Delta, it is only logical to expect the oil
330
companies to take precaution by engaging military protection. 
This, however, does not explain why the oil companies did not
mention military engagement as part of their strategies for dealing
with conflicts in the communities. It also does not excuse the
alleged excesses of the military personnel as reported by the
participants. 
The participants also agreed that the oil companies involved the
government in their community relations during conflicts.  But
unlike the claims of the companies, the participants saw the
companies and the government as partners in business- looking out
for each other. The oil companies were accused of running to the
government during conflicts, while the government in turn made
promises that were never kept. They were also accused of blaming
the government for the undeveloped state of the communities, 
thereby absolving themselves of responsibilities.  
Omoweh (2010) also notes that there is a joint venture between the
oil companies and the government, in which the companies are the
junior partners; therefore, the companies expect the government to
shoulder the development responsibilities in the communities. This
may explain why the oil companies frequently refer the
communities to the government in cases of conflicts.    
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The participants also claimed that the oil companies gave gifts to
community leaders during conflicts, though this was not reported
by the companies. While some participants were favourably
disposed towards the idea, some others were not. Those who
favoured the idea claimed that contracts were given to their leaders
and even sometimes the youths. It can be seen in this situation that
the benefits from the companies were not limited to the leaders, 
which explains why those participants favoured the idea.  
On the other hand, those who did not favour the idea claimed that
the benefits were targeted at corrupting their leaders. They
explained that some of those gifts were given to their leaders to
help manage protests in the communities. Not only would such
gifts prevent the leaders from representing their people effectively, 
they would also cause strife within the communities. It can be
observed in this case that the oil companies appeared to be
selective in their generosity; some individual were identified and
they were given special treatments due to their abilities to
influence other people.  
The global memorandum of understanding (GMoU) was another
strategy that the participants identified with the oil companies
during conflicts. Though the companies did not list the GMoU as
one of the community relations strategies they used during
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conflicts, it was mentioned among the unique strategies to both
Chevron and Shell. As conceived by the oil companies, the
strategy was meant to reduce the number of MoUs signed between
them and the communities by making a single arrangement that
covered several communities at a time. The strategy was designed
so that the communities could determine their own development. 
The communities were grouped into clusters and each cluster
selected its development projects while the companies provided the
funding. In the case of Chevron, the clusters were administered by
Itsekiri Rural Development Council (IRDC), while Shell had
Cluster Development Boards (CDB).  
The findings in this study reveal that though the respondents were
familiar with the acronym “GMoU,” most of them could not tell
what it meant. Notwithstanding, there was a consensus among
most of the respondents that their communities felt less impact of
the oil companies after the GMoU than before it. They were of the
opinion that the companies became inaccessible after the advent of
the strategy. Before the agreement, the communities had direct
contacts with representatives from the companies, but afterwards, 
only the IRDC and CDB made the contacts on behalf of the
communities.  
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The participants complained that they had not seen any tangible
impact of the oil companies since the GMoU strategy was adopted. 
This finding agrees with Faleti (nd, p. 23) who discovered in his
study that most of the communities that signed the agreement
regretted it soon afterwards because they lost access to benefits
they enjoyed previously by the virtue of their host community
status. He claims that the benefits included “Unemployment
allowance, payment for ‘ghost workers,’ compensation for
environmental disruption, Christmas and New Year gifts, etc.” He
also notes that environmental issues pertaining to degradation due
to dredging and spills, among others, were not reflected in the
agreement. 
It was observed in this study that most of the participants, 
particularly in Tisun and Kolokolo, felt that the strategy was not
achieving whatever it was meant to achieve. There was, however, a
different view from the secretary of a council the participants
referred to as Trustees; the council representing each Itsekiri
community. He claimed that the communities had felt the impact
of Chevron more in the last three years than they had felt in thirty-
three earlier years. He stated that the primary aim of the strategy
was to address issues relating to development and employment. Of
all the participants in this study, he displayed the clearest
understanding of the origin, purpose, and nature of GMoU.  
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From the above, it becomes obvious, therefore, that there was
information gap between the Trustees (or IRDC) and the rest of the
communities. It is also a paradox that the secretary of the council
claimed that the communities felt the impact of Chevron more after
the GMoU was adopted, while the rest of the communities claimed
the opposite. From the claims of the communities and the
observations made during this study, it could be seen that the
communities lacked schools, portable water, power supply, and a
good road network, among other things. It was also obvious that
poverty was a reality in those communities.  
The GMoU, as conceived by the oil companies, is no doubt a
laudable strategy due to its people centered philosophy. It may, 
however, be faulty in its execution. The strategy may have
succeeded in solving the problem of multiple MoUs signed by the
oil companies, reducing the seemingly unending demands made by
several groups within the same community, and making the
communities take responsibility for their development, thereby
lacking reasons to blame the companies. But it has also succeeded
in creating an opportunity for a few people to determine the fate of
several communities.  
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Considering that the Trustees representing Tisun and Kolokolo, for
instance, did not even reside in the communities, how would they
make developmental decisions that would affect the people? Since
the oil companies claimed that they would no longer determine the
development of the people because they did not experience their
peculiar challenges, it is arguable, therefore, that the Trustees are
neither qualified for the same reason.  
If indeed Shell’s CDBs and Chevron’s IRDCs were effective, they
would have served as extensions of the companies, bringing their
benefits closer to the people. Consequent on the foregoing
discussions, it is arguable that the councils or boards may continue
to present the oil companies with development plans and the
companies may continue to support same while the communities
continue to lack development.  
The oil companies may not be bothered by the politics between the
CDBs/IRDCs and the communities if all they care about is the
positive publicity generated by the GMoU; but if they are actually
interested in the development of the communities, the strategic
execution of the GMoU must include a grass root monitoring
scheme. This will ensure that the communities are actually
benefiting from the arrangement. The failure to ensure that the
grass roots benefit from the GMoU may return the companies to
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the era when the communities felt that their leaders were benefiting
from the oil companies at their expense. 
From the participants’ evaluation of the oil companies’ community
relations strategies, we see that the oil companies have not created
acceptable outcomes for the communities. Though they have made
efforts to create values, those values have not been considered
satisfactory by the communities. This explains why their existence
in the Niger Delta is threatened. Also going by Broom & Dozier’s
(1990) suggestion that the level of agreement and accuracy
between an organization and its publics can be used as an indicator
of the quality of their relationship, we see that both parties differ
on the strategies used by the oil companies. This, therefore, 
indicates a poor relationship between the companies and their
publics.  
   
4) What structural differences are inherent in the
community relations strategies adopted by the selected
oil companies in the Niger Delta?
Some scholars have observed that the twentieth century brought
with it a better understanding, among organizations, of the need to
be more organized and proactive in respect to community relations
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activities (Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997). They insisted that
organizations must, at all cost, guard against negative acts and also
work to preserve existing relationships through proactive and
positive actions. Hence, oil companies also engage specific
community relations strategies to create and maintain profitable
relationships with their host communities.  
Also, considering that the companies differ, it is to be expected
that some differences would be inherent in their strategies.  The oil
companies under study also claimed some uniqueness in their
strategic approach to community relations. Fig. 4.7 shows the
unique community relations strategies adopted by Chevron and
Shell. Agip declined all interview requests; hence, its strategies
were not reflected the discussion.  
According to the Fig.4.7, one of Chevron’s unique strategies was
its corporate social responsibility (CSR). No doubt, other
companies also practised CSR; nevertheless, Chevron claimed that
its design was unique because it focused, not only on the
immediate communities, but also on the broader community being
Nigeria. Chevron’s representative stated that the company donated
computers and other facilities to universities, as well as encouraged
staff members to contribute to knowledge by teaching in
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universities. The strategy was designed to create a cross-
fertilization of ideas between the industry and the academia.  
Another community relations strategy that Chevron made use of
was the GMoU. The strategy could be considered unique to the
company mainly because Chevron originated it in 2005. Though
the strategy had since been adopted by Shell and some other oil
companies, it still remained unique in that no two organizations
could engage it the same way. The strategy was a redefinition of
Chevron’s community engagement method by making the
communities responsible for their own development. The company
allowed communities to originate development ideas and they were
made to work with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to
draw up their own plans to achieve the ideas. The secretary of the
Trustees in Kolokolo also explained Chevron’s GMoU design by
stating that it catered for 23 oil producing communities in five oil
fields. He explained that the communities were represented by the
Itsekiri Rural Development Council (IRDC). 
According to its design, the strategy allowed the communities to
draw from the fund provided by Chevron to address any
developmental challenge of their choice without waiting for the
company’s direct intervention. It also empowered the communities
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and promoted sound decision making, since they must evaluate all
their needs before choosing the most important one to address. 
As earlier stated, Shell also made use of the GMoU. The strategy
was adopted by Shell in 2006 and became fully functional in 2007. 
Shell’s representative explained that the strategy was adopted to
avoid the challenges created by the signing of several MoUs in the
same and several other communities. GMoU made the agreements
easy to manage because they were all contained in a single
document that was applicable to several communities at the same
time.  
According to Shell’s GMoU design, the 1,500 communities in
which the company operated were divided into 67 groups, either
by their local government areas or their ethnic affinities. Each
group was called a cluster and had an overall governing body
known as the Cluster Development Board (CDB). The
communities in each cluster met to decide on their development
plans while counting on Shell’s financial support for the execution. 
The fund provided by Shell was for a fixed period of five years
after which it was renewable. Shell also made allowance for the
communities to seek funding elsewhere whenever such was
necessary. 
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Another of Shell’s unique community relations strategies was the
company’s business ethics. Shell’s representative claimed that the
company exhibited good neighbourliness and was mindful of its
host communities. He defined being mindful as doing things that
were beneficial to the communities and minimizing negative
impact on them. He claimed that it also meant being ready to
apologise to the communities when they were offended. 
Shell again identified openness as another unique community
relations strategy. The company’s representative expressed Shell’s
readiness to make information available to the communities. He
claimed that the company always put the communities in the
picture of whatever related to them. Not only were the people
given information about the activities of the company in their
communities, they were also allowed to express themselves. He
was of the opinion that the level of trust between the company and
the communities would be very high if the communities were
consulted and nothing was hidden for them. 
Shell also claimed that its business principles were part of its
unique community relations strategies. The company’s
representative referred to the set of principles as the Statement of
General Business Principles and said that it served as the guideline
for all the activities of Shell in a different way from what was
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obtainable in other companies. He explained that the principles
served as the frame work that determined the way the company
would relate with the communities. From the above, it can be said
that Shell’s community relations was ingrained into the companies’
business principles.   
The responses of the oil companies revealed the uniqueness of
their strategies. Those strategies were products of the companies’
policies; therefore, they represented their corporate characters. The
decision at the management level to adopt the strategies showed
that community relations was a management function. This reveals
the link between our findings and the stakeholder theory, since
Freeman, Winks & Parmar (2004) claim that the stakeholder
theory is managerial in nature. They say it reflects and directs how
managers operate in respect to their stakeholders, who in this case
are the Niger Delta communities. It also provides assistance to
managers through the promotion of analysis of how the
communities fit into their larger environment. 
While the oil companies presented the uniqueness of their
community relations strategies from an organizational point of
view, the respondents assessed the strategies from the recipients’
point of view.  One of the areas in which the oil companies were
assessed was the perceived direction of their relationship with the
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communities. Table 4.11 shows that of the three oil companies
selected for this study, most of Agip’s respondents said that its
relationship with their communities was cordial. This percentage is
relatively high compared to that of Chevron and Shell. On the
other hand, more than three-quarters of the respondents claimed
that Shell’s relationship with their communities was not cordial, 
and exactly three-quarters also claimed the same for Chevron.  
A comparison of the respondents’ views above with the preceding
responses of Chevron and Shell reveals a contradiction in the
claims of both parties. While the oil companies reported their
unique community relations strategies, which were obviously
people centered, the respondents claimed that the relationships of
the duo with their communities were largely not cordial. 
Considering that the oil companies’ community relations strategies
were meant to help establish a mutual relationship between them
and the communities, it raises some concern that a very high
percentage of the respondents felt that their communities were not
favourably disposed towards Shell and Chevron. There is, no
doubt, a missing link between the oil companies’ design of their
well articulated strategies and their delivery to the communities.  
Also, the respondents assessed the oil companies on the perceived
frequency of their communication with the communities. Of the
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three oil companies, most of the respondents claimed that Chevron
never communicated with their communities, four out of every five
said that Shell communicated once in a while and Agip was
considered to have communicated often. Although Agip had its
highest percentage among the respondents who said it
communicated once in a while, compared to Shell and Chevron, 
more respondents said Agip communicated often.  
As presented earlier, Chevron’s unique community relations
strategies included the company’s CSR and the GMoU. 
Considering the nature of the strategies, it should have been taken
for granted that communication with the communities would be the
driving force of the process. This, however, did not appear to be
the case since this study shows that almost three-quarter of the
respondents claimed that Chevron never communicated with their
communities. A possible explanation for this paradox may be
found in the structure of the GMoU strategy. Since, Chevron no
longer communicated directly with the communities, the tendency
was there for the respondents to see less of the company and
thereby believe that communication was not taking place. Also, 
considering that the representatives of the communities who
related with Chevron did not reside in the communities, it is
plausible that whatever communication they had with the company
might be unknown to the people.  
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Also in the case of Shell, most of the respondents said that it only
communicated once in a while with their communities. Looking at
the combination of strategies adopted by the company, one would
have expected an assessment better than this. For instance, how
could the company have practised openness if there was no
constant communication? Shell also made use of the GMoU;
hence, the same situation described for Chevron might apply to a
certain extent. In Shell’s case, however, the host communities did
not make any claim about their leaders not being residential. This
means that the communities were likely to be aware of whatever
communication that went on between their leaders and the
company. This might account for the “once in a while” assessment
given to Shell’s communication with their communities. 
Again, the respondents expressed their views on the oil companies’
contributions to development in their communities. The findings
reveal that of the three oil companies, Agip had the highest rating
among the respondents who agreed that it contributed to the
development in their communities. Three-quarters of the
respondents said Shell sometimes contributed to their development
while most of the respondents said Chevron did not contribute at
all.  
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Talking about contributions to development, it can be observed
that Chevron, while presenting its unique CSR strategy, focused
more on the general community (Nigeria) rather than the
immediate communities. This might have determined the amount
of attention that was given to the immediate communities. On the
other hand, it is noteworthy that though Chevron had the highest
claim of not contributing to the development of the communities at
all, 43.1% still claimed that it did once in a while. The close call
between the two categories, therefore, shows that rather than
conclude that Chevron did not contribute at all, it can be said that
the contribution was minimal.  
Shell was rated highest by respondents who said that it contributed
to community development once in a while. This also
corresponded with the company’s previous assessment of
communicating with the communities once in a while. 
Notwithstanding the strategies adopted by Shell, this finding
suggests that the communities have not seen enough of the
company’s efforts. This may raise the question as to whether or not
the communities can ever see enough of the oil companies’ efforts. 
The Agip situation may provide an answer to this, since the
perception of the respondents of the company has been mostly
positive. Unfortunately, Agip’s rating cannot be explored further in
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light of its strategies because the information was not provided by
the company. 
As far as consultation with the communities was concerned, most
of the respondents said Chevron never consulted with their
communities and Shell consulted once in a while. On the other
hand, Agip was considered to have consulted often. Going by Shell
and Chevron’s GMoU strategies, one could say that the oil
companies were no longer directly involved in planning and
executing development projects in the communities, therefore, the
need for consultation might not arise.  
Considering how old the strategies were as at the time this study
was conducted, the host communities of Shell and Chevron would
have done without direct consultation for three to four years
respectively. If in spite of this arrangement, Shell was still
considered to have consulted with the communities once in a
while, then the company must have found a way of sustaining
partial contact with the communities which Chevron had not. 
Nevertheless, more than partial contact would be required to foster
favourable relationship with the communities. 
347
5) How do the host communities perceive oil companies’
community relations strategies?  
Over the year, several scholars have emphasized the role of
perception in human relationships. According to Perreault &
McCarthy (2005), perception is how we gather and interpret
information from the world around us. Considering how valuable
the perceptions of the relevant publics are to an organization, this
study also examines the host communities’ overall assessment of
the community relations strategies of the oil companies.  
The finding in this study shows the respondents’ views of the oil
companies’ influence on their communities. Agip was considered
to have had a positive influence on the communities while
opposing views were held of Shell and Chevron. Without any
doubt, perception is one of the determinants of the success or
failure of any organization and the oil companies are no exception. 
The companies require the goodwill of their significant publics to
function effectively.  
Moon (2001) notes that community perceptions mostly form the
basis for community choice to either support or disrupt corporate
activities. As can be seen from the discussion so far, a large
percentage of the respondents said that Shell failed to positively
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influence their communities. The qualitative data, however, show
that some of the participants in the interview sessions were of the
opinion that Shell did not completely fail; it only did not measure
up to the expectations of the communities. An elder in
Eruemukohwarien said that Shell made some efforts to pacify the
community by providing some facilities, but it could do more.  
Chevron too was adjudged not to have influenced the communities
positively. Agip, on the other hand, was perceived by the
respondents as having positively influenced their communities. 
The qualitative data show that the women leader in Obrikom stated
that Agip had to be pressurized before it contributed to the
community.  This might suggest that the positive influence the
company had on the communities would not have been the case if
pressure was not applied.  
A good relationship is built on effective communication. As can be
seen from the explanation above, the respondents were of the
opinion that Chevron and Shell did not communicate effectively
with their communities. Not only can this situation complicate
existing conflicts, it can also engender fresh ones. The oil
companies should endeavour to establish a communication system
that will extend to the grassroots. This is necessary because the
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people at the grassroots are the ones that are actually affected by
the challenges in the communities.  
The respondents also expressed their satisfaction with Agip’s
conflict resolution strategies while they were dissatisfied with
those of Shell. Chevron returned the worst assessment, however. A
possible explanation for this was provided during the men’s FGD
session held in Tisun. They were of the opinion that Chevron
lacked the grassroots approach since the GMoU was introduced. 
They claimed that they could not be sure whether or not their
leaders were representing them well with Chevron.  
Hence, it was a failure on the part of the company not to have gone
to the grassroots where the actual problems were. Chevron’s
representative, however, was of the impression that the company
had made significant improvement in its relationship with the
communities since the strategy was adopted. He said that the
company had never been shut down on the account of any conflict;
rather, it had enjoyed a positive operational community.   
Conflict is undesirable in any community; hence, decisive actions
must be taken to either forestall or resolve it as soon as possible. It
is interesting to note that in the explanation above, Chevron had
the highest rate of respondents’ dissatisfaction with its conflict
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resolution, while it was also reported as having the least conflict
acknowledgement of the three oil companies. It is also a paradox
that in the above explanation, more respondents were satisfied with
Agip’s conflict resolution, yet, more than three-quarters of the
respondents also acknowledged its involvement in conflicts. Shell
was the only company that the respondents’ dissatisfaction with its
conflict resolution corresponded with the acknowledgement of
conflict occurrence.  
In order to rule out coincidence, it can be observed (see Table 4.8)
that majority of the respondents from the five communities under
study claimed that conflicts rarely occurred in their communities. 
However, a further observation reveals that Omoku and Obrikom, 
where Agip operates, had the highest percentages among
respondents who claimed “often” and “very often” conflict
occurrence in their communities. This means that more conflicts
were reported for Agip than any of the other two companies.  If
indeed Chevron’s conflict resolution was not satisfactory, it would
have been expected that there would be more conflicts associated
with the company, and the opposite would also have been expected
for Agip.  
Again, most of the respondents said Agip was usually ready to
negotiate during conflicts, followed by Shell and with Chevron
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coming last. This corresponds with the claim made by the
Secretary of the Trustees that Chevron never gave room for
negotiation. By implication, even the councils administering the
GMoU clusters were denied the opportunity to negotiate with the
Company.  
Also, most of the respondents said that Agip’s communication
reduced the frequency of conflicts in their communities, followed
by Shell. On the other hand, more than three-quarters of the
respondents said that Chevron’s communication did not reduce
conflicts.  
This is understandable, since earlier results had shown that most of
the company’s respondents claimed that its communication was
not effective. While the responses on Chevron and Agip
correspond with earlier result, that of Shell is contradictory. Here, 
more of Shell’s respondents claimed that its communication
reduced the frequency of conflict, while earlier, the respondents
had claimed that its communication was not effective.  Considering
that the respondents also acknowledged that Shell was ready to
negotiate, it is not farfetched that conflicts were reduced through
its communication with host communities. 
Respondents also assessed oil companies based on their abilities to
keep promises. The entire process of conflict resolution is based on
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the ability of both parties to keep to the terms of their agreement. 
This should be more so for the oil companies because they tend to
be the dominant party in the agreement. For Chevron, more than
three-quarters of the respondents said the company did not usually
keep its promises. Also, more than half of the respondents said
Shell never kept to its promises.  
During the FGD session in Eruemukohwarien, the women also
agreed with this finding. They explained that the company would
not go to the community unless by invitation, and after the visit, 
nothing would be done. Recalling the protest that was staged in
2008, they claimed that Shell made promises (which could not
have been covered by the GMoU since negotiation with individual
communities had been stopped), but had not fulfilled them. 
However, Shell’s representative claimed that the GMoU had
achieved much of the desired impact. He explained that the
communities made less demands and more decisions. This means
that the company did not have any development promise to fulfil
since development decisions had been left to the clusters. As for
Agip, more than half of the respondents claimed that it usually kept
to its promises, which was the highest percentage among the three
companies. Generally, it can be concluded that most of the
respondents perceived Agip to be far better in keeping promises
than Chevron and Shell.  
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From the responses of the communities, it can be seen that they
had strong opinions of the oil companies. Those opinions were
formed in the process of seeking and processing information
concerning the companies and their activities in the communities. 
Hence, the communities can be referred to as active publics
(Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997), thereby establishing a link
between them and the behaviour described in the situational
theory.  
6) What community relations strategies would host
communities prefer in their relationship with oil
companies?
The question of the community relations preference of the host
communities is one of the most important questions that must be
answered if a cordial relationship will be developed between them
and the oil companies. This is because the oil companies can keep
making efforts without their being appreciated by the communities, 
because they are not desired. The companies are the sources of
community relations efforts and the communities are the
354
recipients. Fig 4.12 reveals that the oil companies identified
transparency, consultation, community initiatives and the provision
of amenities as the perceived preference of the communities. While
it is important to know what the companies think those preferences
were, it is more important to find out what the communities
identified as their own preferences.  
Fig 4.13 shows that the first strategic preference of the
communities was the withdrawal of the forces by the oil
companies. They claimed that it would foster a better relationship
that would be void of suspicions and threats. The participants were
also of the opinion that the companies enjoyed better relationships
with the communities at their initial incursion, when the military
forces were not involved.  
The oil companies, however, did not identify the withdrawal of
armed forces as one of the preferences of the communities, since
they did not even admit that they used the forces in the first place. 
The companies, probably, did not want to create the impression
that any situation was beyond control, thereby warranting the
involvement of armed forces. Or, the companies may see the
involvement of the armed forces as a protective measure rather
than a strategy for relating with the communities. Whatever be the
case, the communities were of the opinion that any medium of
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communication or compulsion used by the companies was their
strategy. 
The participants also identified better employment as another
strategy that would help ensure company-community peaceful
cohabitation. They said that the provision of employment would
keep the youths occupied and make them less susceptible to
restiveness. Employment was recommended as a potent remedy for
militancy. It was also suggested that the government should make
proper employment provision an integral part of the amnesty
program it was running. This is to avoid the undesirable possibility
of the ex-militants returning to the creeks if they are not properly
engaged. They acknowledged the oil companies’ contributions in
terms of scholarships, but they also pointed out that scholarships
would be useless if there were no job opportunities after
graduation.  
One of the major complaints of the participants as far as job was
concerned was the employment of other ethnic groups such as
Yoruba and Hausa into key positions, while Niger Delta indigenes
were given casual appointments. They insisted that they had
educated and qualified individuals who could fill such positions.  
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Another strategic preference indicated by the respondents during
the FGD and KII sessions was the physical presence of the oil
companies. This strategy was stressed by all the participants in this
study.  They insisted that if the oil companies were really
interested in building a good relationship with their communities, 
they would go down to the grassroots. Some participants said that
if the oil companies failed to go to the grassroots, they would only
be negotiating with the people in the townships who could not be
affected by any of the challenges in the communities. It was also
advised that the oil companies should stop inviting community
leaders to the townships where they would be pampered with hotel
accommodations and other benefits, thereby corrupting their sense
of judgement. 
It is necessary, at this juncture, to recall that the GMoU strategy
adopted by Chevron and Shell, as explained by the companies’
representatives, did not make provision for the physical presence
of the companies. Since the communities now make and execute
their own development plans, there is little or no need for the oil
companies to visit the communities, unless probably to
commission projects. Though Agip did not seem to have adopted
the GMoU, the participants still complained of the lack of its
physical presence in the communities. Consequently, it is
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important for the oil companies to stay connected with the
grassroots to ensure the effectiveness of their strategies. 
The communities also suggested that the oil companies should
adopt education as part of their community relations strategies. No
doubt that scholarships and school buildings were part of the
benefits enjoyed from the oil companies in the past, there could be
more. In Tisun for instance, a school was built for the community
and was never used until the building became dilapidated. One of
the reasons for the non-usage of the school was the lack of
teachers. Considering that the community is located in the creeks
and is far from any major town, it may be unrealistic to expect
teachers from the city to be deployed there. A better arrangement
would be to train indigenes as teachers so that they can teach in
their own communities. Female and sex education were also
suggested so as to reduce the rate of teenage pregnancy in the
communities. 
Another popular strategic preference of the communities was the
focus on skill training. It may not be realistic to expect an entire
community to be educated. Hence, proper provision should be
made to cater for those who do not have the opportunity to attend
school. It was also suggested that skill training in the communities
would prevent urban migration and develop the potentials in the
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communities. The communities also said that the oil companies
should help train the youths in the companies’ needed areas of
technicalities so as to guarantee their employment after training
them. School on wheels was also suggested to serve as a mobile
training centre for several communities at a time. 
The participants in this study also suggested company-government
partnership as another community relations strategy that would
help to resolve the conflicts. They were of the opinion that there
would be progress if the two parties could stop trading blames and
they cooperate to develop the Niger Delta. Company-community
partnership was also suggested to ensure peaceful cohabitation
between the oil companies and the communities. Except an
extreme case like that of Ogoni reoccurs, the communities and the
companies would continue to interact closely; therefore, efforts
must be made to achieve mutual understanding. 
Also, the communities identified effective communication as
another of their preferred strategies. They considered it a
compulsory ingredient in building a mutually profitable
relationship. This strategy corresponds with two of the ones
identified by the oil companies; transparency and consultation with
the communities. In terms of transparency, the companies believed
that the communities wanted to be updated on every activity of the
company that concerns them and their land. Shell’s representative
359
claimed that the company usually kept the communities informed
except for commercially sensitive information. The companies also
believed that consulting with the communities would boost their
sense of relevance and also help to build mutual trust. 
The final strategy that was identified by the communities was the
provision of infrastructure. They noted that a clear difference
existed between the communities and the oil companies’ facilities;
while the companies had electricity, portable water and good
roads, the opposite was usually the case in the communities. They
insisted that one of the ways the companies could demonstrate
their commitment to development of the communities was to
extend the amenities.  
The companies also identified the provision of amenities as one of
the preferred strategies of the communities. Shell’s representative
explained that the company was aware that various communities
had their aspirations as far as amenities were concerned. Hence, 
the company made money available to the clusters, under the
auspices of GMoU, so that they could determine their own
development. Chevron’s representative also agreed that the
provision of amenities assisted the development of communities. 
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One strategy that the oil companies felt the communities would
prefer, but which was not mentioned in any of the communities
was community initiative. The companies, particularly Shell and
Chevron, believed that the communities would rather draw up their
own development plans than depend on the companies to do for
them. Since development preference differed from community to
community, it was better for those communities to drive their own
development plans. From the perspective of the oil companies, that
singular strategy subsumed most of the others as might be
mentioned by the communities, since they did not need the
companies anymore to develop their communities.  
Community initiative was one of the driving principles of the
GMoU. One major argument in favour of the strategy was that, as
at the time the companies attempted to develop the communities, 
they could not put the entire challenges and needs of the people
into perspective. As currently practised, the GMoU allowed them
to simply provide the fund and technical assistance while the
communities made the decisions. By design, the strategy was
foolproof, but in reality, there were some missing links. The major
challenge that was expressed in the findings of this work was the
gap between what the companies claimed and what the
communities experienced. The companies ought to have a system
361
for making sure that development reaches all the communities in
each cluster, and that it reaches the grassroots in particular.  
The findings above are supported by the situational theory because
they portray the characteristics of active publics. First, the
communities recognised that there was a problem, conflict, which
was why they expressed their views. Second, they recognised some
of the constraints or obstacles in the way of finding a solution and
among them were military intervention, unemployment, lack of
companies’ physical presence, and lack of provision for skill
training. Third, they did not stop at the point of recognition; rather, 
they went on to make suggestions as to how the obstacles could be
removed, which clearly demonstrated their level of involvement. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The major aim of this study is to investigate the community
relations strategies used by oil companies to manage the company-
community conflicts in the Niger Delta. Chapter one is the
introductory aspect of the study, which provides background
information on the oil exploration process in the Niger Delta, as
well as the attendant challenges that have led to the company-
community conflicts witnessed in the region. The problem stems
from the environmental degradation engendered by the exploration
process and the depravation in the communities (Naanen, 1995;
Akinola, 2009; Watts, 2009; Nafzinger, 2009).  
The Niger Delta communities are undeveloped and the people
blame this on both the oil companies and the government. The
community relations perspective of the company-community
conflicts is also examined. Considering how valuable the
communities are to the oil companies, they cannot afford not to
maintain a mutual relationship with them, or they will continue to
encounter threats, not only to their operations, but also to the lives
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of their staff. Therefore, this study aims at examining the
community relations strategies used by oil companies in managing
the conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
Chapter two focuses mainly on the review of relevant literature for
this study. The chapter begins with the conceptualization of the
term “conflict” by examining various definitions of the word, as
well as arguments on what it is and what it is not. Sources and
nature of conflicts are also discussed in the chapter. Furthermore, 
there is a review of materials on the Niger Delta conflicts, their oil
dimension, as well as the involvement of multinational oil
companies. Conflict is also examined with focus on the role of
public relations, and specifically community relations, in managing
and resolving it. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the
theories that are adopted to help impose a structure on the study, 
and these include Conflict theory, Situational theory and the
Stakeholder theory. 
In Chapter Three, the methods adopted for this study is presented. 
The study makes use of survey, focus group discussion (FGD) and
key informant interview (KII) designs to gather the data. The study
population comprises the community relations units of oil
companies in the Niger Delta (among which Shell, Chevron and
Agip are selected) and the indigenes of Omoku and Obrikom
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communities in Rivers State, and Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and
Kolokolo communities in Delta State. The sample size is made up
of 595 respondents for the survey, 58 FGD participants and 13 KII
participants. The instruments used for data gathering include
questionnaire, interview guide and question guide. The data were
analysed and then presented using tables and figures.  
Chapter Four presents the results from the survey, FGDs and KIIs. 
The results are discussed and the research questions raised earlier
in this study are answered. Chapter Five provides a summary of the
entire thesis and the conclusion, as well as the recommendations
drawn from the findings. 
5.2 SUMMARY
After investigating the questions raised in this study, it was
discovered that:
1. Majority of the respondents were aware of company-
community conflicts in four of the five selected
communities (Eruemukohwarien, Kolokolo, Omoku and
Obrikom), while those in the remaining community (Tisun)
claimed that they had not witnessed any conflict. It was
also discovered that the four communities reportedly
experienced conflicts rarely, though Omoku and Obrikom
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reported more frequent occurrence than Eruemukohwarien
and Kolokolo. 
In respect to the oil companies’ involvement in the
community conflicts, Shell had the highest percentage of
perceived involvement overall and particularly among
respondents from Eruemukohwarien. Next was Agip, with
specific acknowledgement from Omoku and Obrikom. 
Chevron had the least overall acknowledgement of conflict
involvement, which included both acknowledgement and
denial from Kolokolo and Tisun respectively.  
The study further reveals that the communities that claimed
the occurrence of conflicts identified the following as the
causes: oil companies representing the government, poor
state of infrastructure, need to attract companies’ and
government’s attention, politics and the oil companies’
failure to keep to agreements. On the other hand, those who
claimed the absence of conflicts also attributed it to the
following: the communities’ peaceful heritage, fear of
military invasion, the youths’ respect for elders, the fear of
God and respect for the law. 
2. The conflicts between the oil companies and the
communities had serious implications for the two parties. 
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The communities were affected because they were
neglected by the companies during conflicts, military forces
invaded them, there was lack of development and there was
a lingering fear of future attacks on the communities, which
kept some of the indigenes away. The oil companies, on the
other hand, were affected because they constantly felt
insecure and they experienced low productivity.
3. The oil companies adopted several community relations
strategies for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. Shell
identified pulling out of the community as an option in
extreme cases. It also made use of dialogue, the
government, situational approach and community
initiatives to resolve conflicts with the communities. 
Chevron also made use of community initiative to resolve
conflicts. On the other hand, the communities, which were
the receivers of the community relations efforts of the
companies, identified the following strategies with the
companies: withdrawal of any form of assistance from the
communities, dialogue, provision of amenities, military
intervention, government involvement, the Global
Memorandum of Understanding and giving gifts to the
leaders in the communities. 
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4. The oil companies claimed that they had some unique
community relations strategies. Chevron claimed that its
strategies comprised a unique style of corporate social
responsibility and the Global Memorandum of
Understanding (GMoU), which it originated in 2005. Shell
also adopted the GMoU in 2006. The Company still had
some other unique strategies such as its business ethics, 
business principles and openness with the communities. 
The communities expressed their opinions about the
companies’ strategies by assessing different aspects of their
relationships. The communities claimed that they had
cordial relationship with Agip, while their relationships
were not cordial with Shell and Chevron. Also, as far as
effective communication, contribution to community
development and consultation with the communities were
concerned, Chevron was given a negative appraisal, Shell
performed the above once in a while, while Agip was
positively appraised. 
5. The communities shared their perceptions about the oil
companies. As far as the companies’ positive influence on
the communities, satisfaction with their conflict resolution
and their keeping of promises were concerned, the
communities rated Chevron and Shell poorly, while Agip
was highly rated. Also, the communities were favourably
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disposed towards Agip and Shell on effective
communication, readiness to negotiate during conflicts and
the reduction of conflicts through communication, while
they were unfavourably disposed towards Chevron. 
6. The oil companies expressed their opinions of the
community relations strategies preferred by the
communities as the following: transparency on the part of
the companies, consultation with the communities, 
provision of amenities and community initiatives. The
communities, however, had a longer list of preferred
strategies which included: withdrawal of military forces, 
better employment, companies’ physical presence, proper
education, skill training, company-government partnership, 
company-community partnership, effective
communication, and the provision of infrastructure. 
5.3 CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the conclusion of this study is
that the community relations strategies adopted by the selected oil
companies are not adequate in preventing and resolving company-
community conflicts in the Niger Delta. The most important reason
for this is the lacuna that exists between the strategies the oil
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companies believed host communities preferred for conflict
resolution and the ones actually preferred by those communities. 
The gulf seemed to have consumed efforts made by the companies, 
thereby leaving little proof of their responsibilities to their hosts. 
The lack of grassroots approach also reduced the effectiveness of
the strategies, since oil companies quoted large sums of money
being spent on development and host communities said they got
none of it. The communities’ representatives appropriated the fund
earmarked for development while the companies believed that
since they represented the communities, they were delivering the
benefits. Hence, a grassroot approach would serve as a check for
the excessiveness of community representatives.   
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
The study has shown that good community relations strategies are
indispensible if conflicts between oil companies and host
communities would be resolved. Having examined the relationship
between the selected oil companies and communities, the
following recommendations are made:
i. The oil companies should pay specific attention to the
factors identified by the communities as being
responsible for the occurrence of conflicts. For instance, 
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the companies should be mindful that the performance of
the government in the state or country in which they
operate would have immense implications on the
perception they enjoy from their host communities. 
Hence, they should use their strategic economic position
to encourage or pressurise the government into being
responsible. Also, the oil companies should make efforts
to spread their contributions to all the communities in the
Niger Delta rather than paying too much attention to the
restive ones. This is because some of the conflicts that
occurred were due to the need for attention by some of
the communities. 
ii. The community members should be properly enlightened
by NGOs, which are more readily accepted than the
government, on their rights as individuals and their roles
in national development. This will prevent them from
being used by deceptive politicians as tools for winning
elections. It would also protect them from some
influential community leaders who may incite the people
to protest for their own ends. This is because the people
would seek out information and facts for themselves
before they act, rather than depending on the instructions
of some privileged class. 
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iii. The oil companies should note that some of the
communities in which there were little or no conflict
occurrences did not attribute their seemingly peaceful
disposition to the oil companies’ community relations
strategies. Rather, they attributed it to their respect for
their elders, peaceful heritage, fear of God and respect for
the law. This, therefore, challenges the oil companies to
work harder on their strategies. It also gives an insight
into the areas the companies can explore to maintain a
good relationship with the communities. 
iv. Both the oil companies and the communities should
constantly bear in mind the double edged consequences
of conflicts; hence, they must be avoided at all cost. The
companies must not be seen to be covertly instigating
communal conflicts so as to make more profits while the
communities are busy warring.   
v. Considering that majority of the respondents were not
satisfied with the community relations strategies of the oil
companies, more efforts should be made by the
companies to improve on their strategies. Since the
communities are the recipients of such efforts, it would
be risky for the companies to ignore their feelings. 
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vi. The oil companies using the Global Memorandum of
Understanding (GMoU) should improve the strategy by
including a grassroot scheme that will help ensure the
desired result. Considering that majority of the
respondents complained of not feeling the impact of the
companies since the GMoU was introduced, and that the
councils and boards constituted to represent the
communities sometimes did not deliver the benefits to the
people, the oil companies cannot afford to withdraw
completely from the communities. The model below is
suggested for a more effective execution of the GMoU:
Fig 5.1: GMoU Monitoring Scheme
Oil Companies
Grass root monitoring
scheme
Development
Agents
Government
CDB/IRDC
Communities
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What is currently obtainable is the communities relating with the
Cluster Development Boards (CDB)/Itsekiri Rural Development
Councils (IRDC), while they in turn relate with the oil companies, 
government and other development agents such as NGOs.  Hence, 
the only addition to the process is the inclusion of a grass root
monitoring scheme that will perform three important functions:
restore the oil companies’ contacts with the communities, monitor
the productivity of the CDB/IRDC and ensure the even distribution
of benefits. 
vii. The oil companies should work harder to improve the
communities’ perception of their positive influence on the
communities, effective communication, conflict resolution, 
readiness to negotiate during conflicts and keeping of
promises. 
viii. The companies should try as much as possible to
reduce the presence of military forces in the communities. 
If they are really interested in building a good relationship
with the people, they should not treat them as enemies. 
Military involvement should be limited to the protection of
the companies and their staff, rather than giving them the
unbridled access to subdue the communities and extort
money from them. 
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ix. Skill training should be encouraged so as to cater for
members of the communities who are not educated. The
fact that they are uneducated does not mean that they are
useless. Training can be provided in the technical areas that
the oil companies would need their services. 
x. The government should implement the policies that
regulate the activities of oil companies. This will help to
curb the excesses of the companies and reduce as well as
make them take responsibility for environmental
degradations and other poor business practices. 
xi. The government should co-operate with the oil companies
to develop the Niger Delta communities, rather than trading
blames. It will be difficult to achieve development if the
communities do not know who to turn to for their various
needs. The government and the oil companies should
clearly define their individual and joint responsibilities so
that the communities can rightly channel their requests. 
5.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
The findings of this study have revealed other areas that could be
explored in further studies. One of such areas is the implication of
the amnesty programme for peace building efforts in the Niger
Delta. While the present study focuses on the strategies used by the
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oil companies to build a favourable relationship with the
communities, further studies can evaluate the objectives of the
amnesty programme and its ability to restore peace in the Niger
Delta. 
Further studies could also examine the nature of partnership that
exists between the oil companies and the Nigerian government, 
and the implication of this for community development. Since the
two parties are in joint venture, it is necessary to investigate the
extent to which they protect each other’s interests and at what
expense? The study could also find out the degree of influence that
one party enjoys over the other and the effect of this on the Niger
Delta communities. 
Another important area that could be explored is the role of the
Niger Delta leaders in the development or the underdevelopment
of the region. This becomes necessary as a result of the findings of
the current study that some leaders prosper at the expense of their
communities.  
5.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This study has expanded the frontier of knowledge in the field of
public relations, particularly community relations. It is an
exploratory study of the community relations strategies used by the
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oil companies for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. The study
is unique because, unlike several other studies that focused either
on the communities or the oil companies, it presents reports from
both the oil companies and the communities’ perspectives. This
enables us to evaluate the positions of both parties, find common
grounds and identify areas of divergence.  
The study reveals the community relations strategies used by the
oil companies for conflict resolution. It also presents the
peculiarities of the strategies adopted by each of the oil companies. 
This serves as a backdrop against which we can place the diversity
in the communities’ perception of each company. The study also
identifies the strategic preferences of the communities, thereby
helping us to determine whether or not the companies are able to
meet up with those expectations. We are also able to compare what
the oil companies consider to be the preferences of the
communities and what the communities actually prefer. 
This study offers an addition to the process of the GMoU so as to
ensure the achievement of its purpose. This is based on an
examination of the oil companies’ conception of the GMoU and
the communities’ understanding and perception of it. A Grassroot
monitoring scheme is suggested to help to maintain the contact
between the oil companies and the communities. This is the only
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way the companies can be in touch with the realities in the
communities and monitor their development. 
The study also establishes that there is indeed a gap in
communication between the oil companies and the communities. 
This results in the companies claiming that they invest a lot into
community development while the communities insist that the
companies do not do enough to justify their presence. The study
raises a possibility that the middlemen selected to represent the
communities with the oil companies may be receiving the benefits
without passing them on to the people. 
378
REFERENCES
Aaron, K. K. (2008). The failure of corporate social responsibility
in the Niger Delta: Toward a re-interpretation. In
International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil
Industry and the Niger Delta, 11-13 March 2008 (pp. 267-
274).Yenagoa, Bayelsa: Department of Political Science, 
Niger Delta University. 
Aaron, K. K. & Patrick, J. M. (2008). Oil TNCs, CSR practices
and conflicts: A comparative analysis of three oil
companies in selected oil producing communities in the
Niger Delta. In International Conference on the Nigerian
State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, 11-13 March 2008
(pp. 433-444).Yenagoa, Bayelsa: Department of Political
Science, Niger Delta University. 
Adefemi, V. I (1998). Oil and minority ethnic nationalism in
Nigeria: The case of Ogoni (Unpublished Doctoral
dissertation). University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Adkins, S. (2000). Cause related marketing, who cares wins. 
Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann
Agagu, A. A. & Adu, F. (2008). Problems and effects of oil industry
on the Niger Delta: Matters arising. In International
Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger
Delta, 11-13 March 2008 (pp. 433-444).Yenagoa, Bayelsa:
Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University. 
Agip (n.d.). History of the company. Retrieved 2010 from
http://travel.eni.com
Aiyetan, D. (2008, February 18). Oil has been a blessing and a
curse. Tell, p 11. 
379
Akinola, S. R. (2008). Coping with social deprivation through self-
governing institutions in oil communities of Nigeria. Africa
Today, 55 (1), 89-105  
Akinola, S.R.  (2009). Polycentric planning and community self-
governing as panacea to the Niger Delta crisis. Journal of
African Development, 11 (2), 79- 104
Ako, R., Okonmah, P. & Ogunleye, T.  (2009). The Niger Delta
crisis: A social justice approach to the analysis of two
conflict eras. Journal of African Development, 11 (2), 105-
122
Alabi, R.A. (2008). Analysis of socio-economic conditions in
Niger Delta and its implications on policy interventions. A
paper presented at the International Conference on the
Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta. 
Alagoa, E.J. (2005). A history of the Niger Delta. Port Harcourt, 
Nigeria: Onyoma Research Publications. 
Alao, O. A. (2005). Impact of Niger Delta crises on Nigeria’s
national security. Unpublished master’s dissertation, 
Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 
Nigeria. 
Alexei, M. (2000). Stockholder theory. Retrieved 2008 from
www.jstor.org/doi/xm/10.2302/3858020
Aliyu, H. & Mohammed, S. (2008). Public relations and conflict
management. In E. M. Mojaye, E. Arhagba, E. Soola, & L. 
Oso, (Eds), Media, dialogue, peace building and
reconciliation: Conference proceedings, 6-8 August, 2008
(pp.588-592). Abraka: ACCE, Delta State University. 
AM News (1995, November 2). Private investors dump Shell
shares in Britain. AM News, p.16. 
380
Argenti, P.A. & Forman, J. (2002). The power of corporate
communication. New York: McGraw Hill
Asakitikpi, E. A. & Oyelaran, A. P. (2000). Oil extraction and the
socio-cultural impact on peoples of the Niger Delta. In A. 
Osuntokun (Ed), Environmental problems in the Niger
Delta (pp. 173-188). Lagos, Nigeria: Frederich Ebert
Foundation.  
Baskin, O., Aronoff, C. & Lattimore, D. (1997). Public relations:
The profession and the practice. New York: McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc. 
Bassey, N. (2006). Trade and human rights in the Niger Delta of
Nigeria. Retrieved from
http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/06/africa/bassey.htm
Bennett, R. (1999). International business. England: Pearson
Education Limited. 
Bertlett, C. A. & Ghoshal, S. (2000). Transnational management:
Text, cases and readings in cross-border management (3rd
ed). US: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 
Bridges, J. & Nelson, R.A. (2000). Issues management: A
relational approach. In J.A. Ledingham & S.D. Bruning
(Eds), Public relations as relationship management: A
relational approach to public relations (pp. 95-116). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Association. 
Bronn, P. S. (2006). Building corporate brands through community
involvement: Is it exportable? The case of the Ronald
McDonald House in Norway. Journal of Marketing
Communication, 12(4), 309-320
381
Broom, G., Casey, S. & Ritchey, J. (1997). Toward a concept and
theory of organization-public relationships. Journal of
Public Relations Research, 9(2), 83-98
Broom, G.M. & Dozier, D.M. (1990). Using research in public
relations: Applications to program management. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Burton, J. W. (1993). Conflict resolution as a political philosophy. 
In D. J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds), Conflict
resolution theory and practice integration and application.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Cannon, T. (1994). Corporate Responsibility. London: Pitman
Publishing. 
Carroll, A.B. & Buchholtz, A.K. (2000). Business and society, 
ethics and stakeholders management. Cinn, OH: South-
Western College Publishing. 
Chase, H. W. (1982). Issue management conference: A special
report. Corporate Public Issues, 7 (23), 1-2
Chevron (n.d.). History of the company. Retrieved from
http://www.chevron.com/about/leadership/
Chevron (n.d.). Nigeria: Highlights of operation. Retrieved from
http://www.chevron.com/countries/nigeria/
Children kidnapped in Niger Delta. (2007, October 22). BBC
News. Retrieved from www.bbcnews/nigerdelta/kidnap
Chronology of Nigeria militants’ attacks. (2007, February 21). 
Nigeria Masterweb. Retrieved from
http://www.nigeriamasterweb.com
382
Civil Liberty Organization (2002). Blood trial: Repression and
resistance in the Niger Delta. Delta, Nigeria: CLO  
Coombs, T. (2000). Crisis management: Advantages of a relational
perspective. In J.A. Ledingham and S.D. Bruning (Eds), 
Public relations as relationship management: A relational
approach to public relations (pp. 73-93). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Association. 
Coser, L. A. (1956). The function of social conflict. London: The
Free Press. 
Cutlip, S. M., Center, A. H. & Broom, G. M. (1985). Effective
public relations (6th ed). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall
Cutlip, S. M., Center, A. H. & Broom, G. M. (1994). Effective
public relations (7th ed). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall
Daramola, A. C. (2003). Fundamentals of professional public
relations: A global overview. Lagos, Nigeria: CMCIN
Dawson, S., Manderson, L. & Tallo, V. L. (1993). A manual for
the use of focus groups. New York: International Nutrition
Foundation for Developing Countries. 
Donaldo, T. & Preston, L. (1995). The stakeholder theory of
modern corporation: concepts, evidence and implications. 
Academy of Management Review, 20, 65-91. 
Dougherty, D. (1992). Crisis communications. New York: Walker
and Company
383
Edafejirhaye , V. & Edafejirhaye, E. (2008). Effective public
relations and sustainable development in Niger Delta. 
Warri: Vinbeth Publication
Edeogu, C. F. O. (2008). Peace building strategies for peace in the
Niger Delta: A comprehensive four phased peace model. In
International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil
Industry and the Niger Delta, 11-13 March, 2008 (pp. 64-
80).Yenagoa, Bayelsa: Department of Political Science, 
Niger Delta University. 
Esparza, L. & Wilson, M. (1999). Oil for nothing: Multinational
corporation, environmental destruction, death and impunity
in the Niger Delta. A US Non-governmental Delegation Trip
Report, 6-20, September 1999. 
Ezeobi, (2008, February 17). 50 Depressing years of oil in Nigeria. 
Punch, p 20.  
F.O.E. (2005). Communities sue shell to stop Nigerian gas flaring.  
Retrieved from
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/communities
_sue_shell_to_s_20062005.html
Ferguson, M. A. (1984). Building theory in public relations: Inter-
organizational relationships. Paper presented to the public
relations division, at the annual conference of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass
Communication, Gainesville, FL, August. 
Folarin, B. (1998). Issues in applied communication. Ibadan, 
Nigeria: Stirling-Horden Publishers (Nig) Ltd
Folarin, B. (2005). Theories of mass communication: An
introductory text. Lagos, Nigeria: Bakinfol Konsult
384
Freeman, E. & Reed, D. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholder: A
new perspective on corporate governance. In C. Huizinga
(Ed). Corporate governance: A definitive exploration of the
issues. Los Angeles: UCLA Extension Press.  
Freeman, E. & Reed, D. (1983). Stockholders and stakeholder: A
new perspective on corporate governance. California
Management Review, 3 (25), p88-106
Freeman, E. R. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder
approach. Boston: Pitman
Freeman, R. E., Winks, A. C. & Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder
theory and “The corporate objective revisited”. 
Organizational Science, 15 (3), 364-369. 
Friedman, M. (1970, September 13), The social responsibility of
business is to increase profit. The New York Times
Magazine. Retrieved from
http://www.colordo.edu/tudentgroups/libertarian/isues/fried
man-soc-respo-business. 
Furneaux, B. (2006). Stakeholder theory. Retrieved from
http://www.istheory.yorku.ca/stakeholdertheory.htm
Grunig, J. E. & Hunt, T. (1984). Managing public relations. New
York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston. 
Grunig, J. E. & Huang, Y, -H. (2000). From organizational
effectiveness to relationship indicators: Antecedents of
relationships, public relations strategies, and relationship
outcomes. In J.A. Ledingham, and S.D. Bruning (Eds), 
Public relations as relationship management: A relational
approach to public relations (pp. 23-54). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
385
Grunig, J. E. (1993). Image and substance: From symbolic to
behavioural relationships. Public Relations Review, 19 (2),
121-139
Grunig, L.A., Grunig, J.E. & Ehling, W.P. (1992). What is an
effective organization? In J.E. Grunig, D.M. Dozier, W.P. 
Ehling, L.A. Grunig, F.C. Repper & J. White (Eds), 
Excellence in public relations and communication
management (pp. 65-90). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. 
Harper, E. (2003, July). Nigeria oil economy. Online NewsHour. 
Retrieved from
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/nigeria/oil.html
Hartman, L. P. (2005). Perspectives in business ethics (3rd ed). 
New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 
Hinman, P. (1993), Greenpeace exposes shell’s pollution record. 
Retrieved from http://www.greenleft.org.au/1993/112/5579
History of Corporate (n.d.). The history of the large company
model: Chevron corporation. Retrieved from
http://www.thehistoryofcorporate.com/companies-by-
industry/energy/chevron-corporation/
Hon, L.C. & Brunner, B.R. (2002). Measuring public relations
among students and administrators at the University of
Florida. Journal of Communication Management, 6(3), 227-
238
Hon, L.C. and Grunig, J.E. (1999). Guideline for measuring
relationships in public relations. Gainesville, FL: Institute
for Public Relations. 
HRW. (2003). The Warri crises: Fueling violence. [Electronic
version]. Human Right Watch, 15(18), 1-30. 
386
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sustainable-
development
                    
http://www.nigerdeltacampaign.com/html/enviromental_po
lution.html
Huang, Y, -H. (1997). Public relations strategies, relational
outcomes, and conflict management strategies. Doctoral
dissertation. College Park, MD: University of Maryland
Human Rights Watch (1999). The price of oil: Corporate
responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria’s oil
producing communities. Washington D.C.: Human Rights
Watch/Africa
Ibaba, S.I (2005). Understanding the Niger Delta crises. Port
Harcourt, Nigeria: Amethyst & Colleagues Publishers. 
Idemudia, U. (2007). Community perceptions and expectations:
Reinventing the wheels of corporate social responsibility
practice in Nigerian oil industry. Business and Society
Review, 112 (3), 369-405
Igben, H. G. O. (2008). Public relations, issues and conflict
management in Nigeria. In E. M. Mojaye, E. Arhagba, E. 
Soola & L. Oso (Eds), Media, Dialogue, Peace Building
and Reconciliation: Conference Proceedings, 6-8 August, 
2008 (pp.602-610). Abraka: ACCE, Delta State University. 
Ikalama, C. (2006). Grievances and the emergence of militant
groups in the Niger Delta, its implication for Nigeria’s
national security (Unpublished master’s thesis). Institute of
African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Jones, G. R. (2004). Organizational theory, design, and cases: Text
and Cases (4th ed). New York: Pearson Education Ltd. 
387
Ledingham, J. A (2008) A chronology of organization-stakeholder
relationship with recommendations concerning practitioner
adoption of the relational perspective. Journal of Promotion
Management, 14, 243-262
Ledingham, J. A. (2003). Explicating relationship management as
a general theory of public relations. Journal of Public
relations Research, 15(2), 181-198
Mayer, D. O. (nd). Stakeholder theory. Retrieved from
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/sel-
str/stakeholder-theory.html
Mojaye, E.M.V. (2007). Communication for people-centered
development of Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the globalization
era. In E. V. Mojaye,  A. Salawu & O. O. Oyewo (Eds.). 
Ebenezer Soola Conference on Communication: Proceedings
(Pp 74-79). Ibadan: Ebenezer Soola Conference on
Communication. 
Moon, J. (2001). Business social responsibility: A source of social
capital? Reason in Practice: Journal Philosophy of
Management, 1 (3), 385-403
Mtchell, R., Agle, B., & Wood, D. (1997). Towards a theory of
stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the
principle of who and what really counts. Academy of
Management Review, 22, 853-886  
Mustapha, A. R. (2000). Transformation of minority identities in
post-colonial Nigeria. In A. Jega (Ed). Identity
transformation and identity politics under structural
adjustment in Nigeria. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
388
Naanen, B. (1995). Oil producing minorities and the restructuring
on Nigerian federalism: The case of Ogoni people. Journal
of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 32 (1), 46-78
Nafzinger, E. W.  (2009). Economic regress and Niger Delta. 
Journal of African Development, 11 (2), 57- 77
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) (2006). NDDC
Acts. 
Niger Delta situation will determine direction of oil sector. (1999, 
November 29). The Guardian, P. 28. 
Nwajiaku, K. (2006) Between discourse and reality. Cahiers
d’etudes Africaines, 178, 496-496  
Nwankwo, C. & Ezeobi, O. (2008, May 15). Nigeria lost N150bn
to pipeline vandals in eight years. The Punch.  Retrieved
from www.punchng.com/articles.aspx
Nwaobi, G.B. (2005), Oil policy in Nigeria: A critical assessment
(1985-1992). Retrieved from
http://ideas.repec.org/e/pnw1.html
Obi, C. I. (1999). Globalization and environmental conflict in
Africa. African Journal of Political Science, 4 (1),   
Ofehe, S. (2008), Environmental pollution. Retrieved from  
                    
http://www.nigerdeltacampaign.com/html/enviromental_po
lution.html
  
Ogbogbo, C.B.N. (2006). Niger Delta and the resource control
conflict, 1960-1995 (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation). 
389
Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 
Nigeria. 
Ogedengbe, K. (2005). Principles and practice of community
relations. Lagos, Nigeria: PR Plus Consulting. 
Okonta, I. (2000). The lingering crisis in Nigeria’s Niger Delta
and suggestions for a peaceful resolution. Retrieved from
www.iags.org/Niger_Delta_book.pdf
Olorode, O. (1998). Imperialism, neocolonialism and the extrative
industries in Nigeria. In O. Olorode, W. Raji, J. Ogunye &
T. Oladunjoye (Eds). Ken Saro Wiwa and the crises of the
Nigerian State. Lagos: Committee for Defense of Human
Rights (CDHR)
Oloruntimilehin, B. O. & Ayoade, J. A. A. (2002). An overview of
conflict in Nigeria: 1984-2000. Ibadan: Development
Policy Centre. 
Omamofe, J. P. (2006). The Conflict over political control of the
Warri territory by the Itsekiri, Ijaws and Urhobos
(Unpublished master’s thesis). Institute of African Studies, 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Omoweh, D. A. (2010) Political economy of natural resource
struggle in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Covenant University
Public Lecture Series, 1 (33), 3-42
Onua, N. (2005). Ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta region of
Nigeria: A study of eleme and Okrika communities
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation) Institute of African
Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria
Orubu, C. O., Odusola, A. & Ehwarieme, W. (2004). The Nigerian
oil industry: Environmental diseconomies, management
strategies and the need for community involvement. Journal
of Human Ecology, 16 (3), 203-214
390
Osagie, S. O., Ibaba, S. I. & Watts, M. (2009). Introduction:
Reflections on the Nigerian State, oil industry and the
Niger Delta. Journal of African Development, 11 (2), 9- 26
Otitie, O. (2001). On conflicts, their resolution, transformation, and
management. In O. Otitie & I. O. Albert (Eds), Community
conflicts in Nigeria: Management, resolution and
transformation. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. 
Park, R. E. & Burgess, E. W. (1921). Introduction to the science of
sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Peak, W. J. (1991). Community relations. In P. Lessly (Ed), Hand
book of public relations (4th ed). New York: AMACOM
Pease, K. S. (2003). International organization: Perspectives on
governance in the twenty-first century (2nd ed). New Jersey:
Prentice Hall. 
Pease, K. S. (2003). International organizations: Perspectives on
governance in the twenty-first century. New Jersey:
Pearson Education Ltd
Perrealt, Jr. E. & McCarthy, J. (2005). Basic Marketing: A Global
Managerial Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies
Inc
Philips, R. (2004). Some key questions about stakeholder theory. 
[Electronic version]. Ivey Business Journal, 9 (6), 1-4. 
Ray, S. J. (1999). Strategic communication in crisis management
lessons from the airline industry. Westport, CT: Quorum
Rim-Rukeh, A., Ogbemi, O. B. & Imide, I. O. (2008). Corporate
social responsibility as a strategy to reducing conflict
391
between oil companies and host communities in the Niger
Delta, Nigeria. In E. M. Mojaye, E. Arhagba, E. Soola & L. 
Oso (Eds), Media, Dialogue, Peace Building and
Reconciliation: Conference Proceedings, 6-8 August, 2008
(pp.645-657). Abraka: ACCE, Delta State University. 
Ritzer, G. & Goodman, D. J. (2004). Sociological theory (6th ed). 
New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 
Ritzer, G. (2003). Contemporary sociological theory and its
classical roots: The basics. New York: McGraw-Hill
Companies, Inc. 
Rizvi, H. (2005), Shell ordered to stop wasteful, poisonous ‘gas
flaring’ in Niger Delta. Retrieved from
http://www.commondreams.org/headline
Rugman, A. M. (2006) International business (4th ed). England:
Pearson Education Limited
Saiyou, B. (2006). Transnational oil corporation relationship with
oil producing communities in Bayelsa State: A comparative
analysis (Unpublished doctorial dissertation). Institute of
African Studies, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Sallot, L.M., Lyon, L.J., Acosta-Alzaru, C. & Jones, K. O. (2003). 
From aardvark to zebra: A new millennium analysis of
theory development in public relations academic journals. 
Journal of Public Relations Research, 15 (1), 27-90
Sandole, D. J. D (1993). Paradigm, theories, and metaphors in
conflict and conflict resolution: Coherence or confusion. In
D.J.D Sandole & H. V. Merwe (Eds), Conflict resolution
392
theory and practice, integration and application. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Schelling, T. (1960). “The strategy of conflict” cited in
Cunningham, W.G. Jr (1998). Conflict Theory and Conflict
in North Ireland (Unpublished thesis). Literature and
Political Studies, University of Auckland. 
Seitel, F.P. (2007). The practice of public relations (10th ed). New
York: Prentice Hall
Shell (n.d.). Company history. Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shell_Nigeria
Simon, R. (1982). Gramsci’s political thoughts. London: Lawrence
Wishart. 
Sobowale, I. (2008). Scientific journalism: What tools for the
precision journalist? (2nd ed). Lagos, Nigeria: Idosa
Konsult
Soremekun, K. & Obadare, E. (1998). The politics of oil
corporations in Nigeria. In O. Olorode, W. Raji, J. Ogunye
& T. Oladunjoye (Eds), Ken Saro Wiwa and the crises of
the Nigerian State. Lagos, Nigeria: Committee for Defence
of Human Rights (CDHR)
Stakeholder Theory (2008). Wikipedia. Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/stakeholder_theory
Stephens, K., Malone, P. & Bailey, C. (2005). Communicating
with stakeholders during a crisis: Evaluating message
strategies. Journal of Business Communication, 4 (42),
p309-419
393
Sundaram, A., & Inkpen, A. (2004). The corporate objective
revisited. Organ. Sci. 15(3), 350-363. 
Sustainable Development (2007). Wikipedia. Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sustainable
development(corporate)#cite_note-0
Thomsen, S.R. (1997). Public relations in the new millennium:
Understanding the forces that are shaping the profession. 
Public Relations Quarterly, 42(1), 11-18
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006). Niger
Delta Human Development Report.UNDP. Retrieved from
http://web.ng.undp.org/documents/nigeria-niger-delta-
hrd.pdf
United Nations Development Programme, (2006). Niger Delta
Human Development Report. Abuja: UNDP
Wall, S. and Rees, B. (2004). International business (2nd ed).
England: Pearson Education Limited
Wallace, R.A. & Wolf, A. (2006). Contemporary sociological
theory: Expanding the classical tradition (6th ed.). New
Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Watts, M. (2009). The rule of oil: Petro-politics and the anatomy of
an insurgency. Journal of African Development, 11 (2), 27-
56
Wikipedia (2009). Stakeholder (Corporate). Retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_(corporate)#cite_n
ote-0
394
Wilmot, W. W. & Hocher (1998). Interpersonal conflict. Boston:
McGraw-Hill. 
Will amnesty bring peace to Niger Delta? (2009, November 8). 
British Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8291336.stm
Wimmer, R.D & Dominic, J.R. (2003). Mass media research: An
introduction. United States of America: Wadsworth. 
Zartman, W. I. (1991). Conflict resolving in Africa. Washington DC:
The Bookings Institute.


Buy your books fast and straightforward online - at one of world’s 
fastest growing online book stores! Environmentally sound due to 
Print-on-Demand technologies.
Buy your books online at
www.get-morebooks.com
Kaufen Sie Ihre Bücher schnell und unkompliziert online – auf einer 
der am schnellsten wachsenden Buchhandelsplattformen weltweit!
Dank Print-On-Demand umwelt- und ressourcenschonend produzi-
ert.
Bücher schneller online kaufen
www.morebooks.de
VDM Verlagsservicegesellschaft mbH
Heinrich-Böcking-Str. 6-8 Telefon: +49 681 3720 174 info@vdm-vsg.de
D - 66121 Saarbrücken Telefax: +49 681 3720 1749 www.vdm-vsg.de



